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ABSTRACT 
 
In each of the media systems identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004), autonomy, 
professional norms and a public service ethic are central indicators of journalism 
professionalisation, with codes of ethics and accountability solutions, such as press 
councils, germane. In the Liberal North Atlantic system, where Ireland is placed by Hallin 
and Mancini, autonomy and professional norms are well established pillars in academia’s 
understanding of journalism. Indeed, the theoretical work on press and media systems 
(Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956; Merrill 1974; Altschull 1984; Habermas 1989; 
McQuail 2010) recognises these characteristics. The idea of a public service orientation 
via a system of media accountability opens up a potentially valuable avenue for 
examining the journalistic professionalisation process. In Liberal North Atlantic 
countries, non-institutionalised or informal self-regulation of the press is common, Hallin 
and Mancini argued. The literature, however, suggests this regulation (press councils) has 
failed to provide the public with robust media accountability outcomes. Research in 
Canada (Pritchard 2000), the United States (Ugland 2000 & 2008), and in Britain 
(O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000 2004, 2015) support the conclusion that industry 
power over self-regulatory instruments has infected structures, procedures and decision-
making. Thus, this study examines a new regulatory model which has received little 
attention to date – the independent and legislatively recognised Press Council of Ireland. 
Here, the formal process of institutionalisation has seen the codification of an accepted 
set of professional norms via a code of ethics thereby apparently strengthening the 
autonomy of journalists by clearly defining the journalistic role for industry and the 
public while also strengthening the concept of journalistic accountability. This thesis 
investigates whether the institutionalisation of independent press regulation in the Irish 
case has established a robust accountability framework for the press.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1: Introduction 
In early July 2011, the Guardian newspaper carried a news story claiming that journalists 
at the News of the World had hacked the phone of school girl Milly Dowler during the 
investigation into her disappearance in 2002 (Davies and Hill 2011). The story - the 
culmination of years of disclosures about practices in News International, publisher of 
the News of the World, and the wider British press - prompted then Prime Minister David 
Cameron to establish a public inquiry. On July 8, Mr. Cameron appointed Mr. Justice 
Brian Leveson to examine the culture, practice and ethics of the British press. Beginning 
in August 2011, the inquiry ran until July 2012. It investigated the relationship between 
the press and the police, the links between the press and politicians, phone hacking and 
press regulation. In November 2012, Justice Leveson (2012) published his report. In 
almost every respect, the inquiry was scathing of the British print media. 
Notwithstanding the exposure of questionable practices by journalists at the public 
hearings and in the inquiry’s final report, much of the post-publication debate focused on 
press regulation. Justice Leveson found that the Press Complaints Commission (PCC), a 
self-regulatory complaints handling mechanism for the UK print media, was unfit for 
purpose. He argued the PCC had “serious structural deficiencies” (2012: 1576), was 
given “barely enough money” to perform its regulatory functions (2012: 1577), 
associated itself too closely with the press, failed to initiate its own investigations “other 
than in circumstances where an investigation was needed to head off criticism of the press 
or self-regulation” (2012: 1577), and did not have sufficient powers of investigation or 
sanction. Leveson concluded that these failures “fatally undermined the PCC and caused 
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policy makers and the public to lose trust in the self-regulatory system” provided by the 
PCC (2012: 1579). 
Prior to the publication of Justice Leveson’s final report, in March 2012, the PCC took 
the decision to close even though criticism of its work was nothing new at that point. The 
complaints handling service had been the subject of regular negative comment that started 
almost as soon as the first adjudications were handed down and had been ongoing since 
it began dealing with complaints in 1991 (O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000, 2004, 
2015). Bingham (2007) highlighted how early criticism of the PCC included the supposed 
watering down of its code of practice and a failure to publish rationales for decisions. 
Indeed, within two years, David Calcutt, a barrister, delivered a “devastating indictment” 
of the PCC in a review of press regulation (Bingham 2007: 86). Calcutt concluded the 
PCC was not independent from industry and did not command public confidence. He 
argued it was a body “set up by the industry, financed by the industry, dominated by the 
industry, and operating a code of practice devised by the industry” which, he concluded, 
was “over-favourable to the industry” (cited in Bingham 2007: 86). Calcutt had also 
criticised the PCC’s predecessor, the Press Council, in an earlier inquiry (O’Malley and 
Soley 2000). In fact, criticism of that regulatory system dated back as far as 1961 (Frost 
2015).  
The closure of the PCC was reported as an attempt by the newspaper industry to move 
forward with a “clean slate” and come up with a new system after Justice Leveson had 
outlined his proposals for press regulation (O’Carroll 2012). In his final report, Justice 
Leveson called for a new independent and incentivised system of regulation that was 
supported by legislation but designed by industry. The proposals presented a third way 
between self-regulation and state regulation – and despite some small differences, 
mirrored the establishment of a similar system in Ireland via the Press Council of Ireland 
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(PCI) which was established in 2008. Indeed, in the aftermath of the report’s publication, 
some noted that Irish editions of UK titles had signed up to such as system in Ireland. 
Nick Clegg, the then Deputy Prime Minister, said these newspapers had yet to “complain 
of a deeply illiberal press environment” under the system (House of Commons 2012). 
However, the majority of the UK press, and Mr. Cameron, rejected the proposals. The 
Prime Minister said he had “serious concerns and misgivings” about statutory recognition 
for a system of press regulation. He argued Leveson’s proposals could impinge press 
freedom, be open to political interference and would not, in any case, require the backing 
of legislation to provide newspapers with incentives to join (House of Commons 2012). 
The majority of newspapers including The Times, The Daily Telegraph and The Sun came 
down against the proposals for statutory recognition while The Guardian and The 
Financial Times favoured a stronger regulator (Moura and de Guzman 2012). 
Eventually, the UK press established another form of self-regulation known as the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). It has been set-up outside of any 
legislative recognition process and does not have the full co-operation of the industry as 
The Guardian and The Financial Times remain outside its scope. 
Despite the inclusion of the word ‘independent’ in its title, ISPO exhibits many of the 
same characteristics of self-regulation. It is funded by the newspaper industry and Frost 
(2015) argued its failure to meet the standard set down by Leveson mean it is likely to 
meet the same fate and be subject to the same criticism as the PCC. Some have already 
suggested IPSO is a “total failure” (Toynbee 2015) while Alan Moses, its chairman, has 
praised the new regulator and highlighted its independence from industry (Greenslade 
2016). Moses has highlighted changes to the initial IPSO structures that he believes have 
empowered the regulator and argued it has strong power to direct where, when and how 
member publications print adjudications (Greenslade 2016).  
4 
 
It will be some time before a substantive examination of IPSO’s work can be 
undertaken. However, despite the widespread debate about press regulatory approaches 
that has intensified in recent years, an initial examination of the literature on press 
regulation showed there has been limited substantive research on how press self-
regulation, or indeed independent regulation, ensure and enforce media accountability. 
In the research that has been conducted, in Canada (Pritchard 2000), the United States 
(Ugland 2000 & 2008), and in Britain (O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000 2004, 
2015), the findings, which will be analysed in more detail in later chapters, support the 
conclusion that industry power over self-regulatory instruments has infected structures, 
procedures and decision-making, resulting in credibility problems and failures. However, 
while these examples of research contribute to the academic literature on this subject, 
they do not substantively deal with one of the key criticisms of self-regulation, namely, 
that self-regulation lacks strong sanction powers for newspapers which breach ethical 
guidelines and fail to enforce the powers they do have. Donovan et al (2012) found that 
there is a significant lack of academic research on the effectiveness of enforcement 
powers for regulatory bodies, not just in the field of journalism. They quote a number of 
conceptual and theoretical studies of self-regulation (Heritier and Eckert 2007; Hemphill 
2003; Porter and Ronit 2006; Ashby et al. 2004) but point out that there are “few 
empirical analyses of effectiveness”. 
This study intends the fill that gap and will examine – for the first time – how a 
supposedly stronger method of press regulation, known as institutionalised independent 
regulation, operates within a media accountability framework and whether it offers any 
benefits when compared to self-regulation. This study will examine a new regulatory 
model which has received little attention to date – the independent, legislatively 
recognised and incentivised PCI. As Chapter 3 will detail, there was little non-legal 
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regulation of the press in Ireland until the PCI was established in 2008 as an attempt to 
head off statutory measures that were under consideration by the Irish Government in the 
last decade. All of the major newspapers in operation in Ireland signed up to the PCI and 
it has been the subject of praise for its work, not least by Leveson. The Irish case operates 
in a similar fashion to the PCC in that it is primarily a body for the handling and 
adjudication of complaints. Indeed, one can argue that the formal process of 
institutionalisation and legal recognition has seen the codification of an accepted set of 
professional norms (code of ethics) thereby apparently strengthening the autonomy of 
journalists by clearly defining the journalistic role for industry and the public while also 
apparently strengthening the concept of journalistic accountability. Thus, this thesis will 
investigate what impact, if any, the institutionalisation of independent press regulation 
has had on the concept of media accountability. 
Chapter 2 begins by examining the theoretical literature in an attempt to make sense 
of concepts of journalistic and media accountability functions in a democratic society. 
The chapter then turns to the broad philosophical notions of libertarianism and social 
responsibility as two defining concepts of journalism. This discussion provides a 
foundation for examining what responsibilities journalism has to society and what society 
expects of the press and the wider media. Only once these responsibilities are codified 
and accepted can society then hold the media accountable when it fails to comply. The 
concept of accountability is examined in the context of press regulation with forms of 
media accountability systems also assessed. To conclude, this chapter discusses the 
concept of the press council and reviews the literature on self-regulatory press councils 
in order to establish their strengths and weaknesses before the study turns, to examine in 
detail, Irish press regulation in later chapters. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1: A theoretical framework for press regulation 
Assessing press regulation requires a broader understanding of the media’s role in 
society. To date, ethical regulation of the press has been based on the press accepting or 
being assigned responsibilities for which individual journalists or media organizations 
are held accountable. Media systems theory attempts to identify specific characteristics 
of the journalistic media to categorize media systems at the level of the nation state. As a 
theoretical genre it establishes what responsibilities are assigned or expected of the press 
and how such responsibilities might be enforced. Thus, a review of the relevant media 
systems theory should provide a sound basis for examining press regulatory issues.    
The 1956 work by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, was 
an early serious effort at theoretically categorizing a system for understanding the modern 
press and its relationship with society. The authors identified four main theories which 
they labeled as authoritarian, soviet communism, libertarian and social responsibility. In 
the Western context, the concepts of responsibility and accountability are among the key 
contrasts found across the libertarian and social responsibility strands. As Nerone 
correctly pointed out (1995: 18), ‘Four Theories’ argued that the structure, policy and 
behavior of a communications system reflects the society in which it operates. Indeed, 
among the strongest supporting arguments for adopting media systems theory is its ability 
to identify societal influences and treat them in a flexible manner.  
However, despite its success as a manual, ‘Four Theories’ has been criticised for a 
variety of structural and methodological failures (Nerone 1995; Hallin and Mancini 2004; 
Nordenstreng 2009; Christians 2009). Nevertheless, as Altschull correctly pointed out, 
the work is discernible in later media systems theory, primarily as thematic elements 
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within broader treatments of media systems, while “all press systems endure the doctrine 
of social responsibility” (1984: 288).   
Later work by Merill (1974) condensed ‘Four Theories’ into two theories: 
authoritarian and libertarian, while Altschull (1995) argued that there were three models: 
market, Marxist and advancing. Similarly, Nerone (1995: 17-82) argued that the 1956 
work incorrectly identified four distinct theories. For Nerone, it explained one theory – 
classic libertarianism – and used four examples to support it. Thus, ‘Four Theories’ gave 
the incorrect impression that a press system could be defined by one coherent theory, 
according to Nerone. He pointed out that such a belief is a “useful assumption for abstract 
discussion of press operation” but not for examining “specific historical situations in 
which theories always overlap and in which the various actors are often motivated by 
quite different notions” (1995: 19-20).  
Nerone, however, identified a more fundamental flaw with ‘Four Theories’. He 
argued that the 1956 work was over-simplified in its failure to recognize the influence 
that concentrations of private power and markets have over media. Nerone argued that 
Siebert, Peterson and Schramm placed too much emphasis on freedom of the press in a 
political context as a freedom from the state, as opposed to other forces. For Nerone, this 
ignored other sources of control, such as the market. Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 
(1956) emphasised the evolution of libertarianism to a more self-aware socially 
responsible press, a transition which saw a greater industry acceptance of forms of 
regulation. However, the change was an industry idea, Nerone argued:Thus the myth of 
a free press in the service of society exists because it is in the interest of media owners to 
perpetuate it (1995: 29). 
More recent theoretical work has attempted to solve these particular deficiencies. For 
example, McQuail (2003, 2010) emphasised the influential role that non-state actors 
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have. In the first of his four categories of media systems, the liberal-pluralist or market 
model, the free market is the solution to regulatory and quality issues. McQuail’s second 
category, the social responsibility or public interest model, confirms that mechanisms of 
accountability exist with obligations that go beyond media self-interest. Other media 
markets have developed around the concept of professionalism – McQuail’s third 
category1. Here,  
the choice of roles for society and the guardianship of standards belong 
in the model to the ‘press’ itself and to the journalistic profession. They 
are…still the best guarantors of the interests of the public since their 
primary concern is serving the public’s need for information… The 
institutional and professional autonomy of journalism is also the best 
guarantee of an adequate watch being kept on those in power (McQuail 
2010: 184) 
The foundation for the idea that the market and the media institution play key roles in 
defining their own parameters came from Habermas (1989). He argued that a bourgeois 
public sphere emerged in Western Europe at the end of 18th century as a social space 
which allowed private individuals to discuss public issues with equality and reason. This 
social transformation, which resulted in the development of a middle class established 
from the ranks of the working classes, produced an opening between civil society and the 
state. This space became a public sphere where citizens debated on government and the 
state: a space for journalism. Newspapers, originally intended for the mercantile classes, 
became political organs. As time progressed, Habermas argued, this sphere eventually 
became deeply politicised and in turn began to collapse by the mid to late 19th century 
with the rise in power of capital. Schudson (2011: 58-62) noted Habermas’s belief that 
                                                 
1 McQuail’s fourth category, the alternative media model, relates to mainly non-mainstream 
media where the rights of subcultures are recognised.  
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capitalism refudalised public life with power falling into the hands of the few who owned 
news organisations. Newspapers became a medium for culture as an object of 
consumption. Thus, Habermas argued that the notion of the public sphere - noted by 
McQuail (2003: 61-62) as the media’s role in promoting an effective public space for the 
free and open exchange of ideas “in which diverse voices can be heard, ideas exchanged 
and debated, issues of moment debated in a rational way, and public opinion formed” - 
was squandered.  
The work of Habermas is central in highlighting the role of non-state actors when 
evaluating media systems theory and underlines the arguments of Nerone and others. In 
modern theory, this strand of thinking forms the basis of the political economy approach 
for understanding media systems, the interplay between media and publics and, 
ultimately, how responsibilities and accountability combine to form regulatory 
approaches to journalism.  
 
2.1.1: The political economy tradition 
The political economy approach takes heed of two core components (McChesney 1998: 
3-12). First, it addresses the nature of the relationship between media and society. Second, 
it looks at how ownership support mechanisms (e.g. advertising) and government policies 
influence media behaviour and content. For McChesney, political economy analysis is 
key in capitalist societies where dominant commercial media systems exist. Thus, such 
an approach may appear at odds with media systems analysis, although, as a reading of 
McChesney would suggest, recognising a political economy analysis overcomes 
weaknesses exhibited in ‘Four Theories’ and other systems theory. 
For McChesney, the political economy approach tends to focus on the link between 
advertising and news output, and on the influence that the increasing concentration of 
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ownership has over the news media. However, the political economy tradition also 
recognises the democratic responsibilities of media communications. Thus, political 
economy analyses are driven by “the notion that democracy is predicated upon an 
informed participating citizenry, and that a political culture typified by an active and 
informed citizenry can only be generated in a final analysis by a healthy and vibrant 
media system” and that “the political economy of communication, at its best, should 
develop models of democratic communication that emerge organically from its critique 
of the commercial media system” (1998: 8).  
However, McChesney correctly pointed out that capitalism’s consequences - 
including strong class inequality and possessive individualism - display an anti-
democratic edge. As a result “the political economy of communication has focused on 
how capitalist control and commercial support of media have tended to serve elite 
interests in a manner that is anathema not only to an informed citizenry but to core 
democratic values as well” (1998: 8).Therefore, the approach exhibits a strongly 
normative critique of the ways in which state policies and the methods of ownership, 
management (regulation and accountability) and subsidisation affect the capacity of the 
media to serve their democratic functions and responsibilities.  
The political economy approach has evolved considerably. Herman and Chomsky 
(2010) proposed a propaganda model which argued that the media serve and 
propagandise on behalf of powerful societal interests which control and finance the 
media. Under the model, ‘flak’ is the ability to complain about the media’s treatment of 
news - a form or function of media accountability - but this area is influenced and 
controlled by the same underlying power sources and also plays a key role in fixing basic 
journalistic principles and dominant ideologies suitable to capital. Such structural factors 
do not produce homogenous results, Herman and Chomsky pointed out, and indeed 
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dissenting or alternative viewpoints can and do emerge. But such alternative views are 
relegated and marginalised according to their propagandistic, political economy 
paradigm.  
For Herman and Chomsky, the propaganda model explains media behaviour and 
performance according to a corporate character and an integration into the political 
economy of the dominant economic system. Indeed, they believe that ‘flak’ has 
strengthened as a mechanism of elite influence over the media, which suggests they 
believe that regulatory and accountability mechanisms of the press serve the media’s 
corporate ends rather than the public and broader society. Herman and Chomsky’s 
position is that the neoliberal agenda has resulted in a vast swathe of those who believe 
in the benevolence of the market and who believe all non-market mechanisms are suspect. 
Journalism has internalised this ideology, Herman and Chomsky concluded, and 
ultimately this has weakened the public sphere. 
The political economy analysis cannot be ignored. However, extreme forms of the 
theory, such as Herman and Chomsky’s, exhibit their own weaknesses making them 
somewhat unsuitable for assessing normative concepts around regulation, responsibilities 
and accountability. Schudson (1989, 2011) supported such a conclusion and is dismissive 
of the hypodermic model of the media as a form of propaganda that injects ideas into a 
passive and defenceless public at the behest of wealthy, corporate owners (2011: 16-17). 
Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is a “misleading and mischievous stance” for 
four reasons (2011: 31-34). First, Schudson disagreed with the propaganda model’s 
comparison between Pravda and the New York Times, arguing that the latter’s approach 
to professional and ethical journalism clearly differs from that of Communist Russia. 
Second, he pointed out there is a “vital arena of legitimate controversy” (2011: 32) in 
journalism, outside of a determinant focus on capitalism. Third, there are multiple voices 
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in the US news media while historical and recent examples have shown it keen to pursue 
scandals which do not tally with the desire of a corporate system. And fourth, the media 
are obligated to maintain credibility with readers.  
Nevertheless, the sheer influence that political economy theory has had on media 
studies means it is important to recognise its potential in identifying possible weaknesses 
in media system theory such as those in ‘Four Theories’.  While Schudson argued (1989: 
266-270) against political economy as a theory often caricatured as conspiracy, which, in 
its simplest form is easily dismissed, he pointed out that more sophisticated versions “not 
only add to but are essential to an understanding of the generation of news” and to how 
media systems operate (1989: 267). The political economy approach looks at the big 
picture, he pointed out, rather than the minutiae of journalism convention. And it is at 
this level that the approach is strongest and where journalism operates in conjunction 
with and alongside official, elite points of view, both political and corporate.  
Such a measured political economy approach ultimately contributes to an analysis of 
concepts of journalistic responsibility, accountability and regulation. Much criticism of 
media accountability has focused on structural and operational flaws which favour 
corporate media owners, and as a result these media regulatory efforts framed within a 
context of accountability do little more than maintain the status quo, despite promising 
reform of journalistic standards and quality as a means to improving the public sphere. 
Nevertheless, establishing a suitable media systems framework is essential for the 
analysis of press regulation which follows this chapter. Thus, the question arises: if the 
political economy analysis of ‘Four Theories’ concluded that it is ultimately flawed, what 
other media system theory is suitable as a framework mechanism for the study of systems 
of press regulation? 
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2.1.2: Schudson and Bourdieu 
Schudson (1989, 1997, 2011) incorporates political economy approaches, but stops short 
of singling out particular media systems, instead offering an overall analysis of the 
potential for the presence of particular characteristics. Schudson’s first category is the 
macro-institutional approach, which, along with political economy approaches, 
minimises the role of human agency; favouring the argument that structural conditions 
account for most features of the news and its relationship with society. Thus, the focus in 
this regard has been on the economic with the categorisation founded on the basis that 
ownership and profit damage the media and ultimately democracy, rather than on the 
political element of news which reinforced the definition of the political situation offered 
by the political elite. 
Schudson’s second category is the micro-institutional and mainstream sociology 
approach. It promotes the power of routines, journalistic conventions and the social 
pressures on journalists as a means for understanding journalistic output. It favours the 
view of the building of a “socially constructed” world by journalists rather than an 
objective truth and is marked by the professionalisation and normalisation of journalists 
into becoming accepted journalists working to the same concept of social construction. 
The micro-institutional approach accepts a framing of news which operates to fit 
predetermined, successful and accepted narratives; the reduction of complex narratives 
to binary choices or simplicity. At the centre of news generation (1989: 270-275) is the 
link between reporter and official, the interaction of the representatives of the news 
bureaucracies and the government bureaucracies. This makes the relationship an 
important tool for the state as it tends to dominate the agenda due to the importance 
attached to sources – the majority of which are official – which is part of journalism’s 
conventions. 
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Schudson’s final category is the cultural, or “culturological” (1989: 275-279) 
approach. It emphasises the role of human agency which is constrained by cultural 
archetypes where journalists feel compelled to conform to existing myths and narratives. 
It is concerned with symbolic determinants of news in the relation between facts and 
symbols rather than between people. This concept is related to the idea of hegemony as 
the ruling class’s domination through ideology, typically through the shaping of popular 
consent. For Schudson, it is about reinforcing the conventional moral order of society, a 
moral order that has been established by cultural development. The concept is related to 
the idea of the “news sense” as an undefinable element which news people possess so 
that they recognise news when it happens. 
Schudson’s work is particularly useful for the recognition within the macro-
institutional setting of the structural influences which dominate the media’s relationship 
with society. In addition, the micro-institutional reference to the professionalisation of 
journalists is germane. However, Schudson’s work is focused on the structure of news 
and the journalistic process, rather than the relationship between the news and other 
stakeholders. Thus, while particularly useful, it is not entirely suitable as a theoretical 
framework for this study. 
At another spectrum of the theoretical conceptualization of the press is Pierre 
Bourdieu, the French philosopher. Bourdieu described journalism as a field which is a 
“structured social space” where actors, in this case journalists, struggle for the 
transformation and the preservation of the field (Benson and Neveu 2005: 30). Each field 
is centred around the struggle between economic and cultural forces, perhaps even more 
so in journalism (Benson and Neveu 2005: 4). Bourdieu argued that a field has three 
elements – doxa, habitus and capital. Each are suggestive of the internal dynamics within 
journalism on the micro level of journalism practice despite the arguments of others who 
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describe Bourdieu’s work as being on a meso-level (Neveu 2007: 344). For Bourdieu, 
fields are dynamic and influenced by internal conflicts which tend to reproduce and 
reaffirm them (Benson and Neveu 2005: 6).  
However, Bourdieu accepted that external shocks can bring about changes also, and 
distort the field. Thus, a political economist may argue that in the modern western 
capitalistic society, journalism has moved so close to the economic field it exerts a pulling 
influence on other fields toward the economic model. Indeed, Benson and Neveu (ibid) 
argued this point in highlighting the influential role in the social and political spheres 
occupied by journalism. Nevertheless, on the micro journalism practice level, Bourdieu 
is positive about the possibilities of autonomy despite the inherent problems with the 
concept concerning the economic influence and the likelihood that journalism is often, as 
he argues, a “weakly autonomous field” (2005: 33). 
Field theory positions itself precisely between those approaches 
(political economy or cultural) that commit the ‘short-circuit’ fallacy 
and news production directly to the interests of broad social classes or 
the national society, and those (organisational) that focus too narrowly 
on particular news producers. Field research thus calls for the 
examination of “institutional logics”: the simultaneous analysis of 
social structures and cultural forms, as well as the complex interplay 
between the two (ibid: 12) 
Bourdieu’s work, while regarded by many of those cited as seminal, is not exempt 
from academic criticism (e.g. Neveu 2007). Indeed, for the purposes of this study, it is 
likely to contribute little to any overarching theoretical framework for a number of 
reasons. First, Bourdieu’s work is heavily influenced and focused on the internal 
dynamics of journalism rather than the impact that any external organisation may have 
on such activities. Second, despite Bourdieu’s optimism for autonomy, his argument that 
journalism is a “weakly autonomous field” is undermined by the idea of an independent 
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ethical organisation which, via the codification of journalism practice and norms, has the 
potential at least to strengthen the autonomy of the journalistic group. Indeed, it may even 
provide a bulwark to concepts of cultural and economic influence. According to Benson 
and Neveu (2005: 44), within a field there is competition for legitimate appropriation of 
what is at stake in the struggle for the field. In journalism it is about competition for 
readers. One of the paradoxes of this, however, is that competition, said to be a 
prerequisite of freedom, has the effect in fields of cultural production under commercial 
control (journalism) to produce uniformity, censorship and conservatism. “Journalists are 
caught up in structural processes which exert constraints on them such that their choices 
are totally preconstrained,” Bourdieu argued (ibid). Based on this line of thinking, one 
would expect the institutionalisation of independent press regulation – an attempt to 
disrupt the power relations within the ethical sphere of the field – to actually empower 
journalists against the commercial logic thus improving their autonomy. 
 
2.1.3: Hallin and Mancini 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) take the 1956 work of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm as the 
starting point for their system theory. Von Krogh (2008: 19) has argued this shows that 
“both the ability and the means to hold the media accountable have developed differently 
in different parts of the western world” albeit revolving around conditions in the US. 
Thus, the echoing of Schudson’s sentiment on structural impacts is clear. For Hallin and 
Mancini (2004: 8) “one cannot understand the news media without understanding the 
nature of the state, the system of political parties, the patterns of relations between 
economic and political interests, and the development of civil society”. Nevertheless, 
Hallin and Mancini’s work marks a move away from the more normative concepts of 
‘Four Theories’ (McQuail 2010: 177). 
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Hallin and Mancini (2004) examined political and economic variables (development 
and structure of media markets, political parallelism, professionalization and 
instrumentalisation) as the basis for proposing three journalistic cultures and media 
systems. Their first model, the liberal model, which includes Britain, the US and Ireland, 
is marked by deregulated media markets, a developed professional journalistic culture 
and minimal state interference on media. Hallin and Mancini’s second model, the 
democratic corporatist model, which encompasses Scandinavian countries, Germany and 
Austria, is also characterised by a significant culture of journalistic professionalism but 
has state involvement in the media through public broadcasting. The polarised pluralist 
model, Hallin and Mancini’s final media system which contains countries like Italy, 
Spain and France, features strong political influence on media with weak professional 
cultures among journalists.  
While they note that there is a modern tendency for media systems to increasingly 
move closer to the liberal model (2004: 76-85), in each of the media systems identified 
by Hallin and Mancini the level of journalistic professionalization plays a key role as a 
major variable within their method of media system classification. Hallin and Mancini 
argue that within each media system (polarised pluralist, democratic corporatist or 
liberal) indicators of journalistic professionalization vary. For the authors, autonomy, 
professional norms and the development of a public service ethic are central to 
professionalisation, with codes of ethics and systems of regulation or accountability, such 
as press councils, identified as being key to examining the concept of professionalization. 
In countries categorised as having liberal model press systems – Britain, Ireland, 
Canada and the United States – professionalization of journalism is strong while non-
institutionalised self-regulation of the press is common. Indeed, the majority of the 
theoretical work on press and media systems (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm 1956; 
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Williams 1962; Merrill 1974; Altschull 1984; Picard 1985; Habermas 1989; McQuail 
2013) reflects, to varying degrees, a recognition of characteristics of journalistic 
professionalism, more commonly labelled the social responsibility theme (Altschull 
1984: 288). Lauk and Denton (2011: 218) identified the importance of the concept of 
journalistic professionalism to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) categorisation process for 
media systems. While others such as Nerone (1995) and McChesney (1998) doubt the 
motives of journalistic professionalism it needs to be examined further particularly in 
light of its core role in the idea of an accountable press as part of the social responsibility 
theory, its role in McQuail’s media system theory and now its central role in Hallin and 
Mancini’s work.  
As stated, according to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) North Atlantic Liberal model, 
the press system in respect of performance issues is characterised by two elements: a 
strong professionalization process among journalists and a system of non-
institutionalised self-regulation characterised by a peer led culture of accountability.  
The professionalisation of journalism began in the latter half of the 19th century and 
gathered pace in the early 20th century as public and political discourse criticised a 
sensationalist press (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 218). It centred and developed around two 
ideas: objectivity and a hands off approach by owners (2004: 219). However, as 
McChesney and Nerone pointed out, Hallin and Mancini also argue that media owners 
had political and economic incentives to promote and accept journalistic 
professionalization due, in part, to the very process acting as a bulwark to state 
interference, continued public criticism and a loss of public credibility which would affect 
profits. 
It constrained owners and often has served to increase journalistic 
autonomy and limit instrumentalisation of the media. But it also 
constrains journalists, who are expected to renounce any ambition of 
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using their position as a platform for expressing their own political 
views, and to submit to the discipline of professional routines and 
editorial hierarchies (2004: 225) 
There are three dimensions of professionalisation identified by Hallin and Mancini. 
The first dimension is autonomy, which the authors argue, has always been central to the 
idea of professionalising an industry as a means to justifying attempts to gain greater 
control over work practices. Indeed, journalists have never achieved the degree of 
autonomy associated with other professions due to the mass production of their work, 
elite ownership of the means of production and control of media organisations being 
exerted by those other than journalists. The second dimension of professionalisation is 
the formation of distinct professional norms, characterised by the development of a set or 
horizontal journalistic norms (evident in codes of ethics) as well as routine work 
practices. The third dimension is public service orientation. Such an idea should not be 
dismissed as “mere ideology”, Hallin and Mancini argued. One of the clearest 
manifestations of the development of an ethic of public service is the existence of 
mechanisms of journalistic self-regulation and accountability mechanisms, which in 
some systems are formally organised in the form of, for example, press councils. 
Hallin and Mancini accepts its limitations in terms of the variations within the systems 
proposed, thus displaying a particular level of flexibility attractive in favouring its 
approach (2004: 11). The systems are not homogenous either. As the authors state, they 
are often characterised by a complex coexistence of media operations; nor are they static, 
as journalism cultures change and develop over time.  
However, some have argued that this three-tiered approach to understanding media 
accountability through the frame of Hallin and Mancini’s categorisation of media systems 
is problematic and unsuitable as a method for categorising and understanding media 
accountability systems in a broader cultural and geo-political context. Fengler et al. 
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(2014: 69) argued that “no study in the field of media accountability has systematically 
drawn on the model to identify and explain ‘cultures of accountability’”. Fengler et al. 
concluded that Hallin and Mancini’s systematic categorisation exhibits inconsistencies in 
respect of media accountability as certain countries - which reside within the 
geographical units proposed by Hallin and Mancini - actually exhibit strong 
characteristics of accountability mechanisms which would reside in other models. By 
way of example, Fengler et al. highlighted Austrian press regulation, which, they argued, 
exhibits many similar characteristics to media regulation in Italy, a geo-political entity 
categorised as part of the polarised, pluralist model of Hallin and Mancini. 
Indeed such arguments can be made about many of the tiered geo-political or 
economic approaches to understanding media systems, whether it is Williams’ (1962) 
authoritarian, paternal, commercial or democratic frames, or Blum’s (2005 cited by 
Dobek-Ostrowska 2010) six models: Atlantic-Pacific liberal model, southern European 
clientelism model, northern European public service model, eastern European shock 
model, Arab-Asian patriot model or the Asian-Caribbean command model. Nevertheless, 
as a framework for assessing and analysing systems of press regulation, Hallin and 
Mancini’s provides the most relevant, viable and sustainable media systems theory 
appropriate to this study of the Irish case. Taking the North Atlantic Liberal model in 
isolation, the aim of this research is to examine how the institutionalisation of press 
regulation in Ireland has impacted on the third dimension of professionalisation identified 
by Hallin and Mancini, the development of a public service ethic or ethos. Indeed Hallin 
and Mancini’s model allows – despite the belief of Fengler et al. (2014: 69) – for a full 
assessment and test of the robustness of press accountability mechanisms due in part to 
its flexibility and also its recognition of the measured political economy approach which 
views professionalism as part of the corporate control motif. 
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Theoretical considerations aside, in order to establish a sound base for examining 
concepts of press regulation and ethically accountable frameworks, particularly in a 
western setting, the remainder of this chapter must examine the development of the 
themes proposed as theories by Sibert, Peterson and Schramm.  As noted, criticism of 
‘Four Theories’ is particularly focused on claims the work is outdated, but its value lies 
in the recognition given to two of the more relevant and important themes closely linked 
to the western, professional press, namely libertarianism and social responsibility. 
  
2.2: Libertarianism 
Between the 15th and 19th centuries, early manifestations of journalism and the press in 
western society, particularly in Britain, were marked by control and severe limitation, 
primarily originating from the state in the form of taxes, pre-publication censorship, 
restrictive libel laws and licencing systems (Murray 1972; Altschull 1990; O’Malley and 
Soley 2000). As a consequence, the freedom vital to the concept of assuming journalistic 
responsibility was absent. It was this restrictive context that established the conditions 
which sparked debates about the role of a free press in society and the development of 
what is now identified as classic liberalism.  
In a wider social context, Kelley and Donway (1990: 68) suggested that a new liberal 
philosophy emerged in response to religious wars of the 16th century which convinced 
societies that tolerating difference was preferable to constant confrontation; scientific 
advancements that led to a questioning of orthodoxy; and in response to the growing 
oppressive role of political elites in British life. Keane (1991: 10-20) suggested a variety 
of influences which emerged including the theological approach which criticised state 
censorship on the basis of individualistic God-given faculty of reason and supported a 
free press to let the love of god and the “free and knowing spirit” flourish; the 
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individualistic or natural rights approach which extended the idea of a free press to the 
political sphere where a free press was a guarantee of freedom from political “coxcombs, 
parliamentary hoodwinking and government slavery” (Tindall 1704 quoted in Keane 
1991: 15); the utilitarian approach of  Bentham which held that a free press was necessary 
in order to ensure free elections as a check on poor governance and despotic rulers; and 
the attaining truth approach of Mill which held that public debate was the best way to 
discover truth. Altschull (1990) correctly pointed out that such social changes brought 
the concept of public opinion into the political process. Western society began to 
seriously question power and democracy, and their own relationship with it.  
The awakening of such ideas is often credited to John Locke (1632-1704), the English 
philosopher and father of classic liberalism. He argued for a greater awareness of 
individualism as the key to achieving collective happiness (Sibert 1956: 43). The 
arguments of John Milton (1608-1647), Locke’s contemporary, complimented these 
individualistic notions. Milton called for free, unregulated and robust debate – at that time 
impossible due to severe state restrictions – to help an individual reach his/her potential 
through the establishment of truth (Altschull 1990: 40-42; Sanders 2003: 67). Almost two 
hundred years after Locke and Milton, John Mill (1806-1873) argued for “the liberty to 
know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties” (quoted 
in Sanders 2003: 66). 
While western society was slow to incorporate these ideas, in the 1720s, Cato, a 
political column written by journalists John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, stressed the 
political need for free communication. If the people were to be sovereign as having power 
over public officials, they needed to be aware of how well or poorly the officials were 
carrying out their jobs, Cato regularly argued in the column. For Trenchard and Gordon 
it was more important to keep the people informed than it was to keep people thinking 
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highly of governors, to the extent that other principles could be violated to achieve such 
a goal (Knowlton and Reader 2009: 21-22).  
The arguments of Locke, Milton, the Cato columns and Mill are regarded as the 
underpinnings of classic liberalism (Sibert 1956: 40-71). The rhetoric led to the social 
and political conditions which allowed for the development of a free and independent 
press as a vehicle for informing and educating citizens. These ideas eventually gained 
acceptance among the powerful and political elites in western societies. Restrictions on 
the press in Britain were largely removed by the mid-19th century (O’Malley and Soley 
2000). In the US, the first amendment of the constitution, adopted in the late 1700s and 
continually reinforced since (Bollinger 1994), protected the press from any law 
interfering with its freedoms.  
Thus, classic liberalism granted almost complete independence to the press (Kelley 
and Donway 1990). Dominating political discourse, libertarianists argued that 
government or the nation state ought to preserve the rights of the individual. Kelley and 
Donway pointed out that the main rationale for preserving a free press was in order to 
protect wider individualistic freedoms. Classic liberals believed the press should perform 
the watchdog function on government to ensure it did not impinge on other freedoms. In 
effect, free speech and a free press ensured two things: it enabled people to pursue their 
private ends and served as a check on government (Kelley and Donway 1990).  
Despite its flaws, the ‘Four Theories’ treatment of the libertarianist position remains 
salient. According to Sibert (1956: 40-71), the underlying rationale for libertarians was 
derived from the self-righting process of truth versus falsity first proposed by Mill. 
Libertarianism was an attempt:  
to let the public at large be subjected to a barrage of information and 
opinion, some of it possibly true, some of it possibly false, and some of 
it containing elements of both. Ultimately the public could be trusted to 
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digest the whole, to discard that not in the public interest and to accept 
that which served the needs of the individual and of society of which 
he is a part (1956: 51).  
Libertarians believed there were enough opinions to let the public debate and decide, 
while everyone - theoretically at least - had the same opportunity and ability of access to 
the channels of communication to share their opinions. Anyone could set up a media 
outlet, and the only deciding factor on its success or failure would be profit, and by 
extension the public which it sought to serve, not any overbearing state influence, control 
or interference.  
There were underlying weaknesses with this approach. While libertarians accepted 
limitations including defamation, prohibition against indecent and obscene material and 
the protection of the state, there was no recognition of extra-juridical responsibilities.  
Libertarians believe in a completely free press - free from any role or responsibility 
assigned to it by any individual. Sibert (1956: 40-71) pointed out that liberals preferred 
this to the alternative of state control. While Sibert acknowledged there are criticisms, he 
pointed out that the theory’s greatest asset was its flexibility, its adaptability to change, 
and “above all its confidence in its ability to advance the interests and welfare of human 
beings by continuing to place its trust in individual self-direction” (1956: 71). 
Merrill (1986), a strong supporter of the tradition, developed this element of 
libertarianism, strongly arguing that no one can assign responsibilities to the media. If 
responsibility lies anywhere it is with those determined by the individual journalist. 
Merrill argued that government, and the development of press responsibilities defined via 
processes of self-regulation, posed significant problems for press freedom. He argued 
that those who circumscribe the ideals of liberalism, such as Mill, are “manifesting not 
only a certain arrogance but also something of the spirit of authoritarianism, however 
well-meaning they may be” (1986: 49).  
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In a free and truly liberal society, Merrill argued that responsibility remained in the 
eye of the beholder. Thus, a logical outcome for a free press system is a divergence of 
views on responsible and irresponsible procedure. Merrill argued the press is responsible, 
but responsible to someone’s individual concept of responsibility. In this way, 
responsibility is a personally defined issue which not everyone agreed on. Therefore, any 
attempt to define responsibility, whether by government or anyone else, contradicted 
constitutional and societal protections extended to the press. As a result, Merrill argued 
there is no way to settle questions of press responsibility in a free society because even if 
the press behaves or conforms in a manner agreed by various stakeholders, anyone is free 
to disagree.  
The liberal position assisted the development of the powerful mass media we know 
today (Bagdikian 1997; Herman and McChesney 1997) by creating a market (Glasser 
1986: 82-86) to act as a mechanism of quality control. Through the ideological protection 
granted to the press, newspapers and journalists created a unique position in western 
society. Under libertarianism, journalists were free from any external responsibility, other 
than their own conscience. No credible universal standards or ethical obligations 
developed. Any attempt to improve content or behaviour through external, or indeed 
internal, regulatory accountability mechanisms was considered a breach of moral, 
ideological, and legal rights established and awarded to the free western press. Instead, 
the self-righting process of truth would find its own level in the free market-place of ideas 
and would act as the only necessary non-legal check on the press. Perhaps William Peter 
Hamilton, a former publisher of the Wall Street Journal, summed up the concept of press 
responsibility best in respect of classic liberalism when he wrote that “a newspaper is a 
private enterprise owing nothing whatever to the public, which grants it no franchise. It 
is therefore affected with no public interest. It is emphatically the property of the owner, 
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who is selling a manufactured product at his own risk” (quoted in Dornan 1991: 159-
160). 
   
2.2.1: Liberal weaknesses 
A fervent belief in favour of ignoring responsibilities is identified by Schultz (1998) as 
central to a gradual shift away from libertarianism. O’Neill (1990) identified libertarians 
as holding a rights-based approach where rights are free from any concurrent 
responsibilities or obligations. O’Neill (1990) argued that without obligations, rights are 
merely “shams”. “We do not have to be enemies of free speech to find a lot alarming that 
is not usually thought to violate rights (1990: 164).” Indeed, Frunza and Frunza (2011: 
36) pointed out that responsibility is maintained outside the juridical sphere and “implies 
a type of ethical commitment” (2011: 36). 
Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987) also identified problems with the liberal 
interpretation of moral rights and responsibilities, and the assumed liberal demand for 
privilege without exception. They pointed out that Mill is often cited as the source of 
claims that a free press would serve the public interest better than any other form of 
morally established press control. However, Klaidman and Beauchamp noted that Mill 
was not a free speech absolutist2 and accepted that moral claims could, on occasion, 
outweigh press freedoms. They argued that the libertarian concept of a press operating 
                                                 
2 Neither could Mill’s main influence, Milton, be considered a free speech absolutist due to his 
belief that neither Roman Catholics nor journalists of the day be granted unhinged freedom of 
speech with no concurrent responsibilities because he deemed each grouping not to have reached 
the standards of honesty required to participate in public debate (Sibert 1956: 44).  Sanders (2003: 
56) points out that Milton favoured restrictions on free expression when Popery or superstition 
was concerned, as well as that “which is impious or evil absolutely against faith or manner not 
law can possible permit”. Peters (2004) rightly points out that, while Milton’s positions on 
pluralism, his contempt for compulsion and his equation of censorship with murder make him a 
friend to libertarianism, his position outlined by Nordenstreng and Sanders, make Milton a 
“puritan radical and magnificent, dangerous poet” (Peters 2004: 69), a consideration often 
forgotten by those who would quote Milton as a “theorist of the marketplace” 
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solely within a legal framework free from non-legal and moral obligation is not actually 
what Mill envisaged. Therefore, “freedom from legal constraints is a special privilege 
that demands increased awareness of moral obligations” (1987: 10).  
Libertarianism never recognised these sentiments and drew the famous statement 
from the American writer and poet Archibald MacLeish (1944, cited in McIntyre 1987: 
141) that a “free society could not permit its press to use freedom to destroy freedom”. 
Without a recognition of responsibility, ensuring any modicum of accountability is 
unachievable; in democracies all social institutions are either owned or given privileges 
by the public and therefore must be held accountable (Lichtenberg 1990). As Klaidman 
and Beauchamp (1987), Schultz (1998) and O’Neill (1990) pointed out, examining 
concepts of responsibility and accountability under the libertarian ideal amounted to an 
investigation of “contradiction, incongruity and irresolution” (Dornan 1991: 150).  
The failure to incorporate journalistic responsibilities is among a variety of flaws 
identified by critics of the classic liberal concept. Indeed, perhaps there are more 
significant and fundamental problems with the classic liberal interpretation. 
Nordenstreng (2010: 214) argued that Mill and Milton, despite being credited as fathers 
of the self-righting market influence on truth, would be “aghast” at the prospect of ideas 
being bought and sold in a market. For Nordenstreng, the “marketplace of ideas” has been 
usurped by modern mass media companies which declared themselves the “virtual 
marketplace of ideas” as a “politically appropriate response to the development of media 
structures in late capitalism” (2010: 216). Peters, whose research found no mention of the 
“market place of ideas” concept until the 1940s despite it being associated with 17th 
century philosophers, argued that such “concepts that glow with unmitigated 
righteousness can create mischief”. Therefore, “the ‘marketplace of ideas’ often shined a 
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noble light on the press and obscured its profit-making interests with a flatter self-
description (2004: 74)”. 
This strict dedication to the market undermined the liberal position. Despite the 
libertarian belief in a ‘free’ market, Fiss (1990) argued the market is its own system of 
constraint: the market favours a select economic elite (owners, advertisers and readers) 
and subjugates the democratic needs of the electorate for profitability. Bertrand (2000) 
argued that the libertarian theory was corrupted by the commercialisation and profit 
dogma that accompanied the free market development of the press. As a result, the market 
alone could not guarantee ethical or good social communications. “At best, it makes it 
possible for a majority to express itself. At worst, the media become servants to a wealthy 
minority, on the one hand, and on the other, they broadcast to an undifferentiated mass 
what seems to displease it least (2000: 20).” For McQuail (2003), the market is not an 
effective way to regulate the media in respect of content or standards because the market 
looks after only those who have a stake in the market, such as owners, elites and so on. 
Despite the obvious concerns about the effect that the untrammeled free market may 
have, it had already resulted in the privatisation of press freedom according to Glasser 
(1986) who argued a market-based business model produced a consolidation and 
concentration of ownership where newspapers and the wider press and media became 
profit-making enterprises for increasingly small numbers of owners. The 1974 Justice 
Potter Stewart position which espoused the free press clause to extend to the “protection 
to an institution” (Glasser 1986: 89) has extended explicit constitutional protection to an 
organised private business in the US, the libertarian’s beacon, a point also referenced by 
Dawes (2014: 21-22). Indeed, Christians (1986) cited this US court-backed protection as 
one of the reasons for the increasing commercialisation of the press driven by the 
emergence and power of large media conglomerates which owned more and more of the 
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print, electronic and broadcast media due to society’s acceptance of a naive 
libertarianism. More critically, one can see how this liberal approach, which led to an 
unresponsive, powerful press, may have contributed to the earlier infamous remarks of 
Stanley Baldwin, a former British Prime Minister, who, in attacking the press barons of 
the 1930s, criticised the “power without responsibility” being sought by the media elites 
which was “the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages” (1931, cited in Bertrand 
2003: 26). 
A consensus has emerged in academia and the media that liberalism was 
unsustainable because of these inherent weaknesses and failures which had become major 
fault lines due to a number of developments. New technologies brought the birth of radio 
(and later television) which resulted in direct and fierce competition for audience share. 
In response, journalists in newspaper companies - now more concerned with profit 
margins than ever as a result of shareholder-led ownership models - dived increasingly 
down market in pursuit of readers, often falling foul of public tastes (Conboy 2012). 
Altschull (1990) tracked the development of a popular press in the US, sometimes known 
as the Yellow Press, which rose to prominence due to the great technological and 
educational changes in the late and early 19th and 20th centuries. He (1990: 265-282) 
identified numerous criticisms of the press which reflected some of the underlying 
weaknesses of the classic liberal perspective discussed above. Indeed, even in the 19th 
century, similar fears about the unaccountable freedoms and the malaise that had inflicted 
the press were expressed by Warren and Brandeis in their 1890 authoritative and 
influential plea on privacy (Quoted in Bollinger 1991: 36-37). In the later part of the 20th 
century, newspaper ownership became increasingly monopolised in few hands 
(Bagdikian 1997, Herman and McChesney 1997).  
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2.3: Social responsibility 
The new concept of social responsibility which emerged in the first half of the 20th 
century - in response to the failures of the “moralistic hyperbole” of the fourth estate role 
of the press (Schultz 1998: 68) - developed as a modification of the classic liberal concept, 
as opposed to a complete change in perspective and thinking. In the opening to Four 
Theories, Sibert and Peterson (1956) argued that social responsibility and libertarianism 
contained many similarities, with the former merely a continuum of the latter. However, 
Sibert and Peterson, acknowledged that there were important distinctions. Classic liberal 
theory and the new social responsibility perspective clearly identified an important social 
and democratic role for the press, and granted it significant freedoms in order to carry out 
this work based on the rhetoric of Locke, Milton, Mill and others. And, while there are 
clear-cut differences between both theories, this research is specifically concerned with 
concepts of responsibility, obligation and accountability – areas where the divergence is 
most pronounced.  
Four Theories and Peterson (1956: 74-103) provide the most cited explication of the 
new theory. Nonetheless, it is important to note – as Peterson does – that the concept of 
a socially responsible press gets in-depth treatment in the 1940s with the Commission on 
Freedom of the Press (Hutchins) in the United States. The Hutchins Commission, 
according to McIntyre (1987), was a policy-based, practical approach at articulating a 
new social responsibility theory, as opposed to the philosophical approach taken by many 
until that time. According to McIntyre, one of the commission’s central tasks was to 
attempt a definition of journalistic responsibilities, a concept alien until that point, and to 
outline concurrent accountability mechanisms.  
Bollinger (1994: 28-33) argued that the Hutchins Commission was established due to 
fears of a decrease in public access to the press; a perception that the press was not serving 
the needs of society; and disquiet over poor journalistic practices. “The news is twisted 
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by the emphasis on firstness, on the novel and sensational; by the personal interests of 
owners; and by pressure groups,” the commission recorded (Bollinger 1994: 31).  
Too much of the regular output of the press consists of a miscellaneous 
succession of stories and images which have no relation to the typical 
lives of real people anywhere. Too often the result is meaninglessness, 
flatness, distortion, and the perpetuation of misunderstanding among 
widely scattered groups whose only contact is through these media 
(Quoted in Bollinger 1994: 33) 
Due to the media’s refusal to accept responsibilities and its deference to economic 
concerns, the press was governed by “a kind of unwritten law” which ignored “the errors 
and misrepresentations, the lies and scandals, of which its members are guilty” (1994: 
33). Responsibilities defined under a system of self-regulation, the Commission felt, 
would help the press understand its role of public service rather than profit; points also 
outlined by Christians (2003).  
The Commission also grew out of the developing free press interpretations expressed 
in the US courts which began to view the freedom of the press as a right of the people to 
get information and not just a publisher’s right (Dornan 1991). Dornan (1991) said a 
perception emerged that the first amendment freedoms had allowed for the development 
of a shield which placed undue emphasis on proprietary rights. Indeed, the commission’s 
conception of freedoms “conceived of the ideal society as one that acknowledged the 
individual basis of freedom but also reflected doubt that traditional self-righting processes 
could still work in complex urban democracies” (McIntyre 1987: 143). In effect, the onus 
was now being placed on the right of the public to be informed which placed a burden of 
responsibility on the press to guarantee this right. The commission stated the press must 
be: 
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accountable to society for meeting the public need and for maintaining 
the rights of citizens and the almost forgotten rights of speakers who 
have no press. It must know that its faults and errors have ceased to be 
private vagaries and have become public dangers. The voice of the 
press, so far as by a drift toward monopoly it tends to become exclusive 
in its wisdom and observation, deprives other voices of a hearing and 
the public of their contribution. Freedom of the press for the coming 
period can only continue as an accountable freedom. Its moral right will 
be conditioned on it acceptance of this accountability. Its legal right 
will stand unaltered as its moral duty is performed (quoted in Jaehnig 
1998: 100-101) 
Going further, Altschull (1990: 283-298) pointed out that the Hutchins Commission 
declared that journalists had the moral obligation to go beyond objective facts and read 
between the lines of information from sources. As argued by Altschull, this was a 
restatement of Milton, in that journalists should not accept what they are told as fact, 
rather they should chase the truth, Altschull (1990) argued. The journalist was, therefore, 
required to present the facts, the truth behind the facts and to be accountable to society if 
he/she failed to do so. Altschull (1990) contended that while social responsibility is a 
modern expression, the idea of a press which has an obligation and responsibility to 
society is an ancient doctrine alluded to by Plato, Aristotle as well as being “reaffirmed 
in every generation since Milton” (1990: 285) – contrary in large part to the classic liberal 
perspective.  
In a marked contrast to liberal theory, in this line of thinking social responsibility held 
that the government and state must not merely allow freedom but actively promote it. 
“The government should help society to obtain the services it requires from the mass 
media if a self-regulated press and the self-righting features of community life are 
insufficient to provide them” (Peterson 1956: 95). Under social responsibility, free 
expression is grounded in duty and is an unrelinquishable moral right. Moreover, it has 
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value for society and for the individual: “It is the individual’s means of perpetuating 
himself through his ideas. It is society’s sole source of intelligence, the seeds from which 
progress springs,” according to Peterson (1956: 96). However, it is not absolute. It must 
be balanced against the private rights of others and against vital social interests. Under 
social responsibility, Peterson (1956) argued, man has a moral right only if he assumes 
the concomitant moral duty of acting on his thought. This moral right incorporates honest 
error. If newspapers do not recognise or accept their duty then they sacrifice their moral 
right to free expression.  
Peterson argued that the concept of social responsibility emerged in response to a 
number of significant developments and hinged on concerns that the press believed it had 
no responsibility to society and ultimately remained unaccountable. Critiques focused on 
many themes and criticised the press for wielding power for its own ends, being 
subservient to advertisers and business interests, resisting social change, focusing on the 
sensational and superficial, and invasions of privacy – and above all neglecting any 
responsibility or accountability to readers, government, the wider public or anyone else 
despite the immense political, social and financial power the institution began to wield as 
a result of the transformative developments of the early 20th century (Bagdikian 1997; 
Herman and McChesney 1997; McChesney 1998; Herman and Chomsky 2010). Peterson 
(1956) argued that allied to such issues was the post-enlightenment changes in intellectual 
thought. This revolution in modern thought, he pointed out, fatally undermined 
libertarianism and diverged from enlightenment beliefs to Darwinian and Einsteinian 
thoughts: closer to a collective society than the individualistic nature of liberalism. This 
had important consequences for the press.  
Peterson also highlighted the beginnings of a professional mind-set within the 
journalism industry – marked by the greater efforts at education for journalists in the mid-
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19th century – as the foundation for the growth in awareness over standards, obligations 
and responsibilities. Such developments were underscored by the writing of ethics codes 
and the implementation of journalism courses in schools and universities. In 1904, Joseph 
Pulitzer wrote: “Nothing less than the highest ideals, the most scrupulous anxiety to do 
right, the most accurate knowledge of the problems it has to meet, and a sincere sense of 
moral responsibility will save journalism from a subservience to business interest, 
seeking selfish ends, antagonistic to public welfare” (Quoted in Peterson 1956: 83). 
Beam, Weaver and Bonnie (2009) identifed Pulitzer’s call for education and training of 
journalists at the beginning of the 20th century as the birth of professionalism, which also 
incorporated autonomy as a key trait. Deuze (2005) explored the concept, which he calls 
“occupational ideology” (2005: 443), and argued its 20th century development was 
characterised by attempts at cross-industry agreement of who a ‘real’ journalist is and 
what ‘real’ journalism should look like. Indeed, this debate is continuing in the new age 
of social media (Christians 1998; Herrscher 2002; Tehranian 2002; Ward 2005; Dodson 
2012; Hansen 2014; Wyatt and Clasen 2014).  
The basic premise of social responsibility, outlined by Peterson and the Hutchins 
Commission, was that the freedom granted to the press carried concomitant obligations 
and responsibilities. The libertarian system would suffice where the press recognised 
these responsibilities and made them “the basis of operational policies” but where there 
is a failure to assume these responsibilities, “some other agency must see that the essential 
functions of mass communications are carried out” (Peterson 1956: 74) in order to 
provide some form of accountability mechanism. Indeed, the function or responsibilities 
of the press remained the same according to both theories and will be discussed in section 
1.5 (Peterson 1956: 74; Bertrand 2000). However, the social responsibility theory 
recognised and reflected dissatisfaction with how these functions had been carried out:  
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Faith diminished in the optimistic notion that a virtually absolute 
freedom and the nature of man carried built-in correctives for the 
press… A rather considerable fraction of articulate Americans began to 
demand certain standards of performance from the press (Peterson 
1956: 77) 
Central to the Hutchins Commission’s work on social responsibility in the US in the 
1940s was the concept, espoused by Edward Hocking, its principle philosopher, of 
positive press freedoms (Christians 2003: 50-53). The negative freedom associated with 
the libertarian’s view of liberty - which equated freedom with the absence of arbitrary 
restraint - was bankrupt for Hocking. Instead, Hocking argued that the State bears a 
responsibility for fostering social justice. Such a pro-active State would develop the moral 
character of its citizens by creating a social environment, where those who want to live 
justly, can act on their principles. Part of this service was enabling public discourse which 
libertarians left to the private sphere:  
In every point, men must be free; and in every point they must be 
subject to a sobering objective judgement which checks that freedom… 
Liberty is a positive thing and demands tools to work with and food to 
grow on, a mental capital of working beliefs to begin life with. Minds 
cannot grow in a vacuum (Hocking quoted in Christians 2003: 52)  
Contrary to libertarian ideals, Hocking, as the Hutchins Commission’s principle 
philosopher, believed that free expressions should no longer be considered an inalienable 
natural right but an earned moral right. Positive freedom was conditional, however, and 
Hocking was committed to the idea of responsibility for one’s actions. His work was 
about establishing an accountable freedom with a framework that identified our 
humanity, rather than our roles, as the principal guide to being responsible. Perhaps 
Glasser (1986) best identified the potential of such an affirmative take on freedoms. 
36 
 
An affirmative theory of freedom of the press seeks to strengthen 
individual autonomy by acknowledging that the tyranny of private 
transactions poses as much of a threat to individual liberty as the 
tyranny of government regulation; it thus moves journalists to bring 
about a truly independent press, an agency of communication as free 
from the whims of the marketplace as it is free from the authority of the 
state. And an affirmative reading of the free press clause underscores 
the importance of public expression by recognising its higher purposes; 
it thus embodies an appreciation for the role of the press, an expectation 
that the press will serve not just itself but the larger community whose 
members look to it for a clearer sense of who they are, where they are 
going, and where they have been (93) 
In Britain, the Royal Commission on the Press, also known as the Ross Commission, 
was established in 1947 and reported two years later (O’Malley 1998). O’Malley and 
Soley (2000: 29-37) pointed out that the British Commission was set up due to similar 
societal and political concerns which led to the establishment of the Hutchins 
Commission in the US, namely, public and political concern about the press intensified 
as a result of technological changes which prompted the beginnings of the modern mass 
trans-national media. In addition, there were issues about ownership and a related link to 
journalists chasing sensationalist, privacy-breaching content. Journalists were criticised 
because their behaviour was driven by a desire for exclusivity as newspapers operated 
within a competitive capitalist free market dependent on audiences to survive. Murray 
(1972: 28) identified the Commission as a turning point for the British press in respect of 
its acceptance of accountability as a means of becoming socially responsible. Indeed, 
Peterson (1956: 75) and Schultz (1998: 111-114) cited the Ross Commission as the 
British explication of the social responsibility theory.  
Dornan (1991: 166-172) pointed out that the Ross Commission held that competition 
renders the press accountable. However, its investigations revealed an increase in 
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concentration of ownership and therefore a reduction in competition which had 
consequences for its conception of press accountability. The Commission, according to 
Frost, found that “the press has taken fewer steps to safeguard its standards of 
performance than perhaps any other institution of comparable importance” (2000: 176) 
and, as a result, failed to encourage “the growth of the sense of public responsibility and 
public service” (2000: 225) among all those engaged in the profession of journalism. 
Murray (1972) pointed out that the commission discovered a ‘Fourth Estate’:  
rent and riven, not only by the customary divisions between employers 
and employed, but by the hostility felt by one section of journalists for 
another. The investigation uncovered a host of rumours and beliefs 
which were unfounded. It disclosed gossip which was untrue, it 
ploughed through suggestions for ‘improving’ the profession and 
industry, many of which were either impossible or downright 
cranky…the press was compelled to take a good, hard look at itself, and 
could not be complacent about what it saw (1972: 28) 
The Commission proposed the formation of a general council of the press, or what is 
known in modern media accountability as a press council. Robertson (1983: 9-11) pointed 
out that the Commission wanted the press council to obtain agreement on sound 
professional practice, eradicate discreditable behaviour, discourage privacy intrusions, 
correct factual errors and encourage plurality of opinion in newspapers – all of which it 
found were absent in the British press in the 1940s. The commission, according to 
Robertson, rejected calls for a licencing system and favoured a voluntary press council 
with public involvement, echoing the sentiments of the Hutchins Commission in the US 
(Tulloch 1998).  
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2.4: Press responsibilities  
The concept of social responsibility flourished in the 20th century. Professionalism, 
ethical self-reflection and journalistic standards became important topics as a result of 
the gradual shift away from classic liberalism. Nevertheless, many continued to pose the 
question: what are the responsibilities of the press? In response, McQuail (2003) 
identified three “external stimuli” (2003: 46-47) as the origin of media obligation. First, 
it is the media’s responsibility to satisfy the public’s collective demand for the supply of 
knowledge. Second, the media is required as a communicative tool for the commercial, 
political and cultural display and dissemination of information. And third, governmental 
and other authorities expect cooperation in communicating issues of public welfare. 
Internal stimuli include financial self-interest, public perception issues, influence and 
professional public interest issues. Perhaps this is best summed up by McQuail when he 
writes:  
Free media have responsibilities in the form of obligation which can be 
either assigned, or contracted, or self-chosen for which they are held 
accountable to individuals, organisations or society either in the sense 
of liability or answerability for harm cause or for quality of 
performance (1997: 518) 
Despite adopting a critical approach to some conceptions of functional duties as those 
dictated by a “liberal political class” as the “somewhat high-minded ideals of the 
bourgeois intelligentsia”, McQuail et al (2009: 121-122) accept that media functions are 
accepted by journalists today, albeit with varying levels of adherence.  
For Hodges (1986), responsibility for a journalist is only meaningful as part of the 
social or collective existence. The root of responsibility, for Hodges, lies in social nature 
and awareness of others. For Hodges, there are three levels of journalistic responsibility. 
The first is the function of the media in society. These functions are guided by principles, 
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the second level. Principles are enforced by ethical norms which govern actions, the third 
level. Actions deals with the minutiae of practical journalistic work, which is expected to 
conform to the ethical principles which guides newsgathering and presentation.  
 
2.4.1: Press functions 
Many scholars have attempted to codify overarching functional media responsibilities 
(Christians 1986; Elliott 1986; Klaidman and Beauchamp 1987; Gurevitch and Blumler 
1990; Voakes 1997; Bertrand 2000; Street 2011: 306; Plaisance et al 2012). However, as 
the foundation document for social responsibility, the Hutchins Commission is an 
obvious starting point for examining the press’s function in society. The freedom of the 
press, for the Commission, was based on the awareness of a moral obligation to contribute 
positively to the collective well-being of a surrounding community (McIntyre 1987). As 
a measure of this performance, the Commission listed five elements (or functions) that it 
believed society required from the press (Peterson 1956: 89-93).  
First, citizens required that the press provide a truthful, comprehensive and intelligent 
account of events in context3. Second, the press ought to serve as a forum for the public 
exchange of comment and criticism, citing a previous failure to do so with the increasing 
concentration of ownership and the burdensome cost of printing and newsgathering 
blamed. The third element of press performance was that the institutions must project a 
representative image of society, and of the groups which make up a modern society. 
Fourth, the press must be responsible for “the presentation and clarification of the goals 
                                                 
3 The press’s liberal and professional commitment to objectivity which demanded that journalists 
strive to report all sides to every story no matter how outlandish (evidenced by the press’s 
unquestioning reportage of the anti-communist tirades of US Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 
1950s cited in Smith 2003: 68) was indirectly criticised by the commission in this regard. Davis 
(1954 quoted in Peterson 1956: 89) perhaps summed this position up best when he wrote about a 
“false objectivity that takes everything at face value and lets the public be imposed upon by the 
charlatan with the most brazen front”. 
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and values of society” and fifth, the press must provide “full access to the day’s 
intelligence” (Peterson 1956: 91).  
Modern work on the media’s function in society has reaffirmed some of these 
concepts. For Schudson (2008: 12-27), journalism has around seven functions as part of 
its democratic role. First, he identifies the media’s informational role which empowers 
the public to study the role of authority and make sound political choices. Second, the 
media has taken on the classic watchdog role, based on the concept that the media sets 
out to “make powerful people tremble” (2008: 14). Third, journalism plays the role of an 
arbiter, transmitting complex ideas in an easy-to-digest format. Fourth, is a journalism 
aware of social empathy and compassion, while Schudson’s fifth function in a democracy 
is its position as a public forum, providing for an open and accessible centre for public 
debate where the media serve as a common carrier of differing perspectives on society. 
Sixth, journalism can be a mobilizing influence, advocating on particular issues, while its 
final identifiable role for Schudson is its influence in publicising representative 
democracy:  
Journalism does not produce democracy where democracy does not 
exists, but it can do more to help democracies thrive if it recognises the 
multiple services it affords self-government, encourages the virtues that 
underwrite those services, and clarifies for journalists and the public 
the many gifts news contributes to democratic aspirations (2008: 26) 
McQuail (2009: 121-122) condensed the work of others, highlighting three acceptable 
functions. For McQuail, journalism’s first task is observing and informing as a service to 
the public. Second, journalism is about independently participating in public life via 
critical comment, advice, advocacy and opinion. And lastly, for McQuail, journalists 
ought to provide a channel, forum or platform for “extra media” voices to reach the 
public. 
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2.4..2: Press principles 
For Ward (2005) the principles of journalism originated in the “overarching contract” 
(2005: 7) the industry has with the publics it serves. Principles become legitimate when 
they are recognized by all parties. As the project of journalism is ever changing, defining 
ethical principles is a never ending task, Ward argued, a process which requires constant 
reinterpretation. Ward (2005: 8) defined this “special role as the requirement that 
journalists act as impartial and independent communicators for the public at large – not 
for the state, not for the governing party, and not for the partisan interests”. 
Many scholars have attempted to define the main principles which are thought to 
guide journalism practice (Altschull 1994; Sanders 2003; Smith 2003; Frost 2015). Much 
of this work is reflected by Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007: 5-6) who argued that despite 
changes in delivery and substance over time, journalistic principles have remained 
consistent. While dismissing principles around the separation between profit and 
journalism, independence, neutrality and objectivity as myths, the authors suggested ten 
principles which appear in one form or another in much of the scholarly material (Table 
1). 
Table 1: Kovach and Rosenstiel's principles of journalism 
 Journalism’s first obligation is to the 
truth 
 Its first loyalty is to citizens 
 Its essence is a discipline of 
verification 
 Its practitioners must maintain an 
independence from those they cover 
 It must serve as an independent 
monitor of power  
 It must provide a forum for public 
criticism and compromise 
 
 It must strive to make the significant 
interesting and relevant 
 It must keep the news comprehensive 
and in proportion 
 Its practitioners have an obligation to 
exercise their personal conscience 
 Citizens, too, have rights and 
responsibilities when it comes to the 
news 
 
Source: (2007: 5-6) 
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According to his review of the literature in the area, Deuze (2005: 447-450) believed that 
the elements which are part of journalism’s ideology can be categorised into five 
principles. First, journalists hold the concept of public service dear through the watchdog 
concept of ‘doing it for the public’ but also by giving the public what they want. Second, 
media literature identifies concepts of objectivity, fairness, professional distance, 
detachment and impartiality as principles to which the industry aspires. Third, Deuze 
identified autonomy as a principle which sees journalists rail against censorship of any 
kind, internal or external, and assert or attempt to assert their independence from the state 
and any other pressures. Fourth, immediacy is noted by Deuze including elements of 
speed, hastiness and fast decision making in accelerated real time which have become 
routinised and respected in the industry. Fifth, Deuze believed ethics is part of the rhetoric 
of journalistic principles as a means of legitimising media actions and work. 
McQuail’s (2003: 68-79) work on “publication values” reflected Deuze’s findings. 
The first of the values cited by McQuail is truth. For the author, truth is reliable, verifiable 
data as well as expert analysis and interpretation. Indeed, claims to freedom of publication 
in democracy are stronger when they are based on truth. McQuail’s truth criteria is broken 
into subgroups of content quality – which deals with accuracy and reliability, 
verisimilitude, balance, demonstrability and relevance such as the characteristics of 
integrity, authenticity, personal truth, courage, openness (2009: 75-79). McQuail’s 
second publication value is freedom (2009: 70). For McQuail, this is the foundation 
condition on which all other benefits of communication exist. Such a principle is visible 
across all media theory and is recognised for its indispensability in opposing state or other 
power, its contribution to truth or discovery and the link to social and cultural progress. 
McQuail argued that order and cohesion is a third media principle. This value opposes 
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isolationism and social fragmentation and posits media support for the ideas of a shared 
culture based on common experience, language, belief, and outlook. Fourth is the value 
of solidarity and equality. Under this principle, the media ought to favour public 
communications arrangements and contents linked to groups and communities based on 
criteria like place, religion, class, ethnicity, gender for the support and empowerment of 
minorities and to exhibit sympathy for the disadvantaged, victimised and unfortunate. 
Finally, McQuail argued for the principle of right purpose and responsibility (2009: 72) 
and the wider acceptance of the notion “that public communication should not knowingly 
cause harm to its recipients, third parties, or society and should accept appropriate 
responsibility for any potential harm caused”. Under this principle is the defence of 
publication on good intention grounds, honesty in acquiring information, respect for 
privacy and dignity, the avoidance of harmful effects for third parties, the weighing up of 
public benefit and an adherence to codes of ethics.  
 
2.4.3: Press actions 
Western and Anglo-American understandings of journalism’s role in society dominate 
the global conception of the industry’s function and principles. While there are diverging 
points of view many have argued that despite cultural and political intricacies, much 
about journalism’s expected role in society confirms to the liberalised, western-developed 
journalistic role (Preston 2008; McQuail 2009; Hanitzsch 2011). Whether it is the 
overarching principles, or the minutiae of specific accountability mechanisms - such as a 
code of ethics (Himelboim and Limor 2008) - dominant western liberal beliefs and their 
modern incarnation within the social responsibility paradigm influence worldwide 
understandings of the role and underpinnings of journalism in democratic society.  
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Nonetheless, defining one set of responsibilities and principles to govern journalistic 
action is impossible. While scholars such as those cited list several functions and roles, 
there is no agreed, overarching or binding list of items which outline the exact 
responsibility of a journalist and how a journalist should act. Indeed, in today’s 
technologically advanced journalistic sphere, it has become even more difficult to reach 
solid conclusions in this regard given the new definitions and contested terrain of what is 
journalism and who is a journalist. While some are ambivalent about the impact of 21st 
century technology on journalism ethics and the role conception of journalists (Singer 
1993; Sanders 2003), many argue (Cooper 1998; Deuze and Yeshua 2001; Phillips 2010; 
Dodson 2012; Hansen 2014; Wyatt and Clasen 2014) that the internet and technology 
have, as Christians (1998) argued, “introduced such novel scales and consequences that 
the framework of traditional ethics no longer addresses them” (68). 
For McQuail (2009: 115) internal contradictions and divergent purposes and practices 
make it impossible to define the central characteristics of journalistic activity or the norms 
that should apply. Instead, trends such as an increasing commitment to professionalism 
in journalism, coupled with globalisation, have “converged on a dominant type of 
journalism in which several loosely related features coexist” (2009: 115). Street (2011) 
argued that democratic theorists have paid little attention to what principles and practices 
should guide the operation of media in democracy. Notwithstanding the attempts of 
media and journalism scholars, Street argued that the media may have failed to meet its 
standards on so many occasions because society finds it difficult to define the industry’s 
role. Hodges (1986: 21) picked up this point much earlier, arguing for a constantly 
evolving notion of journalistic purpose where journalists’ responsibilities to society are 
contracted or self-imposed. Deuze (2005: 444-447) pointed out that this occurred in the 
20th century with the consolidation of a consensual occupation ideology among 
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journalists which defined who a real journalists was/is and what real journalism should 
look like. He refered to Schudson (2001) who describes the occupational ideology of 
journalism as “cultural knowledge that constitutes ‘news judgement’, rooted deeply in 
the communicators’ consciousness” while Zelizer (2004) talked about the “collective 
knowledge” that journalists employ. Yet, as Deuze (2005: 445-446) noted, there is no 
universal definition of practical occupational standards: “It is…possible to speak of a 
dominant occupation ideology of journalism on which most news workers base their 
professional perceptions but this “is interpreted, used and applied differently among 
journalists across media”. The dominant ideology is “a collection of values, strategies 
and formal codes characterising professional journalism and shared most widely by its 
members”. Deuze identified a consensus among scholars that a shared occupational 
ideology functions to “self-legitimise” the position of news workers in society thus 
suggesting that whatever role society may favour for journalists, the industry has filled a 
vacuum by creating its own standards.  
There is an acceptance, however, that the print media in particular is not living up to 
some of its responsibilities as outlined. Notwithstanding difficulty in interpreting its 
responsibilities, various critiques of press performance negatively view the operation of 
modern journalism and others criticise elements within the industry which affect external 
perceptions (Gurevitch and Blumler 1990; Keane 1991; Schultz 1998; McChesney 2000; 
Bertrand 2003; Sanders 2003). Nordenstreng (2000: 78) maintained correctly that 
journalists accept that they have responsibilities to the public. However, instead of 
focusing on these responsibilities, he argues that we must examine how to hold journalists 
accountable for such responsibilities.  
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2.5: Accountability 
Schedler (1999: 14) argued that accountability as a general concept is novel and 
underexplored; has an evasive meaning, fuzzy boundaries and a confusing internal 
structure. Nevertheless, Schedler identified two core elements reflected in the literature. 
First, accountability contains the concept of answerability. For Schedler, this relates to 
the obligation of public officials (or those who are granted responsibility) to inform about 
and explain actions. Being accountable implies an obligation to respond and inform 
others about decisions taken, and, to explain such decisions. Answerability is 
complimented by the second element, enforcement. Schedler argued that enforcement is 
the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power holders who have 
violated their duties. Schedler’s understanding of accountability is supported by McQuail 
(1997: 517 & 2014) whose own examination of the concept comes to a similar two-part 
conclusion. He argued that answerability is about a readiness to achieve reconciliation 
and resolution while enforcement – which McQuail labelled ‘liability’ - is characterised 
by an adversarial relationship.  
For both McQuail and Schedler the process of accountability works best where both 
answerability and enforcement are present. Nevertheless, Schedler, who pointed out that 
without enforcement or consequences accountability mechanisms appear toothless, 
accepted that where one of the two key elements is missing, processes of accountability 
can still occur (1999: 18).  
On the one side, exercising accountability therefore involves elements 
of monitoring and oversight. Its mission includes finding facts and 
generating evidence. On the other side, the norm of accountability 
continues the Enlightenment’s project of subjecting power not only to 
the rule of law but also to the rule of reason. Power should be bound by 
legal constraints but also by the logic of public reasoning. 
Accountability is antithetical to monologic power. It establishes a 
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dialogic relationship between accountable and accounting actors. It 
makes both parties speak and engages them both in public debate. It is 
therefore opposed not only to mute power but also to unilateral 
speechless control of power (1999: 15) 
For Schedler (1999: 20), accountability mechanisms aspire to achieve an “opacity of 
power” and greater transparency. Thus, democratic accountability has to be public (1999: 
21) otherwise it lacks credibility. Accounting organisations “can live only as long as they 
act in the daylight of the public sphere and they crumble and die as soon as they enter the 
shadows of privacy and secrecy” (Schedler 1999: 21). Importantly, Schedler pointed out 
the need to establish criteria for setting out what we expect to hold actors accountable 
for, as well as establishing who we aim to hold accountable.  
For the media, Hodges (1986) argued that accountability is about compelling proper 
conduct and asking who can demand, threaten or persuade political actors like the media 
to live up to duties and responsibilities. Hodges’ argument reflects the interplay between 
personally defined conduct with externalised enforcement. While responsibility is 
something personal and internal for Hodges – as established in the previous section 
journalistic responsibility is difficult to define with virtually no industry-wide agreement 
- accountability is externalised and impersonal. Hodges did, however, raise one important 
note of caution which is inevitable with a concept like accountability. He argued that once 
the basis of accountability is established and accepted total freedom is inevitably 
undermined – not always negatively so – due to the inherent authority connected to 
accountability. Such a trade-off is central to the acceptance of the theory of social 
responsibility.  
More practical definitions of accountability have been prepared by Dalen and Deuze 
(2006) who argued that being accountable means (publicly) explaining and defending 
one’s practices and motivations while Von Krogh’s (2012: 9) definition of media 
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accountability is the interactive process by which media organizations may be expected 
or obliged to render an account of (and sometimes a correction and/or excuse for) their 
activities to their stakeholders. The values and relative strength of the stakeholders vary 
over time and are affected by media systems and media technologies, he argues. Indeed, 
many other definitions of media accountability rely on the practical ideas of rendering an 
account (Franklin 2005) 
For Klaidman and Beauchamp (1987), however, defining accountability is difficult 
and must go beyond definitions of ‘answering’ or ‘being asked to account’. “Any valid 
account generally entails a relevant and justifiable explanation of one’s actions given to 
someone to whom it is legitimately owed” (1987: 211), and in journalism, in particular, 
giving an account should include justifying the reasons for the production and publication 
of a story. An adequate justification must meet broad moral standards and can not alone 
reflect personal or institutional belief. Nevertheless, Seymour Ure (1996) added his 
definition of accountability, which despite the difficulty in confirming the concept’s 
principles, added to the debate: 
Accountability refers not to the internal power relations of media but to 
the arguments and arrangements through which they justified 
themselves externally to the public. The issue is legitimacy. The 
question is, therefore, not whether, say, newspapers were in the pockets 
of their advertisers but how, if they were, they could account for what 
they published (1996: 242) 
For McQuail (2003: 5-19) media accountability “refers to all ways in which public 
communication is ‘accounted for’, by its originators, its recipients, and those affected by 
it.” Underlying this, are interrelated concepts which McQuail introduces. First, he argued 
putative relationships are at the centre of media accountability. The pre-social media 
media by its very nature – the distance between sender and receiver, the lack of a close 
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relationship, the lack of personal interaction, the isolation of receivers who are not part 
of a group – results in an ineffective accountability process. “In this conceptualisation, 
the term ‘accountability’ in its widest meaning encompasses all aspects of co-orientation 
in communicative relationships,” he argued (2003: 14), “including the claims and 
perceptions of others, and alternative meanings”. As a result, accountability, for McQuail, 
is “the entire process of making claims based on expectation and appeals to norms, the 
response of the other party, and any ensuing procedures for reconciling the two”.  Indeed, 
“without accountability, communication is simply one-way transmission, limited in 
purpose, lacking response, guidance, or even known effect.” In other words, media 
accountability is an effort to develop inter-actor media relationships and reconcile 
differences in order to improve the communications process.  
Subsequently (2005: 207) McQuail defined media accountability as voluntary or 
involuntary processes by which the media answer directly or indirectly to their society 
for the quality and/or consequences of publication. Plaisance (2000) and Pritchard (2000) 
underscore McQuail’s argument in this regard. The former argued that accountability 
must be understood as a “fluid dynamic of interaction” or by “the degree of 
responsiveness to the values of media users” and the latter argued that media 
accountability is a “process by which media organisations may be expected or obliged to 
render an account of their activities to their constituents” (2000: 258). Indeed, Pritchard 
also refered to Plaisance’s “fluid dynamic” of accountability as not just an ethical 
principle or complaints mechanism, but an ongoing, continual mechanism which exists 
in informal and formal situations. 
For the purpose of this study, accountability centres around ideas of answerability and 
enforcement. Such a process must be public and transparent, and work within specified 
criteria. This criteria ought comprise both collective (e.g. industry norms, cultural values 
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etc.) and individual (e.g. truth, virtue) elements. If too much weight is placed in 
collectivist issues, the accountability mechanism can flirt with heavy state involvement 
which in turn raises the issue of legislative provisions. Ethics exists only outside law and 
are based on moral philosophy. Indeed, such an argument largely reflects the 
development of media accountability given the reluctance of journalists to accept 
legislative or state involvement, instead working within cultural and individual 
frameworks of accountability. 
 
2.6: Media accountability  
McQuail (2003) argued that the main types of accountability can be categorised 
according to whether they relate to verbal, financial, performance rating, complaint and 
adjudication, public debate and liability for consequences issues. These types of 
accountability frameworks vary according to whether they are internal and private or 
external and public; voluntarily accepted or required; or, informal or binding. Thus, 
accountability mechanisms are either unilaterally imposed, or bilaterally or trilaterally 
agreed, largely based on the parties involved in the process and who takes the 
responsibility.  
According to Bertrand (2000; 2003), there are at least 60 different mechanisms used 
in the process of media accountability, which he refersd to as MAS, or media 
accountability systems. For Bertrand, a MAS is “any means of improving media services 
to the public that function(s) independently from the government” (2003: 17). A “the 
regulatory agency, set up in law - again provided it is truly independent - especially if it 
takes complaints from media users” is also considered under the MAS term (2003: 21).  
Fengler, Eberwein and Leppik-Bork (2011) have revised Bertrand’s MAS concept, 
arguing that MAIs, or media accountability instruments, widen the number of possible 
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inclusions in the format. MAIs are made up of established instruments of media 
accountability such as press councils, media criticism, and innovative instruments of 
media accountability such as websites monitoring media coverage, editorial weblogs, 
criticism on Facebook and Twitter. The authors accept that some MAIs, such as online 
ombudsmen, reflect already established mechanisms, but also point out that there are 
some web-native developments.  
Bertrand argued that the aim of media accountability is to:  
Improve the services of the media to the public; restore the prestige of 
media in the eyes of the population; diversely protect freedom of speech 
and press; obtain, for the profession, the autonomy that it needs to play 
its part in the expansion of democracy and the betterment of the fate of 
mankind (2000: 151) 
Fengler, Eberwein and Leppik-Bork, however, argued for a preventative and 
corrective function of MAIs. In their definition of MAIs (2011: 20), the authors argued 
they are “any informal institution, both offline and online, performed by both media 
professionals and media users, which intends to monitor, comment on and criticize 
journalism and seeks to expose and debate problems of journalism”. 
MAIs operate at four levels according to Fengler at al. (2014: 3): the individual level 
(e. g. journalist blogs and training), the level of media routines (e. g. professional 
standards derived from press councils and trade journals), the organizational level (e. g. 
organisational ethics codes, newsroom ombudsmen), and the extra-media level (e. g. 
social networks, NGOs). A further ideological level is also proposed, which incorporates 
transnational elements. As time has progressed, Fengler (2015: 3-4) points out that MAIs 
have developed at different levels, first at the professional level with ethics codes and 
press councils, second at the organisational level with the interest in ombudsmen post-
1970 in the US in particular, and third at the extra-media level as the exponential growth 
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of online communications has opened up a new frontier for direct communication 
between journalists and audiences. Bertrand (2003: 22-25) also reflects this diversity, 
classifying various forms of MAS which include internal or external, those defined 
according to method used to ensure accountability (e.g. criticism, monitoring, feedback), 
the level established (e.g. local, regional, national, international), the effect caused, 
timeframe (e.g. immediate, medium term, long term), costs and presence on the media 
scene. While acknowledging criticism and some flaws of MAS (2003: 30-32), Bertrand 
argued that MASs are the best non-state way to get the press to live up to its social 
responsibility role. 
McQuail (1997: 521-527) has also contributed to the topic by establishing three 
frames (four frames in his later work 2003: 219-227) of accountability in order to 
operationalize and categorise frameworks of accountability. Such frames provide a 
“reference within which expectations concerning conduct and responsibility arise and 
claims are expressed” and “governs the ways in which such claims should be handled” 
and indeed assessed (2003: 219). 
 First, the legal-regulatory frame is where rights and legislation is balanced between 
free expression and other personal rights like privacy. The legal-regulatory frame deals 
with issues such as intellectual property rights, free expression, harms to individuals, 
ownership and monopoly questions etc. The relevant discourse is legal-rational and 
administrative in character with procedures clearly set out. It is marked by a high degree 
of constraint and settlements of disputes are usually involuntary. Its strengths are its 
apparent ability to implement the public will in a clear and binding way. In a free society 
it should be used rarely and it serves to limit as well as secure freedom. In principle the 
frame is above sectional interests and is fair and transparent in its operation. The frame’s 
drawbacks are the obvious drawbacks on freedoms with beneficial outcomes for the 
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powerful in terms of economic power to use the legal mechanism. It is coercive and 
depends on concepts of harm and liability which are difficult to prove in a communicative 
setting. Legal outcomes can also be ineffective and unpredictable in their outcomes, nor 
are they easy to change.  
McQuail’s second frame is the financial/market one which deals with the normal 
disciplines of the market. Supply and demand secures the appropriate balance within this 
frame. The main issues handled in this framework are issues of property rights, freedom 
(diversity), quality and technological development. The underlying logic emphasises 
freedom, efficiency, choice, profitability and majority preference. The market model is 
flexible, adaptable and effective. It is also self-adjusting, sensitive to differing interests, 
provides consistent and predictable basis for judgements on disputed issues and in some 
respects is egalitarian and non-coercive while not being insensitive to ethics, often a 
component of good journalism and ultimately business. However, the market can lead to 
certain failures such as the development of monopolies while its structures seem 
“intrinsically flawed”. Poor quality communication content is blamed on the market 
while profitable content is not necessarily good nor does it serve the needs of citizens. 
Markets can also lead to concentrations of media power, reduced professional autonomy, 
an imbalance between suppliers and consumers in a relationship which becomes distant, 
calculative and manipulative.  
The third frame is public responsibility or trust. Its relevant goals reflect primary 
concern with society, the public good and ideal communication as information, opinion 
and culture. It is based on freedoms with concurrent responsibilities to the public interest. 
Many issues fall within this frame, including information and cultural quality measured 
in non-market ways, benefit or harm to the community, support for national culture and 
democracy. Often organised through self-regulatory methods of debate and assessment, 
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this model is most suitable for expressing and implementing the public interest and 
holding a free media to account in a free society. It meets criteria such as voluntariness, 
normative richness, as well as participative values. However, the frame is fragmentary, 
variable and weak in terms of implementation and depends on the tradition of the 
particular media system and on there being an existing active participatory democracy.  
Finally, McQuail identified the frame of professional responsibility which he accepts 
is similar to social responsibility. Here, accountability not only focused on a service to 
others but on protecting freedom and raising the status of the profession and its members. 
The means of regulating are similar to the public responsibility frame but the motives are 
different.  
Bardoel (2003) also established four similar mechanisms for categorising media 
accountability under the social responsibility model: market, political, professional and 
public. Under each Bardoel identified a number of outcomes, such as the principle role 
of the accountability mechanism (e.g. for profession, ethics is a key principle); the 
decision (where the authority lies); participation (the aims of the accountability 
mechanism); instrument (the criteria used for assessment) and effects (the perceived 
outcome of the action). McQuail correctly argued that his four frames are limited in their 
scope of application and effectiveness and all compete, in much the same way Bardoel’s. 
For example, the market will reward what regulation and social responsibility try to 
inhibit. While accountability operates not just to restrict but to stop tighter external 
controls, the frames are all weak on promoting better performance. In order to assess 
these frames, McQuail proposed four main criteria of assessment: practicality and 
effectiveness; issues and values; interest; Freedom of publication. 
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2.7: Press Councils  
As discussed previously, the concepts of autonomy and the development of journalistic 
norms are variables within Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) understanding of journalistic 
professionalization. On a normative level, ample research has attempted to examine the 
individual journalist’s perception of autonomy (Russo 1998; Weaver et al. 2009; 
Hanitzsch et al. 2010, 2011; Mellado et al. 2012). The assumption in much of the research 
is that a high level of independence and freedom from internal and external constraints is 
positive for  journalists. However, studies have returned varying levels of reported 
autonomy in news organisations (Hanitzsch et al. 2010, 2011). Journalistic norms are 
characterised by the development of horizontal journalistic standards and routine work 
practices, according to Hallin and Mancini (2004). The clearest text for understanding 
journalistic norms is the code of ethics (Cooper 1989: 30; White 1995: 455-456). There 
are, however, variations in the degree to which distinctively journalistic norms have 
evolved, the degree of consensus and their influence on news-making practices (Merill 
1975; Klaidman and Beauchamp 1987; O’Neill 1990; Christians et al. 1993; Hamelink 
1995; Laitila 1995; Page 1998; Hafez 2002; Harris 2002; Grevisse 2003; Sanders 2003; 
Himelboim and Limor 2008; Keeble 2008; Allen and Hindman 2014; Hansen 2014; Frost 
2015). Contemporary debate about codes of ethics focuses on the potential for interplay 
between ethics and legal issues (Christians 1986; Bertrand 2000; Drechsel 2014; Frost 
2015), the concept of a global code of communication ethics (Herrscher 2002; Tehranian 
2002; Ward 2005; Hansen 2014) and the impact that technological advancements and 
their use in the journalistic practice have had on codifying principles (Cooper 1998; 
Deuze and Yeshua 2001; Phillips 2010; Dodson 2012; Hansen 2014; Wyatt and Clasen 
2014).  
The third variable within Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) understanding of 
professionalization is the concept of a public service orientation. While the authors agree 
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that such an ethos is difficult to accept at face value given the critiques - some political 
economy based - which exist, they argued it should not be dismissed as “mere ideology” 
(2014: 36). Indeed, for Hallin and Mancini (2004: 36) the public service ethic may be 
particularly important for journalism “because journalism lacks esoteric knowledge” with 
“journalists’ claims to autonomy and authority…dependent…on their claim to serve the 
public interest”. Among the clearest manifestation of such an orientation is the 
development and existence of mechanisms of journalistic regulation, the authors pointed 
out.  Depending on the media system, such regulatory environments can be formally 
organised in the form of press councils, or informally designed and overseen by a “peer 
culture of journalism” (2014: 223). While the strength of such regulation varies across 
media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2014: 223-224) pointed out that in the Liberal/North 
Atlantic system professional self-regulation is common via informal channels established 
with news organisations and journalistic culture. Indeed, in practice there are internal 
variations within the Liberal/North Atlantic model when it comes to the success or 
otherwise of journalism regulation. 
Of the over 100 media accountability systems identified by Bertrand (2000), the press 
council is the most common. There are around 90 press councils currently in operation 
globally (Barker and Evans, 2007: 16). Press councils have been established at various 
levels since the acceptance of the social responsibility theme (Tulloch 1998). These 
include local community news councils in the US (Blankenburg 1969; Starck 1970; 
Atwood and Starck 1972; Bertrand 2003; Richstad 2003), regional or state councils such 
as those in Quebec, Canada (Pritchard 2000) and Minnesota in the US (Schafer 1979; 
Ugland and Breslin 2000) and national councils (Robertson 1983; O’Malley 1987; 
Morgan 1989; O’Malley and Soley 2000; Starck and Pottker 2003; Frost 2004; Cohen-
Almagor 2005; Barker and Evans 2007; Gore and Horgan 2010).   
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Beyond the cultural and institutional acceptance of social responsibility, O’Malley 
argued (1987: 105) that the institutionalisation of press regulation has normalised the 
“dynamic interrelations” of the press which can partly explain the popularity of the press 
council concept. However, Bertrand made the case (2003: 117) that there are other 
practical concerns behind the establishment of press councils. His research showed that 
press councils normally develop in urbanised, industrialised, pluralistic democracies with 
developed media and a professional journalistic ethos. Echoing the sentiments of Hallin 
and Mancini (2004), Bertrand correctly argues that where councils are common, the 
media system generally has links to the North Atlantic/Liberal tradition. Bertrand 
maintained that councils commonly emerge when stakeholder groups express particular 
anger or unhappiness with media performance in response to which the original impulse 
to establish a council mechanism usually originates from the media or media 
representative groups. When a democratic state is involved in its creation, Bertrand 
concluded, it commonly acts under pressure from journalists and is rarely set up without 
direct or indirect pressure from government or parliament. Further research supports the 
broad conclusions of Bertrand (Starck and Pottker 2003; Farrar 1986) and has shown that 
in the vast majority of countries, press councils have been set up as a “determined, 
pragmatic alternative response from the industry” (Fielden 2012: 8) to threats of state 
control. The experiences of various countries where press councils are operating – 
Australia (O’Malley 1987), Britain (Morgan 1989), Germany (Sarck and Pottker 2003) 
and Ireland (Gore and Horgan 2010) – also support this conclusion.  
However, as Bertrand pointed out (2003: 110), clearly defining the press council 
concept is problematic. Via his study of councils, he argued such regulatory mechanisms 
commonly aim to preserve press freedom against direct and indirect threats of 
governmental control, strive to assist the press to assume its functions in society, and 
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mobilise public opinion in support of an independent press. For Bertrand (2003: 114), 
councils usually have a dual purpose. First, to help the press in its struggle against 
enemies of its freedoms. Second, to deal with complaints. As Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
pointed out, however, cultural, economic and political influences impact on the 
formation, structures and procedures of the media and press accountability mechanisms. 
Such diversity, which Fielden (2012) explored in a study of press councils in Europe, 
suggests that establishing a clear definition of the press council is problematic, and must 
take into account a wide variation of structures, procedures and powers. Nevertheless, the 
literature suggests that there are commonalities worth exploring.  
Reaching a somewhat evaluative conclusion, Bertrand (2003: 112-113) identified 
three types of press council: pseudo-councils, semi-councils and genuine councils. The 
first two categories, for the author, lack robustness. However, the functions of the genuine 
council, which can comprise media and non-media members, includes monitoring the 
evolution of the media, publicising unethical trends, monitoring government 
communication policy and media ownership, serving as a forum for on-going ethical 
debate and monitoring journalism training and research. Such functions have been 
expressed across much of the literature in the area (Polich 1974: 200; Roberston 1983: 2; 
Balk 1986: 66; Farrar 1986: 509; Zlatev 2008). Adding to the literature, Pritchard (2000: 
93), who examined a range of press councils, pointed out that councils are often funded 
by news organisations or non-profit foundations, comprise of members from the media 
and the public, have limited legal power, receive complaints about press performance and 
have limited powers other than publicity. Barker and Evans (2007: 16-20) also identified 
many of these functions in their study of almost 90 press councils worldwide. 
Klaidman and Beauchamp (1989: 225-228) argued that to be successful, a press 
council must have sufficient, independent and secure funding (Morgan 1989; Bertrand 
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2003: 120; Cohen-Almagor 2005) , the independence to censure, the power to demand 
responses from the media and the support of powerful media. They also must be insulated 
from outside pressures and must have a monopoly on deciding press questions. Klaidman 
and Beauchamp also believed a press council needs significant column space in 
newspapers to publish findings which must be of sufficient quality and circulated widely 
given their role as the primary method of accountability. Summaries of decisions should 
be printed in full by all members while full decisions should be treated as news. Other 
scholars have also attempted to identify common or desired press council functions 
(Sawant 2003; Barker and Evans 2007; Zlatev 2008; Fielden 2012) with some concluding 
press councils require a consistent code of ethics and respect for precedent (Ugland and 
Breslin 2000) as well as powers to fine and suspend publications and journalists (Cohen-
Almagor 2005).  
Barker and Evans (2007: 11) established eight best-practice guidelines, much of 
which reflects the work of Klaidman and Beauchamp and others.  
 
Table 2: Barker and Evans' press council best practice (2007: 11) 
 Clearly specified goals, including timeliness of decisions 
 An organisational structure that: (a) renders funding and process transparent 
and accountable, and (b) enables the selection and employment of the 
appropriate decision makers 
 Adequate funding for its goals 
 Promotion of transparency and objectivity in its operation  
 Promotion of its presence and availability 
 Promotion and explanation of its outputs 
 Application of its outputs to relevant public policy issues and education 
 Reviews of its performance 
 
Irrespective of foundation, Bertrand believed press councils are the most successful form 
of media accountability system because of its ability to be a permanent, independent 
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institution that gathers and represents the people who own the power to inform, those 
who possess the talents to inform and those who have the right to be informed.  
By participating in a press council, owners acknowledge that their 
employees have a word to say in production and journalists 
acknowledge that media users also have a right to make their views 
heard – a great step for democracy (2003: 129) 
Bertrand also favoured press councils because they have an ability to adapt, unlike 
legislation that required parliamentary approval. Indeed, Pritchard (2000) and Henry 
(1989) also note that press councils provide the public with non-legal methods of ensuring 
accountability and media input. 
A press council is not an anti-media machine: lay members show no 
knee-jerk hostility. Actually, a council proves that most complaints are 
unjustified. And it saves the honest media from being tainted by the 
misbehaviour of a few. A council does not intimidate media: it is not 
concerned with their published opinions; and, as far as news is 
concerned, it distinguishes between documented and slanderous 
accusations, between a well-researched report and a sensationalised 
story. It does it better than a court of law. Thus it promotes vigorous 
journalism (Bertrand 2003: 130) 
There are a range of other benefits that press councils can deliver to the media 
industry, the public and wider democracy, including securing journalistic professionalism 
while freeing the media from legal restraint (Ritter and Leibowitz 1974), improving 
media literacy among the public (Blankenburg 1969; Atwood and Starck 1972), opening 
channels of non-legal mediation (Richstad 2003) and creating a culture of ethical 
awareness among journalists (Harcup 2007). 
A healthy scepticism about the success of press councils also exists in the literature. 
Barker and Evans (2007: 67-70) listed some of the most common criticisms that research 
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on press councils has identified. Such criticisms include fears over a demonstrable lack 
of independence, powerlessness in relation to investigations and sanctions, the failure to 
adequately publicise decisions, delays in issuing decisions, a lack of a right of appeal as 
well as vague ethical guidelines, poor management and general accessibility problems. 
Indeed, many criticisms are often connected to structural weaknesses owing to heavy 
industry control. Others have also levelled criticism at press councils over an inability to 
improve media behaviour (Atwood and Starck 1972), failures to meet due prominence 
demands in publishing corrections and apologies (Dornan 1991) and the hostility as well 
as passive support for regulation from the media (Balk 1986). For example, Cohen-
Almagor (2005) takes the Israeli Press Council to task for these issues and argues it is 
inconsistent, underfunded, poorly organised and non-formalised.  
Despite his obvious support for the concept, Bertrand (2003: 125-128) does accept 
that no press council has been shown to have actively participated in the progress of 
media. There are four key reasons for the failure of press councils according to his 
analysis. First, Bertrand argued that councils require particularly attractive cultural and 
political environments to survive, without which robust accountability is impossible.  
It requires a liberal press regime and media that are not state controlled. 
Media need not be commercial, but they need to be at least rich enough 
to finance the many activities that a council should have. Working 
journalists need to be true professionals, conscious of their duties and 
endowed with strong self-confidence. The country must not be split 
between two fiercely hostile ideological blocks. Also it must harbour a 
minority of enlightened citizens concerned with media. Lastly, among 
media owners, there must be people aware that the best long-term 
guarantee of profitability and expansion is quality control (2003: 126) 
A strong media resistance to press councils – usually based on claims about fears over 
press freedoms – is the second reason for their continued failure. Bertrand pointed out 
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that no negative consequences press councils have been linked with, such as a chilling 
impact on journalism, have ever materialised. Third, what Bertrand referred to as 
abnormalities in the make up of councils - such as when one grouping on the council 
becomes dominant - has had a damaging impact on councils. And finally, Bertrand 
criticised the lack of imagination and energy exhibited by press councils which, he 
argued, is the source of their obscurity. Indeed, he argued that the public is rarely hostile 
to press councils but doubt their effect and are unaware of their work. 
Despite the concerns of scholars and the failures of some press councils, the concept 
remains a popular one internationally. Scholars have, however, recommended various 
structural and procedural guidelines, which go some way to address the flaws of the 
concept. Pritchard (2000: 104) concluded - as have others (Ugland and Breslin 2000) - 
that press councils need to adopt a clear set of ethical principles in order to provide 
consistent and clear decision-making. In addition, he argued that in order to avoid claims 
of impartiality, press councils need to remain aware of the tendency to temper negative 
findings in favour of funders, a conclusion supported by Frost (2004) and Pritchard 
(2000). Pritchard also argued that press councils need to become proactive accountability 
agencies rather than reactive complaint handlers. While various studies have found 
elements of proactivity in the field (Barker and Evans 2007: 93; Fielden 2012), Lord 
Justice Leveson also concluded in the UK context that a strong council ought to be 
capable of starting its own investigations (2012: 13-18). 
The findings of studies such as the Barker and Evans (2007) survey, which 
demonstrate how public indifference and dissatisfaction can emerge, are worrying for 
press councils, considering that, as Ugland and Breland (2000: 134) have argued, councils 
require moral authority (“the ability to direct or substantially influence the decisions of 
others by serving as a reference for their moral or ethical choices”) and legitimacy in the 
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eyes of the public in order to function as effective accountability mechanisms. Indeed, as 
we have seen, much of the work on media accountability identifies an important role for 
the public/regulator relationship (Plaisnace 2000; Pritchard 2000; McQuail 2003). While 
the Barker and Evans (2007) study is limited in examining the prevailing attitudes in just 
one country (New Zealand), the findings nevertheless would lead one to suggest that a 
press council must improve its relationship with the public as a key constituent 
stakeholder.  
Other challenges for the concept exist. Gore and Horgan (2010: 530-531) identified a 
range of challenges that press councils face, and identified technological change as the 
first major threat to the viability of such press regulation. Technological changes give 
rise to an increasing reliance on the part of the press on entertainment-related content. As 
such, rumour rather than verifiability is, Gore and Horgan argued, becoming the default 
across large swathes of the print media, in both its traditional and online formats. This 
trend will clearly have consequences for press councils. Indeed, Clark (2012) also picked 
up on this point and questions whether press councils need to institute unique codes of 
standards for online news emerging from traditional print media outlets. This 
convergence is a bi-product of the vast technological changes impacting on the media. 
While press councils are aware of and are adapting to new media realities, a point Fielden 
made in her study (2012), what outcomes these changes have is open for debate and is 
likely to form a key part of evaluating regulatory mechanisms in the future. 
 The second challenge identified by Gore and Horgan (2010) is economic change. The 
continual preoccupation with profit exhibited by media companies has had many effects 
on the output and quality of the print media, including the loss of an experienced 
corporate memory in older staff who have been replaced by cheap younger labour, 
according to Gore and Horgan. Such an atmosphere may result in obvious accountability 
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and ethical knowledge gaps, and may also mean that the cost of regulation is seen as an 
optional extra for media managers. 
The third item is accountability. The authors point out that there is a growing public 
and political trend towards accountability which will see the spotlight focused on press 
accountability mechanisms, with greater significance potentially placed on market and 
statutory forms of press regulation. Indeed, this debate is already underway in Britain 
both prior to, and in the wake of the Leveson proposals, and many have already proposed 
forms of statutory regulation of the print press as a means to empowering self-regulatory 
regimes (O’Malley and Soley 2000; Brock 2011; Freedman 2012; Jones 2012; Cohen-
Almagor 2014). 
Finally, Gore and Horgan identify effectiveness as a continuing challenge for non-
statutory press councils. The authors call for the continuous study of “effectiveness, 
responsiveness and power to maintain standards and enforce desired change” (2010: 531) 
of press regulatory efforts as a means to develop a model of best practice and to identify 
potential weaknesses of established regulatory mechanisms. 
Across the Liberal/North Atlantic media systems, a variety of press regulatory 
councils exist. Each country – the US, Ireland, Britain and Canada - and indeed regional 
areas within some of the countries have experience of the press council. While structures 
and procedures vary from country to country, the existing research suggests a unifying 
theme across the Liberal/North Atlantic media system: that industry power over self-
regulatory instruments has infected regulatory structures, procedures and decision-
making, resulting in credibility problems and regulatory failures. In the following section 
the existing literature on a number of press councils operating in North Atlantic Liberal 
countries will be examined. 
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2.7.1: The United States 
Ugland and Breslin (2000) examined the Minnesota News Council’s (MNC), a US-based 
press council. The authors focused on its consistency in relation to ethical principles and 
its use of precedent as a methodological basis for assessing if it had achieved the moral 
authority and legitimacy press councils require to be successful. The authors concluded 
(2000: 245-246) that the MNC failed to identify or articulate clear principles for decisions 
and lacked consistency due to an indifference to past cases. As a result the council’s 
legitimacy was fatally undermined. While the research found some deference was given 
to certain journalistic principles, every written determination should have been built on 
one or more statement of principle. Furthermore, some MNC statements lacked crucial 
specificity, which Ugland and Breslin identified as a reliance on meta-rules, or “broad, 
categorical synthesis of more discrete ethical principles” which “are always applicable 
but rarely helpful” (2000: 240). Ugland and Breslin concluded that the MNC did exhibit 
consistent decision-making but noted some notable exceptions where it appeared to 
contradict its own jurisprudence. 
The Council has made almost no effort to evaluate current cases by 
analyzing, citing, and distinguishing earlier ones. It rarely cites its own 
decisions, legal principles, other news council rulings, ethics codes or 
guidelines, or any other source of authority. The impression left is that 
the Council is situationalist, which provides little comfort for potential 
participants in the news council process, and it suggests to the public 
and news media that the Council’s rulings have little lasting relevance 
(2000: 246)   
The MNC ceased operations in 2011, with its President Tony Carideo citing a decline 
in complaints and falling levels of corporate funding as the reasons behind its closure.  
The National News Council (NNC), which ceased taking complaints in 1984, has also 
been the subject of research which reflects poorly on its accountability processes. It was 
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a national press council that accepted complaints over newspaper coverage from 
publications across the United States. Newspapers were not obliged to cooperate with the 
organisation, but rather were asked to adhere to the NNC voluntarilty.  
In response to calls for it to be reinstituted, Ugland (2008) reassessed the council and 
identified similar failures found in the MNC. He found little evidence to suggest that the 
NNC was an extra legal mechanism for policing the press. Instead, Ugland’s research 
showed that the NNC routinely violated its own procedures and structures by allowing 
media members of the council to outnumber public members. Ugland concluded that the 
NNC established a prohibitively high burden for complainants to meet, highlighted First 
Amendment rights in a way not germane to ethics-based inquiries and applied a 
conventional set of ethical standards in decision making without articulating justifying 
rationales or engaging in an examination of alternatives. The NNC, according to Ugland, 
also suffered from a lack of publicity and funding. 
Hodges (2004: 174) argued the NNC, and other methods of press accountability 
failed, because they did not adequately define the concept of press responsibility without 
which using accountability mechanisms as a means to coerce responsible journalism are 
undermined.  For Klaidman and Beauchamp (1989: 225-228) the NNC was virtually 
unrecognised by external public stakeholders, lacked support from its other key 
constituent group – journalists and editors – and failed to gain acceptance from some of 
the largest national newspaper in the US, such as the New York Times, which others 
(Jaehnig 1998) have argued was ultimately behind its eventual closure. While Klaidman 
and Beauchamp are supportive of the press council concept, arguing that vigorous self-
monitoring can provide a barrier against the threat of state encroachment, the news 
council’s staff were too timid. Henry (1989) also cited staffing issues as a key problem 
behind the failure of the NNC. For Henry, press councils require large staffs familiar with 
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and capable of dealing with complex journalistic issues. The NNC did not meet this 
requirement, relying instead, he argued, on inexperienced staff. 
 
2.7.2: Canada 
Pritchard (2000) identified “structural flaws” in the decision-making the Quebec Press 
Council (QPC) in Canada. The QPC is a voluntary organisation that adjudicates on 
complaints concerning all media outlets in the region. Pritchard’s research (2000: 95-
103) suggested it has been hindered by a “chronic inability to decide cases quickly” due, 
in part, to a failure to develop and cultivate jurisprudential precedent with decision-
makers dealing with each complaint on an ad hoc basis without reference to guidelines. 
Pritchard believed the QPC’s reliance on industry funding undermined its independence 
and found that in over 85 per cent of cases examined, the QPC found in favour of the 
organisations which funded it. Echoing the sentiments of Ugland and Breslin, Ugland 
and Cohen-Almagor, Pritchard also found the QPC decided upon complaints in an 
inconsistent fashion. However, for Pritchard, the inconsistency was not random. “Rather, 
it clearly suggested that the QPC had undue sympathy for parties to which it had financial 
ties” (2000: 102). Pritchard also criticised the QPC for being reactive rather than 
proactive in investigating breaches of good practice in the press. 
 
2.7.3: The United Kingdom 
The Press Complaints Commission was a voluntary complaints handling mechanism that 
dealt with national and regional newspaper in the UK. Membership of the PCC was 
voluntary. The PCC was set up in 1990 as a successor to the Press Council, a largely 
similar complaint handling mechanism. It ceased operations in 2014.  
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In 2012, Lord Justice Leveson said the PCC was unfit for purpose. He argued the PCC 
had “serious structural deficiencies” (2012: 1576), was given “barely enough money” to 
perform its regulatory functions (2012: 1577), associated itself too closely with the press, 
failed to initiate its own investigations “other than in circumstances where an 
investigation was needed to head off criticism of the press or self-regulation” (2012: 
1577) nor investigations where press actions may result in civil or criminal claims, and 
didn’t have sufficient powers of investigation nor sanction. Leveson argued these failures 
“fatally undermined the PCC and caused policy makers and the public to lose trust in the 
self-regulatory system” provided by the PCC (2012: 1579). Leveson also correctly 
identified that criticism of the PCC was nothing new (2012: 1579). Indeed, Bingham 
(2007: 86) pointed out that within two years of its opening, the PCC had received a 
“devastating indictment” in a state report conducted by David Calcutt.  
Frost (2004) examined ten years of the PCC’s work. During that time, it received 
23,000 complaints. Of these, Frost found that just 321 adjudications were upheld against 
newspapers, just over one per cent. Just 71 cases per year were adjudicated, around half 
as many as its predecessor, The Press Council, which was also continually and widely 
criticised for similar failures (O’Malley and Soley 2000: 51-87). Frost’s research 
suggested that the vast majority of complaints were never examined for various reasons 
including claims they were resolved informally, due to unreasonable delay, because the 
PCC ruled the complaints were outside its remit and because no breach of its code could 
be identified on first examination of the complaint. Frost pointed out that the number of 
PCC complaint adjudications actually fell over its first five years while complaints it 
received were increasing. This research also reflected the sentiments of Pritchard (2000) 
on independence, finding that despite being the most complained about, The Sun and The 
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News of the World newspapers, owned by News International, had the lowest level of 
upheld complaints when compared to other national titles.  
 Frost argued (2004: 113-114) that the PCC’s two main claims - that self-regulation 
was working quickly and effectively and that it had encouraged a change of culture in the 
British press - were unsupported by evidence. Each tabloid, despite facing a barrage of 
complaints, only faced one or two upheld cases a year and even then the sanction of 
printing the negative decision had little impact due to a failure to get the decisions printed 
with due prominence. Despite arguing that the rise and fall of complaints were separately 
positive signs of increasing public awareness and decreasing unethical behaviour, such 
claims could not have been supported according to Frost. Instead, he argued that the PCC 
was designed as a mechanism to reject the vast majority of complaints.  
O’Malley and Soley (2000: 135) also found that both the Press Council and the PCC 
“became efficient mechanisms for rejecting complaints” and conclude that both systems 
of self-regulation issued adjudications according to an inconsistent framework which was 
at times unsystematic. Both regulatory councils produced compilations of rulings but few 
declarations of principle. While both managed increasing levels of complaints, which 
indicated greater public awareness, evidence suggests that self-regulation was not a 
positive institution designed to deal effectively with complaints and protect press 
freedom. Instead, it defended proprietors from encroachments of politicians, journalists 
and the public. Others (Keeble 2001: 15 and Harcup 2007: 106-115) have also cited 
similar criticisms. 
 
 
2.8: Conclusion 
This chapter began by discussing media and media system theory. It settled on the 
Liberal/North Atlantic model system proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the most 
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viable framework for an examination of press regulation. The Chapter traced the 
development of journalistic responsibility from the initial conception of a completely free 
media to one which has accepted that, with such freedoms come concomitant 
responsibilities. What these responsibilities are was then discussed, as well as the internal 
dynamic of how such obligations are ensured via the concept of accountability. The 
Chapter then examined media accountability mechanisms for ensuring the press lives up 
to these standards. As discussed, the press council is perhaps the most popular of these, 
in particular in media systems in and influenced by the Liberal/North Atlantic tradition. 
Despite this, the success of non-institutionalised and informal press councils has been 
extremely limited in the UK, Canada and the US.  
In response to these failures, academics, policy makers and the press have sought 
appropriate alternative regulatory mechanisms. The collapse of the PCC and criticisms 
during the Leveson Inquiry in the UK focused attention on self-regulation and its 
problems. In Ireland, a variation of self-regulation has been operating since 2008. The 
PCI is an “independent” system of press regulation recognised in law. This gives a third 
way status of neither self-regulation nor state regulation. Thus, this unique format, which 
exhibits strong differences with Hallin and Mancini’s conception of regulation in the 
Liberal/North Atlantic system, requires further study. The political, social and media 
debate around press regulation in Ireland which pre-dated the PCI’s establishment is 
discussed in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Irish Press Regulation 
 
3.1: Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the theoretical debates around press regulation and how Hallin and 
Mancini’s (2004) North Atlantic Liberal system related to such regulatory functions. It 
also discussed failures in Canada, Britain and the US where self-regulation has been the 
norm. This chapter begins by examining the early debate in Ireland around the idea of a 
regulatory organisation for the press. This will be done by examining public debates – 
much of it material from newspapers – between the 1960s and early 1990s. This chapter 
will then examine how various governments dealt with the topic during the 1990s and 
2000s. A number of official reports and studies will also be examined in detail. Finally, 
the chapter will explore the treatment of the initial concept for the PCI and how it emerged 
via political and media debate to become an independent and institutionalised form of 
press regulation, the first of its kind in the North Atlantic Liberal system. 
 
3.2: 1968-1991 - Initial debate 
Much of the early coverage in the Irish media on the concept of a press council or 
ombudsman dealt with how similar systems worked in Britain. In the years which 
followed the publication of the First Royal Commission of the Press in 1949 and the 
setting up of the British Press Council, Irish newspapers occasionally covered the high-
profile cases and public comments regarding the council’s operations and findings. But 
ethical self-reflection in the Irish media was rare. One possible reason for this is that Irish 
newspapers were relatively tame publications. Marron (1996), in her study of journalistic 
professionalism in Ireland, found that Irish journalists cited a variety of reasons for a 
reticent journalistic environment, including an underdeveloped journalism culture, a lack 
of resources and strict libel laws (1996: 37). 
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Nevertheless, there were some occasions when the Irish media debated the concept of 
a press council. In 1968 and 1970 the Dublin Branch of the National Union of Journalists 
put the topic on its agenda. At a meeting in late 1968, the Branch agreed that it “should 
consider a resolution exploring the possibility of taking steps to have a press council 
established in Ireland” (Irish Independent 1968). At a meeting in 1970, Branch chairman, 
Maurice Hickey, came down against the idea. Hickey said press council proposals were 
unacceptable if intended solely as “a handy stick to beat the newspapers and journalists” 
with (Irish Press 1970). “Groups who feel that they get unfavourable publicity in the 
newspapers have an easy remedy - the employment of a good PRO,” Hickey said. One 
NUJ meeting heard from member and then Irish Times’ Industrial Correspondent Pat 
Nolan who said there was support for a press council among the union’s membership on 
the proviso that it was protective of journalism rather than restrictive (Ibid).  
The union’s contribution sparked an internal debate within the Irish media. Dick 
Walsh, a columnist with the Irish Times, argued in favour of a press council (Walsh 
1970a). “It would be encouraging to believe that a council might be set up in Ireland 
before it becomes a necessity. But one does not have to be a pessimist to expect that the 
decision will be put off until action is the alternative to atrophy (1970: 7).” Dermot Walsh, 
an Irish Independent columnist, argued that “even a cursory appraisal of the 
correspondence columns of the press testifies to the necessity to establish a Press 
Council” (Walsh 1970b). Not only would a council investigate complaints, he concluded, 
but it would also protect press freedoms. In the same year, however, the Irish Press 
carried a leader entitled: “No case for council.” It pointed out that press council proposals 
had been put forward by various sectors in Irish society at that stage, “without attracting 
any appreciable volume of enthusiasm or support” (Irish Press 1970b). Indeed, the leader 
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argued that Irish newspapers did not indulge in the same ethically questionable behavior 
that the Fleet Street tabloid press was accused of: 
It may be argued that the newspapers themselves are, perhaps, too close 
to the issue to be the most objective of judges…Indeed, it is probably 
true to say that there are hardly any newspapers here which would fear 
the existence of such a body but as yet there is hardly any worthwhile 
evidence to support the institution of a council (1970b: 10) 
In 1972, in what The Irish Times reported was the “first public seminar on the issue”, 
various senior media figures expressed differing  views after hearing a presentation from 
Lennart Groll, the then Swedish Press Ombudsman (Musgrave 1972: 13). Douglas 
Gageby, the editor of The Irish Times, Tadgh Cramer, the editor of the Cork Examiner, 
Desmond Fisher, the deputy head of news at RTÉ, the state broadcaster, and Pat Lynch 
of the NUJ are all reported to have made contributions to the seminar in support of the 
press council concept. The report on the event concluded that no agreement was reached 
about what an Irish press council might look like, and noted that Sean Cantwell, a chief 
leader writer with the Irish Independent, and Tim Pat Coogan, the editor of the Irish 
Press, were indifferent to the idea, with Coogan describing a press council as “a glorious 
irrelevance” (Ibid). Despite the lack of a solid recommendation, one unnamed editor was 
quoted as saying the seminar “may have started something which will have far-reaching 
effects” (Ibid). Reflecting on the event, an editorial in The Irish Times argued that a press 
council free from state influence should be examined. 
If there is, in fact, a demand among the Irish public for a press council, 
the newspaper industry as a whole would be wise to take it seriously. 
So far it has not been clearly or firmly expressed. Even if there is not, 
there are good enough reasons as to why journalists should now be 
looking at the situation (Irish Times 1972c)  
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Later in the decade, Oliver Maloney, the Director General of RTÉ, criticised 
“hypocritical” press journalism which held other institutions to account, including RTÉ, 
but failed to adequately report on internal struggles within its own industry (Irish Times 
1976). Maloney said he and many of his media colleagues recognised a decline in 
standards in the press. To address this, Maloney proposed that the government abolish 
VAT on newspaper sales and that a Council of Media Freedom and Responsibility be 
established. The council, which would include broadcasters, would protect press 
freedoms, encourage higher standards, develop media education, review journalistic 
training, examine technology-related implications for the media and monitor 
concentration of ownership. Maloney did not identify any public complaints function for 
the council but said it would include “distinguished laymen” as members.  
I have, for many years, tended to resist the notion of a press council, 
mainly because I feared that it might be repressive in its general 
approach. However, there is a groundswell of opinion – among 
journalists as well as laymen – that a reappraisal of inherited traditions 
of news values now needs to be carried out. Press freedom must be 
protected in this process, but it cannot be protected by glossing over the 
problems. I believe that a forum must be provided for responsible 
public discussion of threats to the freedom of the media and for 
discussion of journalistic departures from accepted standards of 
accuracy and fairness (Irish Times 1976: 8) 
At the turn of the decade, Coogan, the Irish Press editor, changed his mind on the 
press council concept, while Conor Brady, the assistant editor of The Irish Times, 
expressed a different opinion to his then editor (Irish Press 1980). Both Coogan and Brady 
spoke at a press freedom event in Dublin, with Coogan arguing for a freedom of 
information law to be introduced alongside an industry operated press council which 
would have an independent chairman. The Irish council would be funded by newspapers 
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and would have powers to impose publication of its work on member newspapers, 
Coogan proposed. While Brady said newspapers did not need another layer of regulation, 
doubting the credentials of an organisation made up of members of the press, the debate 
remained largely in the self-regulatory arena. At no stage was the idea of state 
involvement raised.   
Political debate about press standards developed in parallel with similar discussions 
occurring within the media. Horgan (2001), in his historical account of the development 
of the Irish media, highlights how a traditionally deferential Irish media began to change 
in the 1960s. In particular, Horgan (2001: 86) pointed to the 1969 RTÉ broadcast of 
current affairs programme 7 Days as a catalyst for a debate about modern journalistic 
standards. The programme dealt with claims that illegal moneylending was widespread, 
using hidden cameras and microphones as well as actors. In response to the programme, 
the then Fianna Fáil government established a tribunal of inquiry to investigate how the 
broadcast was made, “the authenticity of the programme” and the material held by RTÉ 
in relation to its work on the episode (Dáil Eireann 1969).   
The tribunal’s findings about the broadcast were largely negative (Horgan  2001: 86). 
Using the 7 Days affair as a springboard (Irish Times 1969), Neville Keery of Fianna 
Fáil, a former journalist and university lecturer, became the first politician to speak 
seriously about press regulation. In January 1970 Keery sent his proposals to a number 
of media stakeholders, including newspapers, seeking the establishment of a self-
regulatory press council – despite remarking during a Seanad debate in 1969 that if the 
press did not formulate a council, then government should (Irish Times 1969). In the letter 
Keery laid out seven investigative functions for a press council:  
 Maintenance of the freedom of the press in Ireland; 
 Questions relating to the professional standards of journalists and the training of 
journalists; 
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 Complaints by journalists about the influence of advertisers and advertising agents; 
 Complaints by editors or other journalists that they have been improperly advised by 
their employers or superiors to suppress opinion, distort the truth or otherwise engage in 
unprofessional conduct; 
 Complaints by members of the public about invasions of privacy and the suppression or 
distortion of factual information or a point of view by editors or journalists; 
 Questions concerning the relationship between government and press; 
 Changes in the ownership, control and growth of press undertakings; (Keery 1970) 
 
Keery recognised the potential impact that internal influences could have on 
journalists, and spoke from a position of experience given his journalism background. He 
believed a council could protect journalists from such advertising and management 
pressure.  
The senator’s plan did not meet with government approval. The first official 
government response came in the Dáil a month later, on 4 February (Dáil Eireann 1970). 
In response to a Dáil question, Jack Lynch, the then Fianna Fáil Taoiseach, said:  
I have seen no demand from the public or from the industry itself for 
the setting up of a press council in this country. In the circumstances, 
although, in principle, I see merit in the idea, I am not prepared to take 
steps to set up a press council (Dáil Eireann 1970) 
 Nevertheless, senior political figures continued to debate the topic. In 1972, at a press  
event, Gerry Collins, the then Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, said the concept would 
“fit neatly into our view of Irish democracy” (Irish Press 1972).  Collins, while praising 
the press for its professionalism, stressed the formation of a council was a matter for the 
press and not for government.  
The following year, 1973, the arrest of a former IRA chief of staff on board a ship 
returning from Libya sparked a media frenzy. The ship, the Claudia, was carrying 
weaponry and explosives provided by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. During the National 
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Press Awards that year, Liam Cosgrave, the then Fine Gael Taoiseach, said a particular 
report about the Claudia affair had been “a lapse in the proper standards of serious 
journalism” (Irish Independent 1973). Cosgrave claimed the article in question was based 
on rumour and had damaged national security. He called on the press to examine the 
institution of a press council to eliminate such journalism (Ibid), remarks echoed the 
following year by the Chairman of the Northern Ireland Labour Party, Brian Garrett (Irish 
Times 1974).  
While senior members of government were reluctant to get directly involved with the 
press – if keen to see a commitment to stricter ethical standards – broadcasting policy 
suggested a very different approach. Section 31 of the Broadcasting Act 1962 allowed 
for the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs to ban the broadcast of particular content from 
RTÉ, a measure which attracted no protest from journalists or their representative groups 
until it was invoked in October 1971 (Horgan 2010). The directive was issued as armed 
conflict in Northern Ireland between the IRA and British forces intensified. Its intention 
was to bar “any organisation which engages in, promotes, encourages or advocates the 
attaining of any particular objective by violent means” from the airwaves (Horgan 2010: 
380). While not made implicit until 1975, in practice Section 31 resulted in a virtual 
blanket broadcast ban on IRA spokesmen and members of its political wing Sinn Féin. 
The ban resulted in divisive internal rows in RTÉ between those who supported it and 
those against it which continued until it was revoked in January 1994 by Michael D. 
Higgins, a Labour communications minister (Ibid).  
Thus, the debate surrounding press regulation must be framed by the influence that 
Section 31 undoubtedly had on the media and political landscape at that time. Despite the 
continued existence of the broadcasting ban throughout the 1970s, government declined 
to support a role for the state in press regulation. In 1977, Liam Cosgrave, who had earlier 
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made comments about a press council after the Claudia affair, said he believed there was 
“no sustained demand” for a council (Dáil Eireann 1977). Indeed, he told the Dáil it was 
not “accepted that the initiative for it lies with the government” (Ibid). In a trend apparent 
throughout the time, one government minister followed up the Taoiseach by highlighting 
the need for some sort of self-regulatory organization. Two days after Cosgrave’s Dáil 
remarks, Patrick Cooney, the then Minister for Justice, said he favoured a self-regulatory 
press council.  
It is very noticeable in recent times how frequently newspapers and 
journals have had to print apologies and corrections following the 
publication of erroneous material always about individuals or situations 
which the most elementary piece of research could have avoided. In 
some instances the checks necessary were so easy and obvious that one 
wonders was the error deliberate. Standards leading to such practices 
cry out for supervision by the profession itself (Irish Independent 1977: 
3)  
In an editorial, the Irish Press criticised Cooney’s remarks, accusing the then 
government of attempting to bring “in the most anti-democratic and potentially crippling 
restriction on press freedom to be found this side of the Iron Curtain” (Irish Press 1977), 
while Douglas Gageby said he was suspicious of government motives for press regulation 
(Irish Times 1977). 
Between 1979 and 1983, during a period of significant political instability, three 
different Taoisigh insisted that government would not regulate press standards. Jack 
Lynch and Charles Haughey, both Fianna Fáil, holders of the office in 1979 and 1980 
respectively, said it was a matter for the press (Dáil Eireann 1979; Dáil Eireann 1980). 
“It is something which I do not think could be imposed on them,” said Lynch, while 
Haughey suggested that “responsible journalists would support the idea of a press 
council”. In 1983, Dr. Garrett Fitzgerald, the then Fine Gael Taoiseach, told the Dáil that 
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the government had no plans to establish a press council and had not received proposals 
from the media (Dáil Eireann 1983). Various TDs from all parties continued to issue calls 
for the newspaper industry to respond to a perceived decline in standards by establishing 
a press council over the following years (Power 1986; Dáil Eireann 1988). 
During the period, several stakeholder groups in Irish society also had their say on the 
potential formation of a press council. In June 1970, the Irish Transport and General 
Workers’ Union (ITGWU) passed a motion calling for a council (Irish Press 1970a). 
Michael Mullen, the ITGWU general secretary, said a council would ensure fair comment 
and reporting in the news media. Mullen proposed that the Irish Congress of Trade 
Unions set up the council with funding from constituent bodies and the Department of 
Finance. Two years later, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) upheld the call at 
its annual conference, notably with the support of the NUJ (Cummins 1972) with ITGWU 
repeating the call – this time for an “independent” council - the following year (Irish 
Times 1973).  
The issue resurfaced for unions in the 1980s. In 1982, the Dublin Council of Trade 
Unions called for the “urgent” establishment of a press council in response to “inaccurate 
and ill-inspired” media coverage of public service running costs (Irish Press 1982b). 
Later that year, Christy Kirwan, ITGWU’s vice-president, called for the creation of a 
statutory press council “to ensure that information is disseminated by the media is fair 
and accurate and that comment and speculation are not expressed as established fact” 
(Irish Press 1982c).  
I know that there are some people who may baulk at the mention of 
statutory powers for the council because it would mean that Dáil 
Eireann would have a role in establishing it. They would fear with some 
justification that the temptation for ministerial meddling in so sensitive 
an area would be irrestable (sic) to politicians, but the absence of a 
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statutory base for such a press council would almost inevitably 
condemn it to being a carbon-copy of the tothless (sic) watchdog which 
masquerades as a press council in Britain. The danger of political 
interference is a risk we would have to take in order to ensure that our 
watchdog would not only bark but bite as well (1982c) 
The Association of Secondary Teachers in Ireland said it wanted a press council in 
May 1984 (Irish Press 1984), while in April 1987 another large teacher union, the Irish 
National Teachers Organisation, called for a statutory press council in a unanimously 
adopted resolution at its annual conference (Nolan 1987).  
The religious were also keen for input in the debate, but rarely overtly expressed 
opinions about press regulation in public during this time. In December 1968, the Irish 
Spotlight, a publication of the Dominican Order, called on newspapers to “take...action 
with a certain amount of haste” to set up a press council. The editorial argued for a self-
regulated council which would “warn off anyone who may wish to tamper with [press] 
freedom” (Irish Press 1968). In November 1985, Brendan Comiskey, the Bishop of 
Ferns, said a Press Council or Press Ombudsman was required to restore public 
confidence in the press (Irish Press 1985).  
In January 1982, the first record of the judiciary publicly entering the press council 
debate was recorded when Mr. Justice Rory O’Hanlon said if it was constitutionally 
possible, a council should be set up with “the power to impose severe penalties on the 
media” due to the unsuitability of libel being the only avenue for redress (Irish Press 
1982a).  
Periodic debate about the establishment of an Irish press council did take place in 
various areas of Irish life. In the media and the press, there was support, but often this 
support was cautious and based on the proviso that government have no role. There were 
also those in the media who suggested that VAT and libel reform ought to be a quid pro 
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quo for press self-regulation. In the political sphere, TDs and Senators often debated a 
perceived decline in press standards, with many calls for regulation in one form or 
another. At the highest levels of government, there were mixed messages. On the one 
hand, a number of Taoisigh said government had no plans for the establishment of a press 
council, placing the impetus for the initiative with the press, while other senior cabinet 
ministers categorically expressed interest for the idea. Perhaps the most strident calls for 
press regulation, which would be statutory in nature, came from the trade unions, 
however, despite the continuing debate, no side brought forward detailed proposals on 
the subject. Thus, the concept remained one for debate rather than tangible development. 
In the 1990s, however, the debate would intensify.  
 
 
3.3: 1991-1997 - Momentum grows 
In 1988, the National Newspapers of Ireland (NNI), an industry representative 
organisation, published a report on press freedom and libel (McGonagle and Boyle 1988). 
The report recommended that individual newspapers appoint a staff member to deal with 
readers’ complaints in an ombudsman-style manner. A self-regulatory solution, it was the 
first time that Irish newspapers had displayed a unified response to the issue of non-legal 
complaints handling, although the scheme stopped short of establishing any external 
autonomous organisation. According to Louis O’Neill of the Irish Times, who was the 
NNI chairman: 
The idea behind the system is a simple one – to provide the public with 
a clearly identifiable individual within each newspaper whose task is to 
act on their behalf, seeking corrections and clarifications or explaining 
why none is warranted, as is appropriate (1995: 4) 
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By the time of a follow-up report seven years later, also commissioned by the NNI 
and carried out by the same authors (McGonagle & Boyle 1995), “readers’ 
representatives” were in place in every NNI member publication. In their second report, 
McGonagle and Boyle made a number of findings in relation to the operation of this 
limited system of accountability - mainly positive - coming down strongly in favour of 
self-regulation4. The authors concluded that there was no justification for the 
establishment of a press council, partly because informal mechanisms already provided 
non-financial compensation (1995: 34) However, they noted that the regulatory regime 
may need reevaluation should Irish newspapers “respond to the agenda set by the British 
tabloids” (1995: 35), by then a permanent fixture in the Irish media market (see Horgan 
2001). They also suggested that consideration be given to an external system of complaint 
appeal outside the press (1995: 35). Under the NNI’s umbrella, this was the first time that 
national newspapers in Ireland addressed the issue in any unified way, albeit an industry 
group dominated by newspaper executives rather than journalists or editors. The idea of 
a press council, whether self-regulatory or otherwise, did not appear to excite newspaper 
executives.  
Despite the fig leaf of readers’ representatives, politicians continued to highlight the 
merits of further regulatory mechanisms (Irish Independent 1991a; Irish Independent 
                                                 
4 First, the readers’ representative complaint system was commended as a “valuable services to 
both reader and newspaper” (1995: 1) which had significant respect and buy in from journalists 
(1995: 31). Second, the study found that corrections were printed promptly – indicating “a very 
high standard in the promptness of the service” (1995: 1) with 85 per cent of agreed corrections 
printed in the next available edition of the publication and only 4 per cent of complaints left 
unresolved. However, the report also found that on both of the newspapers studied, less than a 
third of complaints were settled with corrections while many cases were “settled by other means”, 
categorized as no action required or requested and no outcome known (1995: 25-26). The report 
found that the main reason for complaint was inaccuracy with few complaints of privacy 
invasions or taste which “underlines the high standards of Irish journalism” (1995: 1). Fourth, 
McGonagle and Boyle recommended that the readers’ representative system or an alternative be 
expanded and taken up by all publications and finally the study called for defamation, contempt 
and official secrecy reforms. 
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1991b; Carey 1992). Again, government was against the idea. The then Fianna 
Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition, in October 1992, maintained that it was opposed to 
any statutory intervention. Maire Geoghegan-Quinn, the Communications Minister, said: 
“I don’t believe that a statutory body with heavy-handed powers is what is required today 
- indeed, if anything is required (McKenna 1992).” In a Seanad speech she pointed out 
that the effectiveness of the British Press Council was being questioned but said a 
statutory body would have little usefulness if it could not impose sanctions on editors.  
Such an arrangement could have the highly undesirable effect of 
stifling good investigative journalism on which our democracy depends 
in part and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to apply those 
standards to imported newspapers (McKenna 1992: 16) 
As previous governments had indicated, Geoghegan-Quinn also said there was merit 
in the idea of a voluntary self-regulatory press council. Dáil records show various TDs 
continued to insist on regulatory provisions for the press (Dáil Eireann 1995, Dáil Eireann 
1996a). 
Later that year, in June, Cardinal Cahal Daly, the Catholic Primate of All Ireland, 
reiterated church calls for a complaints mechanism: “We depend upon the moral integrity 
of media communicators themselves to protect the media from abuse of power, but some 
form of self-criticism within the journalistic profession is also needed (Kennedy 1992: 
76).” 
In the wake of the collapse of the Press group of newspapers in 1995 and the 
increasing circulation of British titles, the then Rainbow Coalition government of Fine 
Gael, Labour and Democratic Left initiated an inquiry into the newspaper industry in 
1995. The Commission on the Newspaper Industry was chaired by Chief Justice Thomas 
Finlay and was primarily set up to deal with issues around media ownership. However, 
under its terms of reference, Richard Bruton, the then Minister for Enterprise and 
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Employment, asked the commission to consider “the correct balance between privacy and 
press freedom including consideration of the desirability of a mechanism for complaint 
and adjudication and of changes in the libel laws” (Department of Trade, Industry and 
Employment 1996: 7). The establishment of the commission was the most significant 
development in the evolving debate about press standards and reader redress.  
The Commission’s terms of reference were split into three separate issues. First, it 
looked at the correct balance between privacy and press freedom. It found that the right 
to privacy and the right to free expression and a free press, all exist in Irish law under the 
constitution and are therefore not absolute, existing in an endless balancing act.5  
Second, the Commission examined a mechanism of complaint and adjudication. It 
conducted a survey (and relied on submissions from members of the press and others) to 
assess the newspaper industry’s attitude to privacy in order to provide context for its 
deliberations on the issue. The commission found that the respect for privacy across the 
Irish newspaper industry was “generally good and seen to be good” (1996: 57). It believed 
that the adherence to standards and ethics was “not...seriously flawed” but took note of 
concerns over treatment of minority groups, such as Travellers (1996: 58). The 
Commission also noted concerns about sensationalism with its survey finding that 
respondents felt British titles had a lesser regard for privacy and ethics, and that Irish 
publications could follow such examples to attract readers (1996: 58). The Commission 
argued that Irish newspapers had a good system of accountability with Irish editors 
                                                 
5 It said breaches of privacy may be justified where “the person holds public office, deals with 
public affairs, follows a public career, or has sought or obtained publicity for their activities” 
(1996: 56). “In any circumstances such as these, where the information revealed could affect the 
validity of a person’s conduct, or the credibility of their statements, or the value of their views, 
publication of relevant details of their private life and circumstances becomes justifiable and 
necessary (1996: 56).” However, the commission also concluded that the public interest must be 
“distinguished from mere curiosity or an appetite for sensationalism” (1996: 57). It concluded 
that the privacy of a child must be respected - except where an invasion could contribute to the 
welfare of the child or other children (1996: 57).   
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emphasising their relationship with readers and also expressing support for further self-
regulation, if doubting its necessity (1996: 58). Nevertheless, newspaper editors 
expressed “unanimous support” for a press council or ombudsman being the second step 
in a complaints process with their publications maintaining the primary point of contact 
for complaints (1996: 58). This conclusion contrasted with the earlier work of the NNI. 
The Commission also found that self-regulation would be pointless if British publications 
on sale in the Irish market could not be persuaded to take part (1996: 58). 
Third, the commission concluded by recommending the appointment of an 
independent press ombudsman rather than a full press council (Table 2.1). To do this, a 
committee, set up by the press, should establish a set of standards to be applied by the 
Press Ombudsman and appoint an independent person to the role (1996: 58). Funding for 
the role would come from the press in a manner agreed by it with “the provision and 
maintenance of adequate funding...vital to the project” (1996: 59). 
  
Table 3: Ombudsman’s role 
Ombudsman’s 
role 
 
 
 Investigate complaints of possible breaches of press standards 
once they had first been made to the publication involved 
 Take complaints from those directly involved or affected by 
the publication or by organisations representing them  
 Direct steps to repair the damage via a correction or 
clarification, “and in any case where it is appropriate, to direct 
further steps which might be necessary to avoid a repetition”  
 Direct publication of his/her ruling in the offending publication 
 Release any information about a complaint the office saw fit 
 Consult with newspapers in order to get their in-house 
mechanisms of accountability published 
 Make the office accessible widely 
 Publish an annual report 
Source: Commission on the Newspaper Industry (1996: 58-59) 
 
The Commission also pointed out that the Press Ombudsman would need privilege 
from defamation complaints and cited updated libel laws as an opportunity “to give 
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immunity by way of privilege” (1996: 60). It concluded its work in the area by examining 
libel reforms6, suggesting that freedom to access information was of “cardinal 
importance” for journalists and required legislation, which might have the knock on effect 
of reducing inaccuracies.  
In an editorial published the day after the commission’s report, the Irish Times said 
the study was “an invaluable blueprint for the future” (Irish Times 1996). It said that the 
commission’s proposals would have the full support of Irish newspapers “as distinct from 
the British imports” but that such support should only be on the basis that the 
commission’s recommendations - which included libel reform and VAT changes - be 
implemented in full. Indeed, it appears as if the press, at least according to the Irish Times’ 
editorial, was already bargaining for a quid pro quo attitude toward regulation - accepting 
it on the proviso of other important financial incentives.  
The Ombudsman proposal, for example, would be unacceptable in 
isolation for it would simply add one more layer of accountability for 
journalists and editors who already operate under some of the most 
restrictive arrangements in the western world. If the commission's 
recommendation on the Ombudsman is to be implemented, so too 
should its recommendations on libel (1996: 17) 
                                                 
6 Despite being lobbied to do so, the commission declined to recommend that a change be made 
to take the onus away from juries in assessing damages in libel actions. It did, however, support 
the introduction of judicial direction to juries in respect of a range of possible damages during 
hearings (1996: 61). The commission also recommended that there be changes in the laws to take 
account of inadvertent libel. It concluded that where a plaintiff fails to show “pecuniary loss”, 
he/she should not be entitled to damages; that the seeking of a retraction or correction be a 
required prerequisite to the institution of defamation proceedings; that defendants inform the 
plaintiff of the decision to rely on the inadvertent libel defence; and that plans be put in place so 
that minor defamation cases where declaration of falsity are sought - and not damages - be dealt 
with by judges at a District Court or Circuit Court level (1996: 62). The commission also 
concluded that newspapers ought to be able to lodge money with the court to meet potential 
liabilities without an admission of guilt; that newspaper should be able to apologise without 
admitting guilt; that the statute of limitations for institution an action be substantially reduced 
from six years; and that the printers of defamatory material be exempted from being a party to 
defamation actions (1996: 64).   
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The Irish Independent also “heartily” welcomed the commission’s “admirable” and 
“excellent” report “which echoes the urgings that for years have come from within the 
industry” (Irish Independent 1996: 12). Primarily focused on VAT and libel changes, the 
editorial did not mention the Press Ombudsman proposal but claimed “Irish newspapers 
have a proud record of accuracy and responsibility”. The NUJ and NNI also supported 
the commission and called on the government to implement the changes Justice Finlay 
had suggested, again focusing more on the financial and legal changes (O’Keeffe 1996a, 
1996b).   
Other interested parties were not so keen. John Waters, a journalist and columnist, 
argued that the commission had aligned itself too closely with the interests of the press. 
He argued that the Press Ombudsman proposal was “woefully inadequate”, particularly 
if the office holder was appointed by the press, as proposed (Waters 1996). 
 
3.4: 1997-2002 - Changing attitudes  
Senior political figures repeatedly expressed support for Justice Finlay’s proposals 
(O’Keeffe 1996c; Dáil Eireann 1996c; Dáil Eireann 1997a) in the years following 
publication of the report. However, the recommendations were not acted on by 
government or the press. Nevertheless, as the Irish Independent editorial noted in the 
wake of publication of the report (Irish Independent 1996), the indigenous press regularly 
underlined the point that British tabloid culture had apparently not infected Irish 
newspapers. Opinions on this aspect of the press would begin to change after a string of 
media controversies. 
Fianna Fáil’s Marie Geoghegan-Quinn had said that a statutory press council was not 
required earlier in the 1990s. However, it is likely that her attitudes – and those of other 
senior politicians - may have changed in early 1997. Several newspapers published 
88 
 
articles about Geoghegan-Quinn’s then 17-year-old son. She unexpectedly resigned from 
domestic politics some weeks later, citing this apparent breach of privacy as part of her 
rationale. “Politics demands - and rightly demands - energy, commitment, idealism and 
resilience. When politics demands - and wrongly demands - that a TD’s family members 
serve as expendable extensions of the elected member, I will not serve,” she said on her 
resignation (Kennedy 1997). The year was marked by many politicians calling for 
varying forms of increased press regulation (Walsh 1997a; Walsh 1997b; Foley 1998; 
Walsh 1998) while in early 1998, Dick Spring, a former Labour Tanaiste, said a press 
council was needed. Spring was unhappy over coverage of his family after his son fell 
ill: “Families shouldn’t be fair game...some of the tabloids went way over the top in what 
was a health scare for us as a family. I think that’s irresponsible but they’re out there to 
sell newspapers and they want scare headlines and big colour photographs” (O’Sullivan 
1998). 
Privacy became a key subject in the press regulatory debate thereafter. In June 1998, 
the Law Reform Commission published a report, Privacy, Surveillance and the 
Interception of Communications, which rejected the concept of a self-regulatory press 
council. The report argued that an absence of strong enforcement powers and the 
influence of “sectional interests” (1998: 65) were critical weaknesses in a self-regulatory 
approach. The commission also dismissed “enforced self-regulation” (1998: 66) – 
delegating regulatory functions to an organisation established under statute - as a 
regulatory mechanism. While the report did not recommend a general privacy law, it did 
call for the introduction of laws to govern “privacy-invasive surveillance” which had 
implications for the media. It singled out “low-priced tabloids from the United Kingdom” 
and their “growing threat” to standards (1998: 41).  
89 
 
The Irish Independent praised the “excellent” report for its focus on “unscrupulous 
operators” who use technology to monitor people and urged the government to act on the 
legislative proposals contained in the report (1998: 16). However, sounding a note of 
caution, the newspaper’s editorial also said the Irish media was still awaiting libel reform. 
“This time, the government should not ‘cherrypick’ the report. It should legislate to 
protect privacy, but it should not diminish the valid role of the media in a democratic 
society (1998: 16).” Striking a somewhat different note, the NUJ said it had “grave 
concerns” over the Commission’s proposals to legislate for privacy, which, it said, would 
have a significant impact on media freedoms (Brennock 1998). Surprisingly, there is no 
record of an Irish Times editorial on the report and indeed media debate on the issue was 
limited according to an analysis of the coverage from the time. 
The potential for privacy legislation did, however, occupy the minds of other senior 
media figures as well as politicians. In February 1999, Damien Kiberd, the then editor of 
the Sunday Business Post, said he favoured the setting up of a press council “with teeth” 
as he was unhappy with emerging unethical media practices (McGarry 1999), in a signal 
that attitudes in the press were rallying around the idea of instituting a regulator to stave 
off the potentially restrictive legislation. Perhaps sensing the opportunity, later that year, 
in November 1999, the government revealed that libel reform – a matter the press had 
long campaigned on – was on its agenda. Mary Harney, the then Progressive Democrat 
Tánaiste, said updated defamation laws would be ready within 12 months. However, 
addressing the press establishment directly, Harney said that she hoped the newspaper 
industry would not wait until then to set up a council or ombudsman in a signal that the 
government’s willingness to produce the long-awaited defamation reforms would only 
pay off once the press set up a regulator (Dáil Eireann 1998). The following year, John 
O’Donoghue, the then Fianna Fáil Minister for Justice, introduced a draft defamation bill. 
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The draft was given a guarded welcome by the Irish Times’ (Irish Times 2001) and the 
NNI (Irish Independent 2001). However, as noted by the Irish Times, a general election 
was looming and it was unlikely that the bill would pass into law before polling day thus 
leaving the reforms at the discretion of the next justice minister (Irish Times 2001). 
However, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, had committed to libel reform as a quid pro quo 
from the press for the establishment of a system of complaints via a council or 
ombudsman (Ibid). 
 
3.5: Legal Advisory Group 2002 
The Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat coalition was re-elected in June 2002. With it, the 
debate about press regulation changed. Under the coalition’s Programme for 
Government, it committed to establishing a statutory press council to adjudicate on 
complaints about media behaviour and conduct (2002). It was the first time that an Irish 
government had made a firm commitment on the issue, bypassing previous high-level 
remarks favouring press-led reforms. The government also pledged to reform defamation 
and libel laws and introduce “improved privacy laws” (2002: 29).  
Later that year, Michael McDowell, the Progressive Democrat Minister for Justice, 
established a Legal Advisory Group on Defamation (Brennock 2002). McDowell, a 
barrister, had long been an advocate of changes to how the media was regulated. In the 
mid-90s he had introduced an ultimately unsuccessful defamation bill in the Dáil and 
indicated that a press council and/or ombudsman was needed (Foley 1996). The advisory 
group’s terms of reference were influenced by the Programme for Government.  It was 
tasked with reviewing the defamation legislation and case defences; reassessing the role 
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of judges and juries in libel hearings; reexamining the concept of the presumption of 
falsity; and considering a statutory press council.7  
Much of the press reacted negatively to the idea of a statutory regulator. Interestingly, 
however, in an editorial after the advisory group had been established, the Irish Times 
declined to express similar hostility (2002). Instead, it welcomed the formation of the 
group and planned libel reforms, expressing minor reservations that no member of the 
newspaper industry was part of it. A statutory press council, the newspaper observed, 
“deserves careful consideration and is not something which the media should reject 
instinctively” (2002: 17). Striking a somewhat different tone, the NUJ again highlighted 
its opposition to any form of statutory oversight (Coulter 2002). Responding to the 
establishment of the advisory group, Seamus Dooley, the NUJ’s Irish Secretary, said: 
We are fundamentally opposed to State regulation of newspapers. We 
do not need a Press Council based on the failed UK model and we 
firmly believe that the government must engage in a debate with all 
concerned on models of self-regulation, such as those in existence in 
European countries (2002: 9)  
The advisory group’s report was published on 20 June 2003, and its recommendations 
ratcheted up fears that government would follow through with plans to establish a new 
statutory regulator. The group recommended a number of legislative reforms and backed 
the government’s proposal for a statutory press council. It concluded that it was 
“somewhat skeptical” (2003: 14) that statutory intervention would run counter to press 
freedoms:  
                                                 
7 The report followed a range of prior contributions, including those from the Law Reform 
Commission which examined the defamation laws in 1991. It made a series of well-received 
recommendations about defamation changes but did not examine the concepts of press councils 
or ombudsmen 
92 
 
and inclined towards the view that, subject to appropriate safeguards, it 
should be possible to construct a statutory model which would respect 
fully the autonomy of the press while, at the same time, providing an 
important element of independence and transparency which would 
secure public confidence in any process which might be established 
(2003: 14).  
Thus, the group concluded that its proposals were “comparatively light” (2003: 16) 
and the case for a statutory press regulator “appears…compelling” (2003: 14).8 
Table 4:  Legal Advisory Group on Defamation (2003: 14-16) 
A statutory 
press 
council 
Function:  
 Investigate breaches of code of conduct 
 Code of conduct must recognise “wide discretion” inherent in 
journalism but must also specify standards, rules and practices 
 Publications would be forced to comply with the new regulator by 
law 
 Part funded by industry annual fee 
 Power to direct publication of decisions, corrections or retractions, 
but no fines 
 Power to apply to the Circuit Court to compel compliance 
 
Incentives: 
 Right of reply to investigations 
 New reasonable publication court defence for members 
 Barring of further plaintiff civil proceedings 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
8 In deliberations over whether statutory or self-regulatory proposals worked best, the group found 
that allowing a self-regulatory assignee member to rely on the defence of reasonable publication 
“did not seem to be practicable given that the defence encompasses not just the press but other 
kinds of communications media” (17). However, it accepted that “this would not preclude the 
development of a statutory provision which would ensure that a court could take into account 
whether or not the publication in question had signed up to a self-regulatory mechanism”. The 
advisory group concluded by suggesting that a “formal consultation process” involving the 
various stakeholders be established to examine the issues it raised (17). It also stated that 
“compliance with...statutory references might, in turn, link in with the granting of a statutory 
privilege which would render such a body immune from any claim in defamation with respect to 
the carrying out of its stated functions” (18).  
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The proposed Defamation Bill contained in the report’s appendix sheds more light on 
the group’s proposals on a press council. It proposed that the council “shall, subject to 
the provisions of this Act, be independent in the performance of its functions” (2003: 99). 
It is not clear how such independence would have been achieved, given that the bill 
offered government strong powers over the regulator. Indeed the draft bill suggested that 
all 9 members, including the chair, be appointed by government (2003: 102) and failed 
to clarify a suggested criteria for council membership other than the “government shall 
have regard to” the various groupings and public interest in appointing members. Indeed, 
the suggested bill gave full power of appointment and employment to the government. It 
also gave the government full powers to remove any member of the council if both 
Houses of the Oireachtas voted for it. The bill did, however, bar any serving public 
representative at national and European - not local - level from being on the council. It 
also gave full powers to the line minister in relation to financing on an annual basis (2003: 
108) and set out what should be in the council’s code of conduct (2003: 109). The 
acceptance of third-party complaints was also proposed. 
On publication of the report, Michael McDowell said he had “an open mind on the 
issue” of a statutory press council (O’Connor 2003), indicating he was to establish a 
public consultation to get the views of interested parties. Opposition to statutory 
recommendations quickly emerged. Marie McGonagle, a media law academic who 
favoured self-regulatory approaches in her work for the NNI, welcomed defamation 
reforms as “even-handed and practical” but criticised the plans for a statutory press 
council as “draconian” (McGonagle 2003: 12).  
It is remarkable that the Government here would pursue the idea of a 
statutory council and the advisory group endorse it so wholeheartedly 
when the stated intention…is to bring the law into line with other 
countries. Indeed, the group notes that ‘self-regulation tends to be the 
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norm’ but goes on to recommend a draconian regime which could only 
be described as a policing measure in all the worst senses of the term, 
complete with dubious incentives and sanctions (2003: 12) 
In an editorial in July 2003, the Irish Times argued that statutory proposals “would 
interfere with editorial integrity and the right to freedom of expression” (2003: 15). The 
Irish Independent initially indicated that it would await defamation reforms before 
assessing the press council proposals (Irish Independent 2003a) – but this was later 
replaced by opposition to the plans in an editorial in early October (Irish Independent 
2003b). Its sister newspaper, the Sunday Independent, quickly outlined its opposition 
with Alan Ruddock, a regular columnist, writing that a statutory press council would be 
“a travesty” (2003: 93).  
No matter who runs it, no matter who writes the code of ethics, there 
should be no way that Irish newspapers accept state regulation as the 
price for libel reform. It is a dangerous nonsense, yet their supine 
reaction suggests that they will bargain away a cornerstone of 
democracy to save their bottom line (2003: 93) 
Indeed, the Sunday Independent left readers in no doubt about its opposition to the 
plans. On 5 October 2003, it printed four opinion articles all negative about statutory 
regulation (Ruddock 2003b; Reilly 2003; Sunday Independent 2003a; Sunday 
Independent 2003b). The salvo was in response to comments made earlier that week by 
Bertie Ahern, the then Taoiseach, when he said that “a statutory press council, 
legislatively based, should be looked at in this country. Any other one is of no meaning” 
(Brennock 2003). In one piece, the Sunday Independent quoted several Irish journalists 
in favour of its editorial line. Editors of The Star, and The Sunday World criticised plans 
for a statutory council as did Seamus Dooley of the NUJ (Sunday Independent 2003b). 
The Sunday Independent continued its opposition throughout late 2003 and early 2004 
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with a series articles from a variety of contributors criticising the plans and others in the 
media for a perceived lack of strong opposition to state regulation. 
Representative organisations were also against the proposals. The Alliance of 
Independent Press Councils of Europe said state involvement on the council would buck 
a European trend and undermine press freedoms (Kelly 2003) while the NNI said state 
regulation was “unacceptable”. “It runs counter not only to press freedom, but to the basic 
constitutional right to free speech” (Oliver 2003). 
 
3.6: 2003-2005 - Industry responds 
The Irish newspaper industry began to seriously discuss plans for independent press 
regulation after the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat government and Legal Advisory 
Group concluded a statutory press council was required (Mitchell 2015: 117). Indeed, the 
Irish Times declared in an editorial that the Irish press had reached a “pivotal moment” 
over press regulation (Irish Times 2003). On this occasion, it appeared that the press was 
ready to act. In October 2003 the Irish Independent carried a report about the NNI’s plans 
for an independent press ombudsman and press council which would be recognised in 
law and based on a Swedish model (Anderson 2003). The NUJ backed the plan (Anderson 
2003).  
Later that month, in a boost to the campaign, Fine Gael, Labour and the Green Party 
confirmed opposition to statutory regulatory proposals (Beesley 2003a and 2003b), while 
the World Association of Newspapers and the World Editors Forum requested that the 
government abandon its proposals (Kelly 2003). Shortly after, McDowell reiterated that 
he was “genuinely open-minded” about the form of a press council:  
It seems to me that the particular model examined by the legal advisory 
group is by no means the only, or, for that matter, the most obvious 
model for a statutory press council. I could envisage a body chaired by 
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a judge, and composed of nominees of a variety of groups to reflect the 
different interests involved (Hickey 2003: 11) 
Indeed, the Irish Times noted what appeared to be a softening of stance in McDowell’s 
remarks and reported that support for a state-backed press council was “evaporating” 
(Irish Times 2003). In an editorial, the newspaper pointed out that it was now up to the 
press to come up with its own proposals for a tough independent regulator in order to 
achieve the long-held ambition of securing libel reform. 
Early the following year, a Press Industry Steering Committee (PISC), chaired by 
Tom Mitchell, the former Provost of Trinity College, set about working on proposals 
(Mitchell 2015: 118). Mitchell said the PISC’s “ambitious” goal was to create a “truly 
independent” regulator that would be acceptable to the “many disparate elements of the 
press industry” and to the government, and which would exhibit “sufficient credibility” 
to garner public trust (ibid). Its membership comprised representatives of the NNI, the 
Regional Newspapers Association of Ireland, the Periodical Publishers Association of 
Ireland, the NUJ and the Irish editions of UK titles.  
It would not be long before its work began to influence government policy, with 
McDowell pointing out his “preliminary reaction” to statutory regulation was that he was 
“broadly supportive” of a council with no political oversight at around the same time as 
the PISC began deliberations (McNally 2004). Indeed, the development of the press 
regulatory system that was being proposed “involved several highly constructive 
meetings” between the PISC and McDowell (Mitchell 2015: 119). McDowell’s 
contributions were of “great importance, and resulted in a mode of press regulation that 
was not only acceptable to the industry, but to the government” (Ibid).  
The PISC soon agreed on the establishment of an “independent” system of press 
regulation operated by a Press Ombudsman and a Press Council, both funded by the press 
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and informed by a Code of Practice (CoP). The committee presented McDowell with its 
plans in April 2004 (Reid 2004). By June 2014, the justice minister publicly backed the 
plans. He confirmed that an independent press council, protected by law, would be 
proposed in new defamation legislation – the first time that McDowell had definitively 
stated that statutory proposals would advance no further. He said his preference had been 
for “an independent press council, not Government appointed, but broadly representative 
of civic society, not a media ‘old boys’ club, but a body that could gain the confidence of 
the general public as being independent, fair minded and effective” (Coulter 2004). Later 
that year McDowell said a statutory press council would be “unacceptable” (Hickey 
2004). “We’re working on a different model…based on recognition of an independent 
press council which would have statutory powers and statutory privileges” (Hickey 
2004). Shortly afterwards, McDowell signaled his intent to restrict new defamation 
defences to publications signed up to the independent press council (Coulter 2004b).  
It appeared that the newspaper industry’s swift response to threats of government 
interference would stave off statutory regulation as McDowell, speaking in the Dáil in 
February and June 2005, confirmed plans for  a “middle way” council which was neither 
voluntary self-regulation nor statutory regulation (Dáil Eireann 2005). 
The Legal Advisory Group on Defamation Report in 2003 suggested a 
particular model involving a State appointed press council. That model 
did not attract me. The approach I favour is statutory recognition by 
way of a resolution to be moved in both Houses of the Oireachtas, of 
an independent organisation which would request to be recognised as 
the PCI for the purposes of the legislation. Recognition would bring 
certain privileges such as immunity from action in respect of its 
decisions, judgments and directions. I also envisage that such a press 
council would have, as its central focus, a code of standards supported 
by and subscribed to by print media organisations with operations in 
the State. Such a code of standards would provide an additional 
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protection for citizens’ privacy from media intrusion and harassment. 
It is also envisaged that the Press Ombudsman would be established by 
the press council to deal with complaints from those affected by 
breaches of the code of standards (Dáil Eireann 2005) 
In October 2005, plans for independent press regulation gathered pace. McDowell 
said he would introduce a new bill with press council provisions attached before 
Christmas in that year. McDowell added that recent newspaper reports about the death of 
Liam Lawlor, a controversial Fianna Fáil politician, showed the urgent need for a press 
council (Cullen and Reid 2005). Several newspapers had wrongly reported that Lawlor 
was with a prostitute when he died in a car crash in Moscow. “To those who say a press 
council is not needed, I say that the defamation law is no use to the family of somebody 
who dies in these circumstances. I think the press council is the appropriate forum for 
such a complaint to be heard (Cullen and Reid 2005).” 
 
3.7: 2006-2008 - Legislative proposals 
In July 2006 McDowell published a new Defamation Bill. However, there was a sting in 
the tail for the press: also attached to the new legislation was an unexpected inclusion, a 
Privacy Bill. The PISC welcomed formal approval for its plans under the proposed laws 
but argued that privacy would be best dealt with by its model of independent regulation 
(Collins 2006). The Irish Times (2006: 15) said the privacy laws were “draconian” and 
“will benefit only the wealthy, protect persons in public life on matters of public policy 
and change the modus operandi of Irish journalism in ways that are possibly unintended 
by its political proponents”. It said that the positive changes, including the press council, 
were now under threat by the privacy proposals which were introduced “without any 
consultation”.  
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The threat of privacy laws renewed the newspaper industry’s efforts – whether that 
was the intent or not. In December the PISC publicly published its proposals for 
independent press regulation. Under the proposal, a 13-person press council would be 
made up of a majority (7) independent members chosen via an independent appointment 
process. The Office of the Press Ombudsman would establish a first option of complaint 
to the public with the council acting as an appeals mechanism. Also published was the 
CoP which outlined ten broad principles under which members of the public could 
complain if they felt that it had been breached by a journalist or publication. The code 
was written by the Press Industry Code Committee, itself made up of journalists (Reid 
2006). According to the PISC the code was “intended as a work in progress and it is 
expected that it will continue to evolve”. The code contained elements of the similar 
codes developed by press councils in Britain, Australia and Germany with a variety of 
other codes, including the NUJ’s, and the work of Prof. Kevin Boyle and Professor Marie 
McGonagle, also informing its creation. McDowell praised the proposals, saying they 
“underline the very nature of what is proposed in this legislation”. To the undoubted relief 
of the press, McDowell also said he was not proceeding with privacy laws (Reid 2006). 
The proposed legislation received a second hearing on 6 December 2006. On opening 
the reading, McDowell reiterated his support for an independent council as set out under 
Schedule 2 of the proposed legislation.  
This approach will allow the print media to put into practice its self-
proclaimed determination to bring forward an independent, effective 
and industry-funded press council operating a proper CoP. The code 
must provide an added protection to citizens’ privacy and dignity from 
media intrusion and violation. Nothing less will be expected by the 
public. The proposed press ombudsman service must be properly 
empowered to deal with complaints from those affected by breaches of 
standards as set out in such a code (Dáil Eireann 2006) 
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McDowell pointed out the benefit of statutory underpinning was two-fold. First, the 
press council and the Press Ombudsman would have the benefit of qualified privilege. 
Second, a new defence of reasonable publication would be made available to any member 
who signed up voluntarily to the council. 
McDowell’s bill was praised9 and criticized in equal measure. Senator David Norris 
said throughout his career in the Seanad there had been pressure from newspaper 
proprietors and editors to “make life easier for them” (Dáil Eireann 2006). Norris was 
unimpressed by the proposals for the council. He said its goals of protecting investigative 
journalism were “pious” and said British tabloid culture was infecting Irish journalism.  
The press council and press ombudsman will be toothless. The 
proposed press ombudsman does not deserve that title. The Minister 
knows well that the post will be quite unlike that of any other 
ombudsman. For example, it will lack all significant powers to compel, 
produce witnesses or impose financial penalties. In addition, the Press 
Ombudsman will be appointed by this wonderful new press council, 
which is not independent. Is that not an irony? (ibid) 
Norris also criticised what he saw as a slim majority in favour of the public interest 
on the council and questioned if all newspapers would sign up. 
In January 2007, a group led by the NNI attended a Joint Oireachtas Committee on 
Justice to discuss the proposals in front of politicians (Dáil Eireann 2007). In opening the 
debate, Frank Cullen, the NNI’s chair, outlined how the system of regulation would work, 
identifying the approach as a complaints handling mechanism largely based on a similar 
set-up in Sweden: 
                                                 
9 John Dardis (PDs), Kathleen O’Meara (Lab) and Maurice Hayes (Ind) - all of whom had a 
connection to the press industry - expressed support for the bill and the concept of an independent 
press council 
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The basis of the model we propose is that editors in particular, but also 
publishers and journalists, will commit to a code of standards and an 
independent process which will adjudicate any complaints received. 
They will support the decision making process because they will have 
ownership of it, rather than having it imposed on them. If the model 
was imposed by statutes, it would be attacked and resented, whereas 
these proposals represent an initiative by the industry to voluntarily 
commit to a code of standards and a process  
The council had three main objectives. First, it was established to provide an 
independent forum for resolving complaints quickly through “credible decisions”. 
Second, the council would maintain high standards in journalism. Third, the council 
would defend press freedoms and the press’s right to inform the public. In order to meet 
the requirements of the Defamation Bill 2006, the council would be a company limited 
by guarantee with a memorandum and articles of association setting out its structure: 
seven independent members (including a chair) and six members from the press. An 
independent appointments committee would appoint the independent members of the 
council and “formally approve industry nominees”. The committee would have veto 
powers over the latter appointments, council chairs would be appointed by the council 
itself, while all appointments would be for two and three years (ibid). 
The Press Ombudsman would be the public’s main point of contact and the role would 
be filled via press council appointment. Cullen said that he hoped complaints would be 
amenable to mediation rather than formal decision processes and said that each party had 
a right of appeal to the press council before the decision was made public.  
The Press Ombudsman hears the complaint, makes a determination and 
advises the two parties of the determination. Before it is published, 
either party can appeal it to the press council. Similarly the Press 
Ombudsman will have the choice, in particularly difficult cases of 
national importance to refer a case immediately to the press council, 
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perhaps with a recommendation, so that a case can be fast-tracked. That 
is the process (ibid) 
During his address, Cullen identified two supporting committees. First, the code 
committee, made up of senior editors and NUJ representatives (and the Press 
Ombudsman), would be responsible for authoring and reviewing the CoP.  
The PCI CoP consists of ten commandments effectively, ten broad 
principles. Interpretation of those principles and their application to 
specific complaints is left to the discretion press council (sic). We did 
not want to be overly prescriptive and sought to give latitude to the 
press council as, no doubt, the code will develop with the jurisprudence 
of the press council. We feel this is the strongest way possible and that 
it is better cases be discussed on an individual basis, rather than have 
an overly prescriptive telephone directory listing what can and cannot 
be done (ibid) 
Second, the administration committee, made up of a variety of representative groups, 
would be responsible for dealing with funding and supporting structures. Cullen said the 
NNI (80 per cent) would be the council’s largest funder followed by the Regional 
Newspapers Association of Ireland (15 per cent) and the Periodical Publishers 
Association (5 per cent).  
In response to a number of questions, Cullen said the proposal’s strength was the 
moral authority the council would establish once editors voluntarily signed up. Brendan 
Keenan, a senior editor with the Irish Independent and member of the code committee, 
said that publicity for decisions in rival newspapers would form part of the sanction for 
publications. “The harder the hit on the rival, the more publicity they will give it. That 
not only gives redress but it gradually lets editors know what will get past the Press 
Ombudsman and what will not.”  Geraldine Kennedy, then editor of the Irish Times, said 
if a newspaper declined to publish a negative decision about it, other newspapers would 
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print the decision, to which Gerry O’Regan, then editor of the Irish Independent, replied: 
“We would feel we would have to do so in the public interest.” Cullen again stressed 
three principles for complaint handling:  
There are three principles in dealing with complaints. The first is speed. 
In this case it can mean within one month or sooner, where possible. If 
possible, a complaint should be dealt with instantly, as speed is critical. 
Second, there should be no cost to the complainant. The third principle 
relates to credibility (ibid) 
Geraldine Kennedy, the then editor of the Irish Times, addressed politicians’ 
questions on sanctions. She said a powerless press council would not be in the newspaper 
industry’s interests.  
It [the council] would have the power to receive complaints, investigate 
them speedily and for free, to provide answers for complainants and 
compel media organisations to have apologies, corrections or 
clarifications made. That would be the sanction. There is no intention 
to address the complaints financially because newspapers are pursued 
financially every day under the defamation laws which still remain in 
place. We are talking about the other side of the package. We believe 
the powers would be adequate. The main sanction for each media 
organisation is the same as that politicians face before tribunals, that is, 
the sanction of exposure (ibid) 
 
3.8: Conclusion 
While it is difficult to identify a single reason for the eventual formation of independent 
press regulation, it is quite clear that the transformation of the Irish newspaper industry 
over the course of the time period analysed here played its part. Horgan (2002: 134-135) 
records that by the 1970s, Irish newspaper readers were already purchasing British 
newspapers in increasing numbers. In 1988, the Independent Group began printing an 
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Irish edition of tabloid The Daily Star (Horgan 2002: 135), albeit with the brashest British 
tabloid content remoulded to avoid protestations among Irish readers (2002: 136), and by 
the mid-1990s Irish editions of British newspapers – such as The Sunday Times, The Sun 
and The Mirror – were being widely read (holding around 35 per cent of the Daily and 
Sunday markets [Horgan 2002: 162]) prompting the then government’s decision to set up 
the Commission on the Newspaper Industry in 1996, as discussed previously. The actual 
impact of the appearance of Irish edition British tabloids is impossible to accurately 
quantify, although Horgan concluded (2002: 167) that a “renewed focus on exclusive 
stories” may have driven tabloids deeper and deeper into the private lives of public people 
while broadsheets upped efforts to find the latest government scandal – not always, it 
must be said, with negative outcomes. As stated, such influence is impossible to 
accurately quantify. It is clear, however, given this chapter’s analysis and that of 
Horgan’s, that increased competition for readers, an aggressive Fleet Street attitude and 
increasing debate about journalism ethics played a part in changing political and social 
attitudes to Irish newspapers, thus allowing the prospect of strong press regulation to gain 
traction. 
Fielden (2012) has concluded that press councils have traditionally been formed as a 
“determined, pragmatic alternative response from…industry” to threats of state intrusion 
into the field of press regulation. As Chapter 2 identified, the experiences of various 
countries where press councils are operating – Australia (O’Malley 1987), Britain 
(Morgan 1989), Germany (Sarck and Pottker 2003) – also support this conclusion. The 
genesis of the PCI fits this description, as this chapter has shown. It was formed by the 
press in response to the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat Government’s commitment to 
the concept of a statutory press regulator. The analysis shows that throughout recent 
history the Irish press ignored calls for a council while little will existed on the part of 
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policy makers. However, with the change of government in 2002, the newspaper industry 
sparked into action due to the statutory ultimatum emerging from the Programme for 
Government and the later Legal Advisory Group Report. 
The model of independent press regulation supported and strengthened by statutory 
recognition was formulated by the PISC, acting on behalf of the press. Its proposals, as 
the analysis has shown, were supported by McDowell and thus ended up as a cornerstone 
of the Defamation Act 2009. In effect, the press drew up the standard against which it 
would be judged as a means of staving off the imposition of standards it could not 
influence.  
The outcome is that a formal, institutionalised system of press regulation now 
operates in Ireland. The PCI is governed by a formal corporate structure via its 
Memorandum and Articles, and exists as a legal entity due to its formation as a company 
limited by guarantee. It is underpinned and recognised by legislation and must meet 
certain requirements in order to maintain such recognition. Under these rules, it was the 
intention that the council be independent of both the press and the state. It has a voluntary 
and incentivised membership under which its members are obliged to accept the decisions 
of the Press Ombudsman and the council. As a result, the intention of the newspaper 
industry and policy makers was that the PCI be a fully institutionalised and independent 
press regulator making it an anomaly across the liberal system. The following chapters 
will examine what impact, if any, the institutionalisation of independent press regulation 
has had on the public service commitment to accountability which is the third element of 
journalism professionalisation in the North Atlantic Liberal system proposed as part of 
the media systems classification model established by Hallin and Mancini (2004). 
Specifically, it will ask how institutionalised, independent press regulation ensures 
accountability for complainants and if it meets standards of accountability established in 
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the literature (see Chapter 2). This study will also compare self-regulatory media 
accountability solutions with independent regulation in Ireland. 
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Chapter 4: The Press Council of Ireland 
 
4.1: Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Irish newspaper industry committed to creating an 
independent form of press regulation after ongoing debate about standards and ethics. 
This chapter will look at the PCI from its inception in late 2007 to the retirement of the 
first Press Ombudsman in 2014. This will be done via a review of the PCI’s founding 
documents; its Memorandum and Articles of Association. These documents set out the 
formal structures of the PCI and are thus important in any analysis of the PCI’s work. 
This text will also examine the early work and development of the office as recorded in 
official statements and annual reports of the PCI and Press Ombudsman as well as media 
coverage and political commentary. The highlighting of possible strengths and 
weaknesses of the PCI will inform and contextualise later data. In addition, the 
Defamation Act 2009 will be analysed as it is the legislation which gives statutory 
recognition to the PCI, and, evidence at the Leveson Inquiry in Britain – and Mr Justice 
Leveson’s final report – will be examined given the referencing of Irish press regulation 
at the inquiry. The chapter will conclude with an overview of top-level complaint data 
collated by the PCI in its annual reports – as precursor to further analysis in Chapter 6 – 
so as to determine its level of activity and examine the areas which have generated 
greatest attention.  
 
4.2: Founding documents 
The Memorandum and Articles of Association of the PCI were registered with the 
Companies Registration Office in November 2007 (PCI 2007). The documents set out 
the structure and administrative dynamics of the PCI, and produce a blueprint for how 
the PCI should operate.  
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Table 5: Articles of Association (PCI 2007) 
 
The first document, the Memorandum of Association, operates as a constitution for 
the PCI. It contains a number of common corporate and financial clauses irrelevant to the 
subject matter of this research. However, many of the clauses are important. First, the 
memorandum refers to the establishment of an “independent, regulatory body” to 
“consider, investigate, adjudicate, and resolve or settle complaints” from the public for 
free over “unfair or unjust treatment or unwarranted infringements” by publications 
Article  Function Summary 
2-5 Membership  Member publications can be registered (3) once “circulated in the 
State by way of hard copy or internet distribution” 
6 & 8 PCI board 13 member board overseen by chairman. Seven, including chair, 
“will be drawn from suitably qualified lay persons” all for 3-year 
terms. Remaining six to come from industry (2 x nationals 
newspapers, 1 each for regional press, periodicals and UK-based 
publishers) 
7  Ombudsman  Appointed by PCI on 3-year term to adjudicate on (or refer) 
complaints, raise regulator’s profile and promote ethical standards. 
9 Committees Appointments: Overseen by Chair with members chosen by PCI - 
charged with hire of all board members 
Administrative: Chaired by independent board member. 5 industry 
members. Power to hire its own members  – charged with oversight 
of premises, funding and staffing  
Code: Six editors, NUJ representative, Ombudsman & chair 
nominated by PCI. Power to hire its own members – charged with 
review and update of CoP 
10 Funding National newspapers to fund 80 per cent, regional and locals 15 per 
cent and periodicals 5 per cent.  
11 PCI 
meetings 
Scheduled monthly 
13,14, 
18 
Meeting 
procedures 
Quorum of 5. All meetings overseen by chairman but can be 
temporarily replaced by another board member if absent. Votes via 
show of hands with chair holding casting vote, all to be recorded in 
minutes 
24 Complaints 
procedure 
Complaint must be directed to publication first upon which 
Ombudsman can examine if “unsatisfactory outcome”. Sets 3-
month limit for complaints after article publication and confines 
complaints to CoP. Complainant must show they are personally 
affected and not have court action pending. No reference to 
conciliation or mediation. 
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which subscribe to the PCI CoP (CoP). Second, the body is obliged to “publish or procure 
the publication of any finding of its adjudications” in member publications via the 
establishment of “such procedures as it may see fit...for the effective discharge of its 
functions”. Third, the body’s work must also maintain press freedoms, free expression 
and maintain the independence of the press from the state and “from state control or 
regulation”. The final clauses set out the areas not relevant to the study10. 
The Articles of Association is a far more substantial document and over almost 30 
pages in 29 articles establishes the structure of the PCI and how it should operate. Many 
of the articles deal with common legal and corporate principles such as resignations, 
funding and directorship rules which are irrelevant to this work. A summary of the 
relevant provisions is contained in Table 5. A number of the articles provide further detail 
about the workings of the PCI. First, the Press Ombudsman is given “full authority over 
the administration, operation and staffing of the offices of the Press Ombudsman and the 
Press Council” (Article 7.4). This article affirms the internal independence dynamic of 
the Press Ombudsman by ensuring he/she holds executive powers internally. Second, the 
articles also give members of the Administrative and Code Committees – which are 
heavily dominated by industry members on both counts (see Table 5) - the power to 
reappoint members. Significantly, the result of these measures is that industry has 
effective control over two of the three committees which deal with the office’s funding 
and also the guide by which the industry is regulated, the CoP.  
 
 
                                                 
10 Included is clause B which gives the regulator powers to accept “gifts, subscriptions and 
donations (whether money, property or other assets)” from members to run the organisation; 
“make all arrangements necessary to enable” it to “accept from any public body, private 
individual or private association or charitable trust” - “as may be solely authorised under any 
statute or statutory instrument” - additional financial support. 
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4.3: PCI, 2008  
The Press Ombudsman and PCI began accepting complaints in January 2008. Professor 
John Horgan, a former journalist, politician and journalism professor, was appointed 
Press Ombudsman. The Defamation Bill, which was to give legal recognition to the PCI, 
had not yet been enacted. Its implementation was delayed by the 2007 General Election. 
Nevertheless, the PCI’s establishment and initial operation was intended as an act of good 
faith by the newspaper industry to assuage political pressure for stricter regulation (Gore 
and Horgan 2010). In remarks at the office’s launch in January 2008, Brian Lenihan, the 
recently appointed Minister for Justice, issued a challenge: 
There has been much comment in the media recently about the 
perceived ills of self-regulation. Notwithstanding the independence of 
the Press Council and its Chairman and the eminence of the Press 
Ombudsman, the model of accountability we are launching here today 
is, by any regulatory standards, on the light side of the scale. 
Essentially, the Press Council will be relying on its moral authority and 
I do not mean in any way to slight that authority. But, be warned: there 
are many sceptics out there. You would do well to prove them wrong 
at an early date (Carty 2008) 
In its first month, January 2008, the PCI received over 30 complaints (McGreevey 
2008). In early publications, the PCI stressed that it offered “quick, fair and free” 
complaints handling (PCI 2008). Later in that year, the Press Ombudsman signalled that 
the number of formally adjudicated complaints would be modest citing the UK’s Press 
Complaints Commission which ruled on “a couple of dozen” cases annually (Horgan 
2008): “If we believe in the basic reasonableness of human beings, this should not be a 
surprise.” Picking up on the speed motif in February 2008, the Press Ombudsman referred 
to an initial six-week timeframe during which his office would work to informally resolve 
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a complaint before it entered formal adjudication.11 However, he was keen to point out 
that the PCI was in unknown territory.   
That six-week period effectively starts when we get a formal complaint 
from somebody. Everybody is on a bit of a learning curve. We’re 
testing our procedures. It is terribly important to be absolutely fair to 
everybody. If that takes a little bit more time that we thought it would, 
well it is better to do that and get a reputation for fairness (McGreevey 
2008) 
Minister Lenihan’s attitude towards this accountability mechanism was reflected in 
the ongoing political debate at the time of the PCI’s formal establishment. A number of 
senators continued to criticise perceived weaknesses in the new regulatory authority with 
many contributors to debates on the legislative framework in 2008 insisting on changes 
(Dáil Eireann 2008a). Two independent senators, Ronan Mullen and David Norris, along 
with Fianna Fáil’s Lisa McDonald and Labour’s Alex White, asked that a meeting 
quorum of seven directors - with a majority of lay members - be inserted in the legislation 
to govern meetings of the PCI. Mullen was keen to ensure that independent members 
always outnumbered industry members when council members were absent. Lenihan said 
the proposal seemed “reasonable” and pledged to examine the issue (ibid). 
Dermot Ahern was appointed Minister for Justice in May 2008. Ahern shepherded 
the Defamation Bill through a further second stage reading in the Dáil in May, where he 
indicated that despite the reservations of many politicians, the bill retained the majority 
of the provisions introduced by his predecessor two years earlier. Despite political 
scepticism, Ahern praised the PCI’s initial work, including a case involving a breach of 
privacy against a TD (Dáil Eireann 2008b). Charlie Flanagan, Fine Gael’s justice 
                                                 
11 The founding documents contain no reference to time frames for processing complaints, either 
informally or formally 
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spokesman, also praised the PCI. He singled out its willingness to begin work before the 
law had been enacted (ibid). 
In May 2008, John Horgan12, not the Press Ombudsman but an independent member 
of the council and a former member of the Labour Court, resigned his position on the 
PCI. Horgan cited the PCI’s refusal to publish dissenting opinions as a factor which 
undermined the system. In an article for the Irish Times, Horgan (2008) wrote that he 
believed the council: 
would be greatly fortified in developing its jurisprudence if the 
members were permitted to express alternative judgments while 
acknowledging that the majority determines the case. Experience also 
shows that where a minority is entitled to express an opinion, it is, 
curiously, much less likely to feel the need to avail of the facility. The 
dynamic of a group discussion in which all members have to stand up 
and be counted encourages responsible and rational decision-making. 
There is nowhere for irrational or prejudiced thinking to hide in such 
an open system. The new Press Council needs to establish its 
credibility, and it does nothing to achieve that by holding up a facade 
of unanimity where such may not exist. This was a unique opportunity 
to demonstrate exemplary openness and transparency. The Press 
Council above all should be the last one to suppress minority or 
dissenting opinions for the sake of collegiality (Horgan 2008: 15) 
Horgan also raised concerns about “excessive confidentiality”: “It seemed to me that 
the restrictions that were being placed on the reporting of the business of the Press 
Council come close to collusion in withholding information from the public. I disagreed 
with that.” The episode was a set-back to the new regulator. Interestingly, however, the 
episode received very little media attention with Horgan’s article published by the Irish 
                                                 
12 Holds same name as the then Press Ombudsman, Professor John Horgan, but not the same 
individual 
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Times alongside a news article confirming the resignation the only recorded coverage that 
could be located during a search of newspaper achieves carried out by the researcher. 
Indeed, no explanation in any of the official PCI material or in any public commentary 
which rebuts or deals with Horgan’s claims could be found. 
When the second stage resumed in the Dáil, Joanna Tuffy, Labour’s justice 
spokeswoman, raised Horgan’s resignation and called on the PCI to review its position 
on the publication of dissent. Despite this, Tuffy committed the party’s support to the 
proposals (Dáil Eireann 2008c). Her party colleague, Pat Rabbitte, supported the council, 
but also raised his concerns about Horgan’s resignation. 
Let us take the famous controversy a couple of years ago of the 
publication of cartoons, deemed to be offensive to the Muslim 
community. If they were published in this country and if there was a 
Muslim member of the Press Council, can it reasonably be said there 
was a unanimous view of the press council to uphold the publication of 
those cartoons? In all probability the Muslim member might reasonably 
be expected to object. Is there any reason we should not know of that 
objection? Is it purely institutional protection that causes the Press 
Council to want to present the image of unanimity? (Dáil Eireann 
2008c)  
In spite of the controversy, the regulatory recognition provisions within the 
Defamation Bill won wide approval in the Dáil. Independent TDs and members of 
Labour, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael all expressed support during the Dáil debates. Much 
of the debate centred on praise for the new complaints mechanism. The Sinn Féin party 
was the exception, suggesting stronger statutory powers as a potential alternative.  
Two main themes emerge from the early material published by the PCI, the first of 
which is the independence motif. In the 2008 Annual Report, the first report, the PCI’s 
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Chairman (PCI 2009: 4) laid out his opinions on the benefits of the office by stressing its 
“independence”: 
The Irish model has sought to find a third way that would be neither 
statutory nor self-regulatory. This has been achieved by creating a Press 
Council which is appointed by a distinguished and totally independent 
Appointments Committee, and which has a majority of independent 
members, who are beholden to none and represent a broad spectrum of 
civil society. In addition, the structure includes a Press Ombudsman, 
appointed by the Press Council, answerable only to the Press Council, 
and who has no dependence of any kind on the press industry (ibid) 
The second major theme to emerge is an emphasis on the informal conciliation of 
complaints. The PCI Chairman referred (2009: 5) to the complaint handling procedures 
of the regulator as one which sought “an agreed solution” between parties. The PCI, he 
said, sought “to the greatest extent possible to avoid the legalistic and adversarial 
character of judicial proceedings, and put(s) the emphasis on conciliation and a spirit of 
co-operation”. Indeed, the Chairman said he hoped that “lawyers and all the trappings 
and technicalities of legal actions can be left out of the entire process”. He added: 
The Press Council welcomes the widespread publication of all 
decisions, in the spirit of the CoP, as an exercise in transparency, as an 
aid to the wider public understanding of the reasoning behind the 
decisions, and to encourage the widest possible public acceptance of 
the aims and objectives of the system of independent press regulation 
that has been established (2009: 13) 
Launching the 2008 annual report, the Press Ombudsman also referenced conciliation. 
An increase in the number of complaints dealt with informally was a “significant” and 
“very positive” trend:  
There are benefits to both parties in resolving complaints through 
conciliation, which involves negotiations under the auspices of the 
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Case Officer. Complaints that are dealt with satisfactorily through the 
conciliation process are resolved without any decision being made as 
to whether or not a breach of the CoP has taken place. For the 
complainant, this means that the complaint is processed more speedily 
than if a decision has to be made by the Press Ombudsman, and s/he 
often has a direct input into the resolution of the complaint (2009: 19) 
It also appeared that a key stakeholder group - the Government - was happy with how 
the PCI was working at this point. Speaking at the launch of this first annual report, 
Minister Ahern said the PCI had “taken time to ‘settle in’” but that it had “made great 
progress” (Ahern 2009). 
 
4.4: The Defamation Act 2009   
The Defamation Act (2009) was signed into law in July 2009. Schedule 2 of the Act sets 
out the “minimum requirements” a press council must satisfy in order to be granted the 
statutory recognition under which particular benefits are available to the regulator and its 
members. The schedule is made up of ten sections, each with subsections. The schedule 
is relatively brief yet clearly outlines core principles the council must incorporate in order 
to be given legislative protection. According to an analysis of the schedule, no changes 
were made between the legislation’s first introduction in 2006 and its eventual signing 
into law in July 2009.  
 
Table 6: The Defamation Act 2009 
Section Function Summary 
2 Goals (2)(a) the press council shall “ensure the protection of freedom of 
expression of the press”; (2)(b) “protect the public interest by 
ensuring ethical, accurate and truthful reporting”; (2)(c) “maintain 
certain minimum ethical and professional standards among the 
press”; (2)(d) “ensure that the privacy and dignity of the individual 
is protected” 
116 
 
3 Independence The council “shall be independent in the performance of its 
functions” 
4 Membership “The owner” of a periodical in circulation in the state “shall be 
entitled” to be a member publication 
5 Board 
membership 
(5)(1) 13 members; (5)(1)(a) a majority of seven “independent 
public interest directors”; (5)(1)(b) five-person limit for members 
who are “directors who represent the interests of owners and 
publishers”; (5)(1)(c) and a “director who represents the interests of 
journalists” 
6 Independent 
board 
members 
(6)(1)(a) Independent members be people “of standing in the 
community”; (2)(b)(i)  be independent of owners and publications 
and (2)(b)(ii) the interests of journalists; (6)(c) states that public 
interest directors be appointed (c)(i) “by a panel of persons who 
are, in the opinion of the Minister, independent of the interests” and 
(cii) “in accordance with a selection process...in a manner that the 
Minister considers sufficient”; (6)(2) the selection criteria for 
independent members “be published in such manner as will enable 
them to be inspected by members of the public” 
7 Funding The press council “shall be funded from subscriptions paid by 
members of the Press Council calculated in accordance with such 
rules as the Press Council shall make for that purpose”; no funding 
allowed from any other source 
8 & 9 Complaints 
handling 
(9)(1)(a) The Press Ombudsman can “provide for the expeditious 
and informal resolution” of a complaint; (9)(1)(b) requires for a 
“determination of the matter by the Press Ombudsman, where all 
reasonable efforts...have failed”; (9)(c)(i) prescribes that the Press 
Ombudsman’s decisions be published at his or her direction “in 
such form and manner” as he/she directs; (9)(c)(ii) lays down a 
standard that corrections are given “due prominence”; (9)(c)(iii) 
grants the Press Ombudsman powers to order “the publication of a 
retraction”; (9)(c)(iv) allows for “such other action as the Press 
Ombudsman may, in the circumstances, deem appropriate”. (9)(2) 
and (9)(3) establish a mechanism of appeal and (9)(4) says a 
decision of the council “shall be published...as the directors of the 
Press Council direct and in such form and manner as they direct”. 
10 CoP The council adopt a code of standards “which shall specify the 
standards to be adhered to, and the rules and practices to be 
complied with” by member publications; including (10)(a) ethical 
standards and practices; (10)(b) accuracy rules and standards 
“where a person’s reputation is likely to be affected”; (10)(c) “rules 
and standards intended to ensure that intimidation and harassment 
of persons does not occur and that the privacy, integrity and dignity 
of the person is respected” 
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While Schedule 2 deals with the minimum requirements of the council, its make-up 
and function, the body to be recognised as the Press Council is also mentioned elsewhere 
in the Act. In Section (26)(2)(f) the legislation prescribes that courts shall take into account 
membership of the press council, adherence to its code of standards and to the council’s 
determinations when examining whether it “was fair and reasonable to publish the 
statement concerned”. In Section (44), the Act sets out a number of further procedures in 
relation to a press council including granting power to the Minister of Justice to withhold 
and revoke recognition of the regulator if he or she deems it is not meeting the standards 
required in the act. Approval by both the Seanad and the Dáil is required before 
revocation. The recognised council (and ombudsman) is also given privilege over its 
work and statements in Part 1, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. 
 
4.5: 2009-2011 – PCI’s initial phase  
In November 2009, in a newsletter (Press  Council of Ireland 2009), the PCI reported a 
spike in complaints in the first six months of 2009 to 123 compared with some 91 for the 
same period the year before. This, the Press Ombudsman said, pointed “to a much greater 
awareness and understanding of the office, whose usefulness and efficiency is becoming 
increasingly apparent both to the reading public and the publishing industry” (ibid). Later, 
in 2011, the Press Ombudsman accepted that drawing conclusions on the basis of 
increases or decreases in complaint numbers was difficult (PCI 2011: 9). Newspaper 
editors were also being praised for their commitment to “resolve complaints in a speedy 
and satisfactory manner” on the back of an increasing number of informally resolved 
cases: 
The many examples of conciliation and of remedial action by 
publications reflect the substantial and effective commitment of editors 
to the complaints process…They also point to the successful 
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development and refinement of complaint-handling systems within the 
various member publications of the Press Council (ibid) 
The newsletter also confirmed changes to the CoP. First, the Code Committee decided 
to divide Principle 2.1 into two, splitting references to newspapers’ views on topics and 
the treatment of comment as fact into separate clauses. Principle 8 was also changed from 
“incitement to hatred”, which the code committee thought was misleading “because, 
although incitement to hatred is a breach of the Code, so is the publication of material 
“likely to cause grave offence”. It was re-labelled as “prejudice”. The PCI said the 
changes were introduced “in the interests of clarity and in the light of the experience…of 
the first two years operation”.  
In addition, the PCI highlighted a trend that complaints were being made under 
multiple principles of the code, each of which required a decision from him and, if 
appealed, the PCI.  According to the regulation, this meant that “a decision upholding a 
complaint under any Principle - which has to be published by the publication concerned 
- also includes lengthy material about complaints that have not been upheld”. In other 
words, the publication of partially upheld decisions also had to include the parts of the 
decision which were not upheld. Thus, the council decided on the “significant change” 
which meant that newspapers were only being obliged to publish those parts of decisions 
upholding a complaint. 
There was another amendment to the publication guidelines not referred to in the 
newsletter or in other PCI material. It is not clear when this change occurred. In the first 
iteration of the publication guidelines, newspapers were obliged to publish an upheld 
decision against it “within 10 working days” (PCI 2009). However, in subsequent 
editions of the guidelines (see Table 7) the PCI insisted that newspapers publish upheld 
decisions “promptly” (PCI 2015). There is no longer a reference to 10 working days. This 
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change is a significant one given that the PCI Chairman referred to the publication 
guidelines as a “core” element of the regulatory system (PCI 2009: 12). 
 
Table 7: PCI Publication Guidelines for upheld decisions 
Existing Publication Guidelines 
1, 2, 3, 
4 
Elements of upheld decision of Press Ombudsman and PCI must be published:  
 In full 
 Promptly 
 On the same page, or further forward, or, if offending article published 
on front page, on the first four editorial pages 
 Same day 
 With due prominence 
 Unedited 
 Without editorial commentary by way of headline or otherwise 
 With logo 
5 Publication of decisions not upheld or elements of complaints not upheld is at 
the discretion of editors but must be written and presented with fairness 
 
 
In April 2010, almost two-and-a-half years after it began work, the Press Ombudsman 
and PCI were granted recognition under the Defamation Act 2009. In the PCI’s second 
annual report for the year 2009, the PCI Chairman said recognition would mean that 
members of the public would realise that the regulator “has the sanction of statute law as 
part of an open system that is fair, free, and independent of both government and the 
press” (PCI 2010). Despite the concept of a “free” regulator, the Press Ombudsman noted 
his concern about the number of complaints being made by solicitors on behalf of 
complainants (Horgan 2009). He said there was no need to engage solicitors because they 
would not ensure success and often slowed the process (ibid). 
Under the leadership of a new chairman, Daithi O’Ceallaigh, who was appointed in 
July 2010, the PCI continued to trade on its initial goodwill and success with 
stakeholders. In its next annual report, 2010, the third report, the chairman said 
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recognition under the Act was “no mere formality” for the regulator. He argued that 
legislative approval was: 
a significant and public recognition of the degree to which these new 
structures, since their institution in 2007, have met the exacting 
requirements laid down for recognition in the Act, and have contributed 
to the climate of enhanced accountability and public service within 
which our press industry operates (PCI 2011: 1) 
Launching its fourth annual report in 2011, by which time the concept of independent 
regulation had bedded down, O’Ceallaigh reflected on the previous three years of 
operations concluding that the system had proven “robust” (2012: 4).  
 
4.6: 2012-2013 – PCI continuing operation  
In May 2012 the PCI held an Extraordinary General Meeting to debate changes to the 
Articles and Memorandum of Association (PCI 2012). The meeting approved a number 
of motions to update various elements of the original documents, referred to in Section 
3.5. A record of the meeting and the motions is contained in documents submitted to the 
Companies Registration Office.  
The most significant change was to Article 24, which dealt with the complaint 
procedures. The motion updated the earlier Article’s requirement that a complainant first 
“approach the publication concerned” to ask that “the complainant shall…make a 
complaint in writing to the editor”. The resolution added that in the case of an article 
published online, the date of publication would be the date from which the 3-month time 
limit would be assessed. More substantially, the resolution updated references to 
complainants showing that their “complaint falls within the code of standards”. In 2012, 
this was changed to showing a possible breach of the CoP and is a complaint which “is 
neither vexatious or insignificant”. The resolution also excluded appeals against 
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“administrative decisions” of the Press Ombudsman in relation to his/her decision on 
complaint time limits and his/her opinion of whether the complainant has shown that they 
were personally affected by the offending article. In addition, the informal process of 
dealing with complaints via conciliation was formalised in the updated Articles:  
24.5 If the Press Ombudsman decides that a complaint is one that is 
appropriate for him/her to deal with, s/he will in the first instance seek 
to have the complaint resolved through conciliation or mediation as 
s/he deems appropriate. Any such conciliation or mediation shall be 
confidential to the parties… 
24.6 In the event that a complaint is not resolved through conciliation 
or mediation, the Press Ombudsman, after making such further 
enquiries as s/he deems relevant, shall make a substantive decision on 
the matter… 
This change was a significant departure, especially as there is no such references to 
informal complaint handling in the 2007 documents. A number of other minor changes, 
including the insertion of “gender-neutral” language throughout, were also passed at the 
meeting. 
In addition to the formalising of the informal complaint procedure, the Press 
Ombudsman said in the 2011 annual report that the regulator had also been issuing 
“advisory notices” to newspapers.  
Many readers of this Annual Report, including journalists, may be 
unaware that the Press Ombudsman will, on occasion, send out 
confidential advisory notices to editors on behalf of families, at a time 
of great tragedy for them, in circumstances in which they have suddenly 
and unexpectedly become the subject of intense media interest. 
Advisory notices are sent out only in response to requests from family 
members or individuals where the Ombudsman feels that the wishes of 
such people should be made known to editors. They are not issued 
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automatically regardless of the circumstances, and they do not 
prejudice the outcome of any formal complaint that may be made 
subsequently. They are purely for the information of editors, who 
remain entitled to make their own professional decisions; but they may 
also, on occasion, help to facilitate appropriate and necessary coverage 
of particularly distressing events. They are simply part of the service 
which the Press Ombudsman provides for journalists and members of 
the public alike (2012: 14) 
The emergence of conciliation and the concept of the advisory notices are two 
examples of how the regulator evolved in the years after its establishment. Its claims to 
be providing robust accountability mechanisms to the public continued. These issues will 
be discussed in Chapter 7. 
In July 2011, in response to a series of revelations about the hacking of phones by 
journalists working for News International, the UK Government ordered the 
establishment of an inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press. Justice Brian 
Leveson carried out extensive public hearings throughout 2012. 
Ireland’s Press Ombudsman was invited to submit evidence to the inquiry and also 
attended a public hearing on July 13, 2012. In his evidence, the Press Ombudsman 
(Leveson Inquiry 2012) again promoted the conciliation and mediation efforts of his 
office. He argued that the “identification of a single individual”, i.e. the Ombudsman, “as 
the key element in the complaint-handling process facilitates public recognition of, 
confidence in, and familiarity with, the system”.  
During the public hearing, the Press Ombudsman discussed a number of relevant 
areas of his work. First, he confirmed that the office worked to a “succession of time 
limits”.  
We try to ensure that from the time a complaint has been formally 
registered with us, if a decision of myself is required, that that decision 
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is reached within a maximum period of three months. And, for 
example, if somebody writes to a newspaper or a magazine to complain, 
the procedures of which all our publications are aware is that if after 
two weeks that complaint has not been replied to, or has been replied 
to in a way that’s unsatisfactory to the complainant, then they come to 
us and we take it up (Leveson Inquiry 2012) 
In other words, it appeared from the Press Ombudsman’s evidence that, including 
initial attempts by the complaint to work with the publication concerned, the office had a 
14-week timeframe for dealing with complaints. 
When asked about the office’s sanction powers – the publication of upheld decisions 
– the Press Ombudsman argued that there was significant industry buy-in for the process. 
In my experience…the sanction that we operate, which is the 
requirement to publish in certain modalities any decision upholding a 
complaint against them, is taken extremely seriously by the editors of 
all our publications. The public may not see it as seriously as they do, 
but in my experience, editors take it extremely seriously and would take 
considerable steps to avoid finding themselves in that situation (ibid) 
Indeed, the Press Ombudsman also pointed out that this core accountability 
mechanism was central to the office’s success. 
The bottom line really is that the success or failure of any system of this 
kind depends on two things in my view. It depends on the robustness 
of the measures that are put in place to ensure redress, and it depends 
on the whole-heartedness of the endorsement and uptake of these by 
the newspaper industry themselves. These two things are absolutely 
essential (ibid) 
A number of other areas were also discussed. During the hearings, the Press 
Ombudsman said he believed that the office did not have widespread public recognition, 
outside of those who had used its services. However, a public awareness campaign was 
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underway to address this. He added that he believed that there had been no split in the 
PCI on any decision during its four-and-a-half years in operation at that point. The 
hearings also heard from a number of other witnesses such as Nick Clegg, the then Deputy 
Prime Minister, and Alex Salmond, then the Scottish First Minister, who made favourable 
remarks about the Irish regulatory solution (Hennessy 2012). 
The work of the inquiry did not go unnoticed in Ireland. Despite the Press 
Ombudsman’s remarks during the hearings that Ireland’s privacy culture was different to 
that in the UK (ibid), others disagreed. Senator David Norris, a long-time critic of the 
Irish regulatory solution, said there was “a strong crossover between bad practices in the 
British and Irish press” and called for a Leveson style inquiry in Ireland (Dáil Eireann 
2012). Melanie Verwoerd, a former director of UNICEF Ireland and a well-known public 
figure due to her relationship with the deceased Irish radio presenter Gerry Ryan, said 
details of press behaviour aired during the hearings reflected her negative experience of 
the Irish press (Hickey 2012). 
I’ve been watching (the) Leveson (inquiry) and a lot of things rang true 
for me as well, having the face the media outside my door for months 
and my doorbell being rung and my children being hounded (ibid) 
Nevertheless, the Press Ombudsman later said that the attention of Leveson was 
“gratifying” and said he believed no system of regulation was perfect (Heffernan 2012).  
In my experience, readers whose complaints have merit get satisfaction 
if their legitimate expectations are met in two areas: an 
independent ombudsman, council or redress mechanism that operates 
swiftly and fairly, and a press industry that engages generously with its 
critics in applying the same standards of accountability to itself that it 
expects of others (ibid) 
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Justice Leveson published his report on November 29, 2012. As expected it was 
highly critical of the PCC and the British press industry. As a result, Justice Leveson 
proposed a new regulator which had many similar characteristics to the Irish model. He 
called for an independent and incentivised system of self-regulation that was supported 
by legislation but designed by industry. 
The press needs to establish a new regulatory body which is truly 
independent of industry leaders and of Government and politicians. It 
must promote high standards of journalism, and protect both the public 
interest and the rights and liberties of individuals. It should set and 
enforce standards, hear individual complaints against its members and 
provide a fair, quick and inexpensive arbitration service to deal with 
civil law claims. The Chair and the other members of the body must be 
independent and appointed by a fair and open process. It must comprise 
a majority of members who are independent of the press. It should not 
include any serving editor or politician. That can be readily achieved 
by an appointments panel which could itself include a current editor but 
with a substantial majority demonstrably independent of the press and 
of politicians (Leveson 2012) 
However, Justice Leveson’s proposals also exhibited some significant differences 
with the PCI. These included stronger sanctions, such as fines, and oversight of the new 
regulatory authority by the statutory broadcasting regulator, Ofcom (Brady 2012, Foley 
2012).  
 In tandem, the UK debates post-Leveson also continued to centre on the idea of 
“statutory” press regulation and the Irish solution. Then Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats, was keen to differentiate what Leveson was 
proposing from the narrative of statutory control by referring to Ireland: 
As the report notes, there is already an example of statutory 
underpinning in the Irish Press Council, which has been accepted by a 
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number of UK newspapers. The Daily Mail, the Daily Mirror, the Daily 
Star, The Sun, The Sunday Times, the Mail on Sunday and the Sunday 
Mirror are all members – they all publish Irish editions. I have not yet 
heard those papers complain of a deeply illiberal press environment 
across the Irish Sea (House of Commons 2012) 
Eventually, the UK press established another form of self-regulation known as the 
Independent Press Standards Organisation. It has been set-up outside of any legislative 
recognition process and does not have the full co-operation of the industry with a number 
of large publishers, such as the Guardian and Financial Times, remaining outside of its 
scope.  
 
4.7: 2013-2014 – PCI criticism and praise 
Irish press regulation continued to operate post-Leveson despite the debate shifting to 
focus on stronger methods of regulation. In 2013, Denis O’Brien, a wealthy Irish 
businessman and media owner with significant interests in the Irish print and broadcast 
sectors, took a defamation action against the Irish Daily Mail newspaper over an article 
it had written about his charity work. During the hearing, O’Brien’s legal team dismissed 
suggestions that the claimant could have used the PCI instead of the courts. O’Brien’s 
barrister said the wrong could not be righted by being “batted off by some slap of the 
wrist from the Press Council” with newspapers “laugh(ing) all the way to the bank” when 
complainants take the PCI route (Gartland 2013).  
From the comments it would seem that O’Brien, who at the time was building but 
now owns a significant stake in five member publications of the PCI via his shareholding 
in Independent News & Media, thought little of the complaints handling mechanism. 
However, academics, the media and the PCI itself were keen to rebut the claims. The PCI 
Chairman (2013) issued a statement when the case concluded on the basis of queries 
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“which appear to be based on a lack of knowledge of the record of these institutions, and 
a lack of awareness of its effectiveness and relevance in the matter of disputes concerning 
the press”.  
In all cases where complaints were upheld, newspapers have published 
our decisions – some of them of substantial import – upholding the 
reputations of individuals and correcting serious errors (ibid) 
The editor of PCI member publication the Sunday Independent, Anne Harris, also 
disagreed with the claims. 
The office of the Ombudsman is but a few short years old. And yet, as 
anybody with even a basic knowledge of the working of the Irish media 
knows, it has put manners on us. It has the same deterrent effect on 
casual waywardness that having a police station in your village does — 
and yes, I understand the implications of the analogy. We are 
sometimes careless; we make mistakes. The difference now is — we 
right them quickly (2013)   
Former journalist and lecturer Michael Foley (2014) claimed that “without doubt” the 
PCI had “had a good first six years”. Elsewhere, another former journalist Tom Felle 
(2013) argued that “despite [the PCI’s] shortcomings it is finely balanced, culturally 
sensitive and country specific, essentially an exercise in soft power, and arguably the 
right fit for Ireland” (2013: 173). Indeed, the PCI continued to insist that it was ensuring 
a robust method of accountability for the press. Launching its fifth annual report in 2012, 
the PCI Chairman said the regulator had built a strong reputation among peers in the press 
regulatory community. He said that the almost 2,000 complaints received were a signal 
of public confidence in the system and that newspapers had published all decisions 
against them (2013: 3). A year later, he paid tribute to the press for the industry’s support 
for the regulatory framework saying that newspapers in Ireland recognised that the PCI 
128 
 
was “not a marketing or a public relations exercise (2014: 3). Not only was the regulator 
ensuring compliance with its sanction powers, the industry was playing its part at a time 
of increasing financial pressure, he added. In both the 2012 and 2013 annual reports, the 
Chairman commended the newspaper industry for “putting its money where its mouth is” 
(2013: 3) and “maintaining” (2014: 3) financial support for the office. 
I would like to express my appreciation, and that of the Council, for the 
substantial financial commitment of the press industry to our system of 
independent self-regulation, which is being maintained despite the 
many financial pressures which the industry continues to experience. 
The press continue to honour this commitment because the Council is 
not a marketing or a public relations exercise, but a highly significant 
development in independent institutional accountability in the private 
sector and, as such, a substantial contribution to the democratic ideals 
which the press, among other institutions, exists to serve (2014: 3) 
In September 2014, John Horgan retired as Press Ombudsman and was replaced by 
Peter Feeney, a former broadcaster who also served on the PCI board for year starting in 
2013. According to the chairman O’Ceallaigh, the first Press Ombudsman had been 
“fearless in upholding the right of the complainant to have the decision published 
properly” (2015: 5). 
 
4.8: 2008-2014 – PCI statistics  
Table 8 contains the main top-level figures covering the work of the PCI during the seven 
years 2008 to 2014. This information was taken from the PCI’s annual reports from which 
four complaint categories were identified: 
 The total number of complaints received by the PCI in any one year.  
 Complaints which were not examined by the PCI i.e. did not reach informal or formal 
adjudication 
 Complaints which were informally resolved or conciliated between the parties  
 Complaints which reached a formal adjudication of the Press Ombudsman and/or the 
PCI 
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Table 8: PCI total complaints 2008 - 201413 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014   
Total  372 351 315 343 575 381 350 2687 
Not examined 293 285 224 266 491 300 265 2124 
Informal assessment 29 18 26 27 35 36 29 200 
Formally adjudicated14 36 35 51 43 42 29 37 273 
         
 
 
4.8.1: Total complaints received 
Between 2008 and 2014, the PCI received 2,687 complaints from members of the public 
(See Table 8). The median number of complaints received every year was 351. As Figure 
1 shows, the annual level of complaints made to the regulator showed a small upward 
trend year-on-year. Occasionally, the PCI has argued that a trend of increasing complaints 
showed that the regulatory system was both well-known and well-regarded among the 
Irish public (PCI 2009).  
However, the positive trend is mainly down to the 575 complaints made in 2012. 
According to the Press Ombudsman (PCI 2013: 9), that year saw two articles attract 250 
complaints between them, four of which were ‘formalised’ by complainants. Therefore, 
if these complaints are removed15, the number for complaints that year becomes 329, a 
figure more in line with previous years. As a result, the small upward trend becomes flat, 
as shown in Figure 2. Thus, concluding that the PCI received more complaints year-on-
year as recognition of its growing place in the consciousness of the Irish public is not the 
complete picture. Indeed, the Press Ombudsman, as noted earlier, has made this point, 
                                                 
13 The total number of complaints received every year includes a small number of complaints that were 
still going through the PCI procedures at various stages when the annual reports were being drawn up. 
Thus, the figures for cases not examined, informal assessment and formally adjudicated do not equal the 
total.  
14 The formally adjudicated figures are taken from those published by the PCI on its website and listed in 
the formal complaint database established for further study (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6). 
15 250 minus four formalised complaints = 246; 575 complaints that year minus 246 = 329 
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arguing that the drawing of firm conclusions on the basis of increases or decreases is 
difficult (PCI 2011: 9).  
 
Figure 1: Total complaints received 
 
 
Figure 2: Total complaints (excl. 2012 outlier) 
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4.8.2: Complaints not examined 
 
 
Table 9: Complaints not formally examined 2008-2014 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL  
Not examined 293 285 224 266 491 300 265 2124 
Not processed/Outside remit 81 53 76 108 117 97 97 629 
Non-member publications 45 28 20 10 13 20 14 150 
Not pursued by complainant 141 157 98 144 356 170 150 1216 
Ruled out on 1st reading 26 47 30 4 5 13 4 129 
 
The second significant data point that emerged from PCI documentation was the number 
of complaints which were not examined. These complaints fell into four categories in the 
statistics presented by the PCI in its annual reports. The first were those complaints which 
were not processed or deemed to be outside of the PCI’s remit. Complaints in this 
category included third-party complaints made without the permission of the affected 
individual and complaints which should have been made to another regulatory body. 
Second were complaints about non-member publications which could not be investigated 
by the PCI. Third were complaints which were not pursued by the complainant after 
initial contact with the PCI. Fourth were complaints which were ruled out on a first 
reading by the Press Ombudsman who could identify no possible breach of the CoP. 
As Table 9 shows, the largest number of complaints which were not examined by the 
PCI were those not pursued by complainants in the three months allowed to make a 
complaint (1,216 complaints). This represents 45 per cent of all the complaints received 
by the office.  
In total, complaints which were not processed or examined either formally or 
informally represented 79 per cent of the complaints the office received, some 2,124 out 
of the total 2,687. While some of these may have resulted in a positive outcome for 
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complainants who did not inform the office of the outcome, the vast majority of these 
complaints were likely to result in no outcome beyond the initial lodging of the complaint. 
As Figure 3 shows, the trend for complaints not processed or examined mirrored the trend 
for the overall number of complaints received by the office.  
 
Figure 3: Total complaints Vs. Complaints not examined 
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Table 10: Cases informally resolved 2008-2014 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL 
Informal assessment 29 18 26 27 35 36 29 200 
Resolved     13 13   8   34 
Conciliated 12 15 6 6 21 21 20 101 
Withdrawn by complainant 11 3 7 1 6 3 3 34 
Postponed due to legal action 6 0 0 7 8 4 6 31 
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The next category of complaints were those which were informally resolved (Table 10). 
There were four categories: resolved complaints, conciliated complaints, withdrawn 
complaints, postponed complaints. As this chapter has shown, the PCI has regularly 
highlighted the benefit of informal conciliation and mediation, both of which are 
represented in the first and second categories of those cases which are dealt with 
informally by the office. For the purposes of this assessment, both categories are 
combined to create a combined conciliated/resolved category. The PCI described the 
category of complaints in the following terms: 
If the Press Ombudsman decides that a complaint is one that is 
appropriate for his Office to deal with, his Office will, in the first 
instance, seek to have the complaint resolved speedily by a process of 
conciliation.  This will involve his Case Officer acting as a facilitator 
between the complainant and the editor to see whether a mutually 
satisfactory resolution of the complaint can be achieved (PCI 2015 
online) 
 In total, some 135 cases have been conciliated/resolved since 2008, representing 5 
per cent of the total. Given the PCI’s highlighting of the area, one might have expected 
more and more cases conciliated and resolved informally by the office. The data confirms 
this. As Figure 4 shows, there is a year-on-year positive trend showing that the office is 
increasingly dealing with complaints informally prior to reaching the formal adjudication 
process.  
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Figure 4: Resolved and conciliated complaints 
According to the PCI, cases which were resolved through this process had a number of 
outcomes including: 
 publication of a correction and/or apology  
 publication of a clarification 
 publication of a letter to the editor from the complainant 
 private letter of apology to the complainant from the editor 
 publication of a further article about the subject matter under complaint, taking the 
complainant’s views into consideration 
 assurances about future coverage of the subject matter under complaint the amendment 
and/or deletion of online material (PCI 2011: 15) 
 
Indeed, the Press Ombudsman said “there is literally no limit to the range and type of 
agreement that can be reached through conciliation” (ibid). The analysis of the founding 
documents also revealed little structure in place around the conciliation process. Table 
11 is a random selection of 5 conciliated complaints taken from the office’s website (PCI 
2015) which demonstrates the variety of conciliated complaints, their outcomes, and also 
the variation in available data types which made in-depth assessment of these complaints 
unviable. 
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Table 11: A selection of conciliated and resolved complaints (Source: PCI) 
 A domiciliary midwife complained about the accuracy of an article in The Irish 
Times about a court case in which she was involved regarding an inquiry into 
allegations of professional misconduct by her. The newspaper published a correction 
of its error. 
 
 A local authority complained about an article in The Irish Times which it said 
contained a factually incorrect statement. The complaint was resolved when the 
newspaper published a clarification.  
 
 A man complained about an article regarding an EU Commission Report that he 
considered was unfair and inaccurate. The newspaper offered to give the complainant 
a right of reply by publishing a letter to the editor. While the complainant did not 
take up the offer, the complaint was resolved when a letter from him, setting out his 
views on the article under complaint, was sent to the newspaper’s editor for 
consideration in the context of any future coverage of the matters in question. 
 
 A complaint was received on behalf of a convicted paedophile whose address was 
published in the News of the World. The complaint was resolved when the newspaper 
advised that it had no plans to publish any further articles about the man in question 
 
 A man complained that an article published in The Kerryman which included a 
reference to him contained a number of inaccuracies. The complaint was resolved 
satisfactory when the newspaper very swiftly gave an undertaking to publish a 
further article clarifying the matters under complaint 
 
4.8.4: Formal adjudication 
 
 
Table 12: Formally adjudicated complaints 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 TOTAL  
Formally Adjudicated 36 35 51 43 42 29 37 273 
Upheld  3 1 2 1 7 1 4 19 
Partially upheld 10 13 15 16 13 9 12 88 
Dismissed/Not Upheld 20 15 18 16 11 11 16 107 
SRA 3 6 16 10 11 8 5 59 
                273 
 
An analysis of the published material concerning formally adjudicated complaints 
published on the PCI’s website showed that in total, some 273 complaints reached the 
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formal examination stage by either the Press Ombudsman or the PCI, or both. This 
represented just over 10 per cent of all complaints received by the PCI in the period 2008 
to 2014.  
 
Figure 5: Adjudicated Vs. Conciliated complaints 2008-2014 
 
 
The trend, as shown in Figure 5, suggested a small negative movement in the overall 
number of cases which reached formal adjudication year on year. This is to be expected, 
given the emphasis placed by the office on attempting to deal with complaints informally 
through the conciliation and/or mediation process. This is further corroborated by 
comparing the conciliated/resolved category. The trend lines suggest that the two 
category types are converging.  
There are four categories of formally adjudicated complaints: 
 Upheld in full  
 Upheld in part  
 Not upheld/dismissed 
 Sufficient Remedial Action (SRA)  
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In total, some 107 complaints were either upheld or partially upheld, with the vast 
majority, 88, being partially upheld. Of the overall number of complaints, this represented 
just under 4 per cent, or some 39 per cent of complaints which reached formal 
adjudication. An identical number of complaints are not upheld or dismissed. A further 
analysis of the data showed that (Figure 6) the number of upheld or partially upheld 
complaints marginally increased as a percentage of all adjudicated complaints. However, 
taken in isolation, upheld or partially upheld cases remained relatively stable when 
compared to the overall number of complaints the office received. 
  
Figure 6: Upheld complaints as percentage of total Vs. upheld complaints as percentage of adjudications 
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4.9: Types of complaints 
 
Table 13: Types of complaints 2008-2014 
  2008 2009* 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* Total Total %  
Truth and 
accuracy 
128 140 116 122 292 121 114 1033 38.40% 
Incitement to 
hatred/Prejudice 
74 40 36 87 216 28 112 593 22.00% 
Privacy 39 70 90 40 40 44 33 356 13.20%  
Fairness and 
Honesty 
37 58 44 34 103 49 22 347 12.90% 
Fact and 
comment 
38 42 40 38 82 38 19 297 11.00% 
Respect for 
rights 
29 40 30 31 64 54 10 258 9.60% 
Children 6 20 11 10 10 10 40 107 4.00% 
Court reporting 10 10 5 7 13 14 16 75 2.80% 
Publication of 
decision 
0 0 0 1 2 0 1 4 0.15% 
Protection of 
sources 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 0.07% 
Number of 
complaints 
372 351 315 343 575 381 350 2687   
 
When compiled, statistical information available in the PCI’s annual reports showed that 
complaints under the truth and accuracy clauses of the CoP made up the majority of the 
complaints received. Some 38.4 per cent of complainants referred to the clause when 
making a complaint. The next most significant complaint category was incitement to 
hatred/prejudice. Some 22 per cent of complainants cited this clause when complaining 
about a newspaper article. Interestingly, privacy complaints made up just 13.2 per cent 
of the complaints. Given the long history of the topic of press regulation in Ireland and 
concerns of politicians and others in relation to privacy, the data shows that the PCI 
actually dealt with a small number of complaints on this topic. There were just 4 
complaints under clause 10 of the CoP which governs how newspapers publish an upheld 
decision of the office.  
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4.10: Conclusion 
This chapter examined the first eight years of the PCI as presented in the first seven 
annual reports. As this chapter has shown, during this time, the PCI secured the approval 
of a number of key stakeholder groups, including politicians and the press. The PCI was 
also been keen to stress what it believed has been as a successful track record in dealing 
with complaints from the public about the conduct and content of member publications. 
Indeed, it also claimed to have secured the approval of the public for its work regulating 
newspaper content. 
Assessing whether all stakeholders fully believe that the PCI is a robust and fair 
accountability mechanism is difficult. Nevertheless, this chapter has analysed the 
structures and operational blueprint to which the PCI has subscribed. While there have 
been a number of important changes in this regard – which will be discussed at length in 
Chapter 6 and 7 - an initial conclusion, based on the information contained in this chapter, 
would suggest that the PCI is operating as intended. Thus, statements of support from 
interested parties are understandable. 
However, this chapter also references a number of areas which require further 
analysis. As discussed earlier, some 79 per cent of complaints received by the PCI do not 
make it to either an informal or formal decision. The PCI identifies a number of reasons 
for this including that complaints are outside of its remit (629 complaints), that 
complaints are about non-member publications (150 complaints) and that complaints are 
outside of the 3-month time limit (1216 complaints) or are ruled out on a first reading 
(129 complaints). Due to data protection restrictions, these complaints cannot be 
examined. Nevertheless, the fact that almost 4 in 5 complaints do not make it past the 
initial lodging of the complaint suggests that further study is needed.  
This chapter has also shown how the PCI has regularly made clear that it is keen to 
utilise its informal complaints handling methods more regularly. The data supports this, 
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showing that, the number of informally handled complaints are rising. In all, some 5 per 
cent of complainants went through the informal conciliation/resolution process. 
However, as Chapter 5 will show, examining these complaints and their outcomes in any 
rigorous manner as to whether the PCI is ensuring complainants achieve strong 
accountability outcomes is extremely difficult. 
This chapter has also found that, just over 10 per cent of complainants reach a formal 
adjudication of their complaints with the Press Ombudsman and/or PCI. In isolation, the 
data and content of this section does not provide the depth required to assess the central 
research question of this thesis - if independent, incentivised and institutionalised press 
regulation produces a robust accountability system in the North Atlantic area. Indeed, the 
Press Ombudsman, as referenced earlier, has cautioned against making conclusions on 
such headline data. Indeed, arguing that a 39 per cent average for upheld complaints in 
the formal adjudication process shows a robust regulator says nothing about the actual 
mechanics of the decisions or how accountability is provided on the back of that decision. 
Equally, arguing that the regulator is weak on the basis of it formally adjudicating on a 
small overall number of complaints – with the rest ruled out or resolved – is also 
problematic.  
Nevertheless, the PCI, academics and politicians have consistently promoted its work 
as ensuring a robust accountability framework for press regulation in Ireland. A top-level 
examination of the data suggests that such a position does have some merit. Between the 
work on conciliating complaints, complaints which are resolved, complaints where the 
publication has offered some form of remedial action and the formally upheld complaints, 
a significant number of complainants get some form of recognition of their grievance. 
However, with the words of the late former Minister for Justice, Brian Lenihan, who 
described the regulatory system as “on the light side of the scale” providing a sharp 
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counterpoint to the overwhelming positivity about the office’s work, a greater level of 
scrutiny of the data is required beyond the information presented here. This will allow 
for a full assessment of whether the office is actually achieving a suitable level of 
accountability when member publications breach its CoP. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology 
 
5.1: Introduction 
As Chapter 2 discussed, a measured political economy analysis (McChesney 1998; 
Herman and Chomsky 2010; Schudson 1989, 1991, 1997, 2011; Duncan 2014) of the 
literature suggests that non-institutionalised self-regulation in North Atlantic Liberal 
press systems (press councils) have failed to provide the public with effective and robust 
media accountability. The rare examples of substantive research carried out in Canada 
(Pritchard 2000), the United States (Ugland 2000, 2008), and in Britain (O’Malley and 
Soley 2000, Frost 2000, 2004, 2015) all support the conclusion that industry power over 
self-regulatory instruments has infected regulatory structures, procedures and decision-
making, resulting in credibility problems and regulatory failures. Thus, this research is 
attempting to analyse a country – Ireland - where no significant systematic or empirical 
work has been undertaken in the press regulatory area. Ireland is a worthy candidate for 
further study due to the unique variation of its regulatory model when compared to the 
other North Atlantic Liberal countries. In Ireland an independent, legislatively 
underpinned and incentivised press council has been operating since 2008 (see Chapter 
4).  
This study examines what impact, if any, the institutionalisation of independent press 
regulation has on the public service commitment to accountability which is the third 
element of journalism professionalisation in the North Atlantic Liberal system proposed 
as part of the media systems classification model established by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). Specifically, it will ask how institutionalised, independent press regulation 
ensures accountability for complainants and if it meets standards of accountability 
established in the literature (see Chapter 2). In addition, this study will also compare self-
regulatory media accountability solutions with independent regulation in Ireland. 
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This chapter will outline the methodology utilised for examining these subjects. It 
will begin by looking at the main arguments and areas of controversy in methodological 
theory. It will also discuss Grounded Theory as a potentially useful basis for the research. 
 
5.2: Methodology and methods 
To reach an acceptable standard in academic research, social science study should meet 
two criteria (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 14). First, research should pose a question 
that is important in the real world. It should be “consequential for political, social, or 
economic life [and] for understanding something that significantly affects many people’s 
lives” (ibid). Second, research should make a contribution to the existing scholarly work 
on a particular subject by extending the ability to establish verifiable explanations of 
some aspect or phenomena.  
This research, which is assessing independent press regulation, meets the first 
criterion. By examining new regulatory mechanisms in place to offer media 
accountability in Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) North Atlantic Liberal media system, the 
research is addressing areas of political and social importance. This is highlighted by the 
long history and current trend of political and societal alarm about the behaviour of 
journalists and the methods for ensuring compliance with ethical standards (see Chapter 
2). As Chapter 2 discussed, journalism in the North Atlantic Liberal press system has 
outgrown its libertarian foundations to take on social responsibilities. There are many 
theoretical approaches to understanding journalism, however, as Chapter 2 showed, a 
growing sense of media responsibility to the media public is part of almost all viable 
theoretical frameworks. 
In order to meet the second criterion of King, Keohane and Verba (1994), research 
must establish a robust methodological framework and evaluate the methods employed 
in coming to the conclusions. Without this, the authors argued, research will struggle to 
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meet the standards required to contribute to scholarly work. It will also fail to establish 
the verifiable conclusions needed to produce solid new empirical findings. 
Researchers often confuse the terms methodology and method. The terms have similar 
connotations in media and communications research, but both have different - albeit 
sometimes complimentary - meanings. The literature strongly indicates that both 
methodology and method exhibit a somewhat symbiotic relationship in academic 
research. For Kaplan (1964: 23 cited in Brannen 2004: 282) the aim of methodology is 
the description and analysis of methods, “throwing light on their limitations and 
resources, clarifying their presuppositions and consequences”. “In sum the aim of 
methodology is to help us to understand, in the broadest possible terms, not the products 
of the scientific enquiry but the process itself (ibid).” Kothari and Garg (2014: 6-8) agreed 
with Kaplan. They argued that methods are the tools used to collect information, the 
statistical techniques to measure the data and the methods of evaluating accuracy. On the 
other hand, methodology is the way of systematically solving the research problem and 
the logic behind it: 
When we talk about research methodology we not only talk of the 
research methods but also consider the logic behind the methods we use 
in the context of our research study and explain why we are using a 
particular method or technique and why we are not using others so that 
research results are capable of being evaluated by the researcher 
himself or by others (2014: 8) 
A potential third characteristic of good academic research is the systematic and empirical 
testing of public claims made by organisations, governments, academics and so on. 
Indeed, the words of US inventor Hudson Maxim here are relevant (cited in Kothari and 
Garg 2014: 5). Maxim argued that “all progress is born of inquiry”. Doubt, he argued, is 
better than overconfidence “for it leads to inquiry, and inquiry leads to invention”. As 
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Chapter 2 and 3 showed, the media and politicians in the North Atlantic Liberal countries 
have regularly praised the work of press councils and other media accountability 
mechanisms. In the example of press regulation in Ireland – this study’s main interest – 
Chapter 4 showed that there has been much commentary since the PCI began work in 
2008. Occasionally those involved in Irish press regulation have tempered their views 
about the success of the country’s particular regulatory system. However, on many 
occasions positive comments have been made about the system’s ability to provide robust 
accountability for readers. Others too have praised the work of the council (Felle 2013; 
Foley 2013; Kenny 2014). For the first time, this research will investigate the validity of 
such claims in an empirical manner. 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994), there are a further four characteristics 
to scientific inquiry. First, the goal of research must be inference, whether it be 
descriptive or explanatory. Inferences are acquired on the back of empirical information 
which is collected according to a robust methodological framework and the employ of 
sound methods. The authors’ second characteristic is that such frameworks should be 
public. If methods are “left implicit, the scholarly community has no way of judging the 
validity of what was done” and the research is therefore “not a contribution to the social 
sciences” (1994: 7). The authors accepted that all methods have limitations but by being 
public, they can be addressed and recognised. Methodological limitations mean that 
conclusions are almost always uncertain - the third characteristic. The authors correctly 
argued that making inferences without uncertainty is not science. Finally, they argued 
that the content is the method, not the material, relying on Pearson’s (1892) argument 
that “the unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material”. Kothari and 
Garg (2014: 19) agreed with these characteristics, arguing that robust research should be 
systematic, logical, empirical and replicable.  
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5.3: Research type 
Methodological literature covers many different approaches to social science research. 
For example, Kothari and Garg (2014: 2-4) pointed out that applied research is an 
approach which “aims at finding a solution for an immediate problem facing a society”. 
Empirical research, therefore, “relies on experience of observation alone…It is data-
based research, coming up with conclusions which are capable of being verified by 
observation or experiment”. Such quantitative research can be approached in two ways, 
inferential experimental and simulation. Simulation, according to the authors, is 
“characterised by much greater control over the research environment” with 
“variables…manipulated to observe their effect on other variables”. It involves “the 
construction of an artificial environment within which relevant information and data can 
be generated. This permits an observation of the dynamic behaviour of a system under 
controlled conditions”. This study, as the remainder of this chapter will show, is firmly 
rooted in the applied and empirical research genre as set out by Kothari and Garg.  
Others have expanded on such contributions. Hammersley (2000) examined the 
differences between practical and scientific research:  
‘Scientific inquiry’ refers to research that is designed to contribute to a 
body of academic knowledge, where the immediate audience is fellow 
researchers - though the ultimate aim is to produce knowledge that will 
be a resource for anyone with an interest in the relevant topic. By 
contrast, practical research is geared directly to providing information 
that is needed to deal with some practical problem, so that here the 
immediate audience for research reports is people with a practical 
interest in the issue; notably, but not exclusively, policymakers and 
occupational practitioners of the relevant kinds (2000: 223-224) 
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For Hammersley (2000), the difference between each sub set of research is the 
validation mechanisms used. In the former, it is about a cautious approach where 
academics “err on the side of rejection as false what is in fact true, rather than accepting 
as true what is in fact false” (2000: 224). While this produces sound knowledge, it also 
renders the process slow, the author argued. In the latter, assumptions are not restricted 
to those of the academic community due to the fact that practitioners “are dealing with 
particular phenomena in specific locales that have not usually themselves been subjected 
to scientific investigation” (ibid). Hammersley goes on to argue that combining both 
strands of research results in diluted outcomes. However, it is clear that in this instance, 
in order to meet good research criterions mentioned earlier, this study will contain both 
elements of practical and scientific research. Hammersley’s categories are too simplistic 
and there is no reason why this academic study cannot have practical and ‘real-world’ 
impacts. 
A further methodological argument exists about the benefits of qualitative or 
quantitative research. Indeed such arguments have abounded since scientific inquiry 
began during the time of the great Greek philosophers (Sarantakos 2012). Whether 
research be grounded in the positivist (quantitative) or the non-positivist (qualitative) 
genres, both traditions deliver equally valid, sometimes different, results, and can be 
suited to different types of research. There is significant disagreement over which type of 
research produces better research (see King, Keohane and Verba 1994). Nevertheless, 
there is an emerging consensus that the differences are unimportant beyond the aesthetics. 
According to King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 4-6), all good research should derive from 
the same underlying logic of inference irrespective of how it is arrived at. Indeed, 
Brannen (2004) argued that qualitative and quantitative material should be thought of as 
complementary. The line of argument is supported by Glasser and Straus (2009: 10-11). 
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As the remainder of this chapter will show, this study lies in the mixed-method approach 
in that quantitative data will need illumination from qualitative material in order to 
establish firm, valid and reliable conclusions. 
 
5.4: Grounded theory 
As Chapter 2 discussed, establishing a suitable theoretical framework for the examination 
of the subject matter of this thesis – independent press regulation in the North Atlantic 
Liberal press system - is problematic. There are aspects of the various theories – the 
healthy scepticism of the political economy tradition, the practicalities of Schudson’s 
work or the universality of McQuail’s contributions – which appear suitable for studying 
the concept of media regulation. This study has relied on the geo-political categorisation 
of press systems established by Hallin and Mancini (2004) and their understanding of the 
public service ethic as a development of media accountability within the 
professionalisation movement. Yet, this particular theory has never been systematically 
employed to study press regulation (Fengler et al. 2014: 69). Indeed, as Fengler et al. 
noted, the theory has internal inconsistencies which make empirical conclusions 
potentially unfruitful. Others have also referenced such concerns, with Rioba, (2012) in 
a PhD on Tanzanian press regulation, noting how generalising about accountability 
mechanisms in the African country was difficult due to the cultural differences which 
exist between continents. Thus, conforming to a stated theoretical approach and 
hypothesising on the basis of a particular framework presents obvious problems. A 
methodological approach known as Grounded Theory offers the potential to overcome 
such difficulties. 
Grounded Theory is regularly used by qualitative researchers (Charmaz 2014 & 
2003). For Charmaz (2014: 87), however, all those who rely on it “assume that the 
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strength of grounded theory lies in its empirical foundation”. Indeed, Charmaz argued 
that the studying of data is key because it “sparks…awareness of…implicit meanings and 
taken-for-granted concerns”. Despite the obvious links to the qualitative genre, Charmaz 
(2003) correctly pointed out that Glasser, one of the theory’s key figures, argued that 
grounded theory is a “method of discovery” which: 
treat(s) categories as emergent from the data, relie(s) on a direct and, 
often, narrow empiricism, develop(s) a concept-indicator approach, 
consider(s) concepts to be variables, and emphasise(s) analysing a basic 
social process (2003: 11) 
Thus, grounded theory is becoming increasingly adopted in mixed-method research. 
Indeed, Charmaz pointed out (2003: 16) that Glaser favoured the flexible approach to 
grounded theory in order for researchers to construct their own strategies in carrying out 
research. Indeed, Charmaz also outlined her own predisposition towards such 
methodological flexibility in utilising the theory for mixed-methods research (ibid). 
Grounded theory has also been favoured by other researchers examining press regulation 
(de Haan 2012). 
The theory’s main authors, Glasser and Strauss (2009), argued that grounded theory 
is about forming theory from data, rather than the traditional step of finding a suitable 
theory from which to assess data. Glasser and Strauss believed that researchers frequently 
distort data to fit “great man” theories. Grand theories, while useful, are generally static 
and rigid, thus potentially limiting the scope and creativity of research. Some “analysts 
are preoccupied with ‘checking out’ the ‘emergent set of propositions’,” they argued. 
Indeed many researchers look for negative cases or setting out deliberately to accumulate 
positive ones to gain further evidence for their hypothesis, Glasser and Strauss argued 
(2009: 18). Thus, “verifying a logico-deductive theory generally leaves us with at best a 
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reformulated hypothesis or two and an unconfirmed set of speculations, and, at worst, a 
theory that does not seem to fit or work” (ibid). 
A grounded theory therefore can be used as a fuller test of a logico-deductive theory 
(2009: 17). Glasser and Strauss conform to the idea of “theory as process”, as a concept 
that is an “ever-developing entity, not…a perfected product” (2009: 18) as many of the 
grand theories espouse to be.  
The discussional form of formulating theory gives a feeling of ‘ever-
developing’ to the theory, allows it to become quite rich, complex, and 
dense, and makes it fit and…easy to comprehend. On the other hand, 
to state a theory in prepositional form, except perhaps for a few 
scattered core propositions, would make it less complex, dense, and 
rich, and more laborious to read. It would also tend by implication to 
‘freeze’ the theory instead of giving the feeling of a need for continued 
development (2009: 18) 
In order to generate successful data for the abstraction of theory, Glasser and Straus 
(2009: 20-30) argued that ‘categories’ and ‘properties’ need to be identified as elements 
of a potential theory. A category is a conceptual element of a theory, they argued (e.g. 
media accountability). On the other hand, a property is an aspect of the element (e.g. a 
press council). Concepts are thus generated from the data which should be analytic 
(“sufficiently generalised to designate characteristics of concrete entities”) and 
sensitising (“yield a meaningful picture, abetted by apt illustrations that enable one to 
grasp the reference”). Thus, generating hypothesis “requires evidence enough only to 
establish a suggestion – not an excessive piling up of evidence to establish a proof, and 
the consequent hindering of the generation of new hypothesis”.   
In the beginning, one’s hypotheses may seem unrelated, but as 
categories and properties emerge, develop in abstraction, and become 
related, their accumulating interrelations form an integrated central 
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theoretical framework – the core of the emerging theory. The core 
becomes a theoretical guide to the further collection and analysis of 
data (2009: 32) 
Notwithstanding their critique of formulaic theories, Glasser and Strauss also 
correctly pointed out that the wide field of established theory remains an important 
consideration in any academic study. 
Substantive theory is a strategic link in the formation and generation of 
grounded formal theory. We believe that although formal theory can be 
generated directly from data, it is most desirable, and usually necessary, 
to start the formal theory from a substantive one. The latter not only 
provides a stimulus to a ‘good’ idea, but it also gives an initial direction 
in developing relevant categories and properties and in choosing 
possible modes of integration. Indeed, it is difficult to find a grounded 
formal theory that was not in some way stimulated by a substantive 
theory (2009: 60) 
In other words, it is best to study the grand theories and use these in order to establish 
a broad theoretical base for the study while maintaining distance when generating and 
analysing data. Thus, this study’s reliance on Hallin and Mancini’s work (2004) as a base 
for examining the broader question of effective press regulation remains relevant and 
suitable for an analysis of data according to the grounded theory approach. 
 
5.5: The research method 
The complaint-handling work of the PCI (PCI) falls into three categories. These are 
covered in detail in Chapter 4. The categories are complaints which were not examined, 
those which reached an informal resolution and those which were formally adjudicated 
on by the Press Ombudsman and/or the PCI.    
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In early 2015, this researcher contacted the PCI to request access to case files for all 
complaints under all three categories. For complaints not examined, the office said that 
complaint files were not available for inspection due to data protection legislation. As a 
result, the only data available for this category is the overall statistical information in the 
PCI’s annual reports thus making the category unsuitable for any in-depth empirical 
research. In the second category, data protection issues were again cited by the PCI 
preventing full access to the complaint files in order to make a full assessment of these 
complaints. The PCI publishes a basic description of the conciliated complaints on its 
website. However, much of the material does not include the full information behind the 
complaint, i.e. the date of the original article, the newspaper, the complainant, details of 
the correction/clarification/letter of apology and so on. Thus it was deemed unsuitable 
for any systematic categorising or analysis.  
The third category – those complaints formally adjudicated – produced the best 
avenue for an in-depth examination of how the PCI meets the accountability criteria. In 
this category the decisions either upholding or dismissing complaints generally included 
important information for the study; such as article dates, newspaper title, complainant 
name, nature of complaint, date of adjudication, appeal date and so on. As Chapter 4 
discussed, the only available sanction power held by the PCI is the publication of its 
upheld decisions in offending member publications according to the publication 
guidelines it upholds. Thus, the availability of core complaint data, mentioned above, 
produced an avenue for an assessment of this key accountability mechanism. This 
information allows for a near complete assessment of whether member publications are 
meeting the publication of decision criteria laid down by the PCI (see Table 14) and how 
the PCI manages formally adjudicated complaints.  
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It was decided that a full picture of the PCI’s work in this category could therefore be 
established by examining all of the upheld or partially upheld complaints (107 in total), 
locating the publication of the decision in each corresponding publication and recording 
data (Table 14) from each publication. This would allow the study to examine if the 
office’s only enforcement sanction – the publication of decisions – was being met by 
member publication in full. In addition, a variety of factors – such as the time taken to 
process complaints, the types of complainants, the most commonly upheld principles and 
so on – could also be examined by studying the decisions of the PCI from the some 273 
formally adjudicated complaints it dealt with between 2008 to 2014.  
 
Table 14: PCI Publication Guidelines 
Sanction category Detail 
10 working days* Decisions must be published within ten working days of the 
Ombudsman/PCI decision  
Page Decisions must be published on the same page, or further 
forward. Where offending articles were published on page 1, 
decisions must be published on one of first four editorial pages 
Day Decisions must be published on the same day of the week 
Edited/Commentary/In 
Full** 
Decisions must be published without any editing, editorial 
commentary or omissions. This includes the use of images, 
newspaper logos and so on 
Logo Decisions must carry the logo of the office 
*despite change in 2009 to “promptly”, for the purposes of this study the 10 working day 
limit was used throughout all years of study 
** After the 2009 change, newspapers did not have to publish the full decision if parts of it 
were not upheld against it. Thus, after this, the word counts of only the upheld parts of the 
decisions were recorded for comparison 
 
 
As adjudicated complaints form the basis of the office’s only formal accountability 
function, the concept of accountability is integral to the in-depth study the formally 
adjudicated complaints. Chapter 2 examined the work of Schedler (1999) and McQuail 
(1997), both scholars who have studied the concept. According to an analysis of both 
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works, accountability contains two related elements: answerability and enforcement. For 
both authors answerability includes elements such as responsiveness, consistency and 
transparency, while enforcement deals solely with the idea of a sanction. In addition, 
Ugland and Breslin (2000), who have examined press self-regulation in the US, argued 
that a press regulatory regime requires legitimacy in order to establish the moral authority 
to sufficiently regulate press standards. Legitimacy, for the authors, means a regulator 
must “act within the boundaries of the power conferred upon it…in ways that advance 
the purposes for which it was created, and [follow] its own publicly communicated 
procedures” (2000: 234). For Ugland and Breslin (2000), moral authority is the ability of 
regulators – through credentials, impartiality, deliberations and judgments – to persuade 
constituents that their decisions and rationales are worthy of adherence, not just attention. 
Thus, legitimacy is part of the answerability element of accountability, while moral 
authority confines to the enforcement element of accountability. These studies prompted 
the establishment of a number of areas for analysis (see Table 15). 
 
Table 15: Accountability framework 
Answerability (A) Enforcement (E) 
Consistency & transparency/ Legitimacy 
 Complaint outcomes per complainant 
backgrounds  
 Complaint outcomes per member 
publications 
 Outcome of appeals to PCI 
 Complaint outcomes per CoP principles 
Responsiveness/Legitimacy  
 Complaint timeframes 
Sanction/Moral Authority 
Compliance with publication guidelines: 
 
 Promptly (10 working days) 
 Same page, or further forward/page1 = 
first four pages 
 In full and unedited & logo 
 Same day 
 
 
In order to examine the three areas within the accountability framework, the decisions 
of the Press Ombudsman and PCI required individual examination in order to extract a 
variety of data points. At the start of this phase of the research, a sample of 20 complaints 
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were examined in chronological order from January 2008 in order to consider the number 
of fields of data which could be collected to study the different elements of accountability 
(Table 15). The following data types were identified (Table 16). 
 
Table 16: Data categories 
Data type Accountability 
framework 
Assessment 
type 
Rationale 
Publication/Title A Consistency Table of worst offenders; 
examination of potential bias 
towards particular members 
Dates: Article, decision, 
PCI hearing, publication of 
decision 
A&E Responsiveness, 
Consistency 
Compare with dates to 
assess responsiveness of 
regulator and examine 
speediness of publication of 
decision by member 
publication 
Article day & publication 
of decision day 
E Sanction Compare to assess 
compliance with 
enforcement rules 
Article page & publication 
of decision page 
E Sanction Compare to assess 
compliance with 
enforcement rules 
Principles cited, Principles 
breached, Principles not 
breached 
A Consistency Compare to assess 
consistency of decisions  
Complainant: Name, sex, 
background 
A Consistency, 
transparency 
Assess outcome bias and 
consistency per complainant 
category 
Decision A Consistency Macro data on upheld, 
partially upheld and 
dismissed complaints  
PCI appeal, appellant and 
outcome 
A Consistency, 
transparency 
Assess outcome bias and 
consistency per appellant  
Decision length & 
publication of decision 
length 
E Sanction Compare to assess 
compliance with 
enforcement rules 
Case notes, complainant 
detail, complaint detail 
A Consistency, 
transparency, 
responsiveness 
& sanction 
Qualitative data noted on 
particulars of each complaint 
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The retirement of the first Press Ombudsman, Prof. John Horgan, was confirmed in 
September 2014. This presented a natural time period for the study, i.e. from January 
2008 to September 2014. 
The initial data collection phase began in January 2015 when various types of 
relational database software was tested such as Microsoft Excel, Nvivo and so on. 
Microsoft Access was chosen and a two-day training course was completed by the 
researcher. Once the training was completed, a database was designed and tested in 
January and February 2015. Microsoft Access was chosen for a number of reasons. First, 
it is a widely available piece of software available as part of the suite of other commonly 
available Microsoft programmes. This availability meant that this study’s dataset can be 
made available to other researchers as a means of proving the reliability of the data 
gathered. Second, despite being a complex programme, Microsoft Access can be learned 
quickly and training in its use is widely and readily available. Access is a powerful 
relational database which allows for an endless number of queries to be raised against 
data for the testing of hypothesis and the production – and visualisation – of data.  
Once the database was tested, the field work phase began in mid-February 2015. This 
process entailed the recording of the above fields of data for each formally adjudicated 
complaint published on the council’s website (273 complaints). For each complaint that 
was upheld, or upheld in part (i.e. those resulting in a decision being published in a 
member publication), the corresponding publication of the decision was located. As the 
date of the publication of the decision is not recorded in a public forum by the PCI, this 
required a number of searches. These searches were carried out in a number of ways. 
First, online databases such as LexisNexis and the Irish Newspaper Archive were 
searched using key words from each decision. This search was limited as a number of the 
publications and many Irish editions of UK titles were unavailable on these databases. 
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For those unavailable via desk research, visits to the National Library of Ireland were 
required. Here, publications could be searched in the weeks and months after the decision 
date in order to locate the publication of the decision in the offending publication. This 
process was laborious and produced inconclusive results as a number of publications of 
upheld decisions could not be located despite numerous searches. For those which could 
not be located, a final step entailed sending a list of the unaccounted for upheld or 
partially upheld complaints to the PCI. From there, the PCI could locate the complaint 
file and source the PCI’s copy of the publication of the decision – a publicly available, if 
difficult to locate, document. The PCI kindly supplied the researcher with this material. 
In instances where the PCI did not hold a copy of the published decision, it identified the 
date of the publication of the decision which could then be easily searched via the other 
two databases. This field research phase lasted until July 2015.  
Once complete, the researcher began to extract a variety of datasets from the gathered 
data according to the categories established within the accountability framework (above). 
This material forms the basis for the discussion and analysis in following chapters. 
 
5.6 Comparative 
As outlined in previous chapters, this study is confined to the North Atlantic Liberal area 
– Canada, the United States, the UK and Ireland – identified by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). Thus the research required comparative analysis of the work of a press regulatory 
organisation in another country in order to highlight any differences between self and 
independent regulation. The literature review examined a number of studies of press 
regulatory regimes in North Atlantic countries (Pritchard 2000; Ugland 2000, 2008; 
O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000, 2004, 2015). However, due to the limited nature 
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of this research, and the unavailability of data required to conduct a comparison, many of 
the regulators were excluded. 
 
Table 17: PCC/PCI comparative data 
 
Nevertheless, Frost (2000, 2004, 2015) has produced in-depth analysis which 
examines the work of the UK’s Press Complaint Commission (PCC’s), a self-regulatory 
organisation which is no longer in operation. Despite the fact that the PCC’s work has 
been discredited by many (O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000, 2004, 2015; Leveson 
2014), it provided a viable case for comparative analysis for a number of reasons. First, 
it was a self-regulatory body set up by the press and controlled by the press thus 
conforming to the concept of self-regulation and producing a test case for comparison 
with an independent regulator. Second, Frost (2000, 2004, 2015) produced useful data 
which can be compared to similar data sets collected during the study of Irish press 
regulation thus providing obvious comparative opportunities. Third, the PCC operated in 
the UK which is part of the Hallin and Mancini’s North Atlantic model thus allowing for 
Type of data Rationale Outcome 
Complaint type Comparison of the types of 
complaints received by both 
bodies and those which make it to 
formal adjudication 
Data on how complaints are treated 
in self versus independent regulators 
Macro figures Comparison of overall figures for 
how bodies operate: total 
complaints received annually, 
those which are not examined, 
those which are formally 
adjudicated, upheld and so on 
Establish differences in headline data 
in self versus independent regulators 
Upheld & 
rejected 
complaints 
Compare percentages of 
complaints that are upheld 
Outline possible differences in 
negative findings of each body 
Conciliation & 
adjudication 
Trends over time period in number 
of complaints that are formally 
adjudicated on versus those that 
are conciliated  
Test for possible similarities or 
differences in approach to complaint 
handling 
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an examination of how institutionalised press regulation differs from a self-regulatory, 
non-institutionalised set-up within the same media system. Fourth, the PCC, like the PCI, 
operated in a hyper-competitive news market where titles are driven mainly by profit.  
Frost’s data provided potential comparative opportunities in the following areas 
(Table 17).  
5.7: Conclusion 
A number of issues emerged during the research design which need to be highlighted. 
First, the lack of a pre-PCI self-regulatory body in the test case country means 
conclusions on how institutionalised and independent regulation impacts on the public 
service ethic, or the other areas of professionalization – autonomy and norms (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004) – are limited. Such a variable would have provided robust comparative 
data for an examination of how self and independent forms of press regulation operate. 
However, tentative conclusions are acceptable in academic research (King, Keohane and 
Verba 1994: 7). Indeed, the PCC, as outlined, does provide comparative opportunities, 
which are key to academic research in the grounded theory tradition (Charmaz 2008: 82). 
In addition, as referenced earlier in this chapter, some complaint data could not be 
examined due to data protection laws. As a result of the unavailability – which was 
unavoidable – of full information on all complaint types, a full and exhaustive assessment 
of the work of the PCI could not be conducted. By assessing the two other complaint 
types – those ruled out on first reading and those which are informally conciliated – 
according to the criteria established for examining the third complaint type – formal 
adjudications – the research could have reached more substantive conclusions. 
Nevertheless, such a weakness is minor as the data which forms the basis of the research 
derives from the work of the PCI in respect of its only formal and measureable 
accountability function thus providing as complete a picture as possible of how the 
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institutionalisation of independent press regulation impacts on the public service ethic in 
journalism professionalisation.  
The limited geographic nature of the study is also worthy of note. As outlined in 
Chapter 2, Hallin and Mancin (2004) have produced a media systems theory which 
established obvious geo-political boundaries. Indeed, other researchers have noted the 
potential for inconsistencies across and within these borders (Fengler et al. 2014: 69). 
However, the North Atlantic’s libertarian tradition, the media’s growth into a social 
responsibility and the political and industry preference for self-regulatory techniques of 
press regulation – all of which have been highlighted in Chapter 2 – produced a natural 
test-bed for this research, despite methodological concerns. Indeed, the literature suggests 
that there are now three models of press regulation: self-regulatory, state-regulatory and 
independent. Given the recent history of press regulation in other countries in Europe and 
further afield (see Fielden 2012; Fengler, Eberwein and Leppik-Bork 2000; Bertrand 
2000, 2003) and the regular favoring and institutionalisation of state regulation, the 
geographic limitations of studying the development of the self-regulatory to the 
independently regulated – a ‘third way’ – becomes a strength of this research as the North 
Atlantic area has not seen state interference in regulatory structures thus producing a 
controlled test area. 
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Chapter 6: Accountability and independent press regulation 
 
6.1: Introduction 
This chapter examines the accountability functions of the Press Ombudsman and the PCI. 
As outlined previously the focus of this research is on the accountability function of the 
PCI in its first period of operation; from 2008 to 2014, during the tenure of the first Press 
Ombudsman. In these years the PCI formally adjudicated on 273 complaints that are the 
focus of the remainder of this chapter.  
The complaint data is examined according to a conceptual framework established in 
the wider literature outlined in Chapter 5. This framework is based on the work of 
Schedler (1999) and McQuail (1997) who defined accountability as a concept made up 
of two core elements, answerability and enforcement. For Schedler (1999: 14-15), 
answerability relates to those being held accountable and the accounting organisation. 
Indeed, much of the literature around the concept of media accountability focuses on how 
the media can account for its actions via the answerability process. In this research, the 
accountability function of the accounting organisation – the PCI – is being assessed. 
Thus, when answerability is referenced, it relates to how the PCI ensures its work meets 
the standards of answerability described in the literature.  
The process of answerability concerns an obligation to respond to questions. Its 
mission, Schedler argues, is finding facts and generating evidence, and establishing a 
“dialogic relationship” between the accountable and accounting actors. McQuail adds 
that answerability “refers to the readiness” of involved actors to achieve reconciliation 
(1997: 517). For Sinclair (1995: 221), securing accountability – in terms of both 
answerability and enforcement – involves “shared agreement about how it is manifested”. 
In other words, the agreement between the professional body being held accountable and 
the accounting body establishes the criteria for accountability. Thus, in order to examine 
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the concept of answerability around the PCI, the research must assess whether its promise 
of being a “fair” (consistent) and “quick” (responsive) regulator stands up. This task is 
undertaken by means of an analysis of the consistency of complaint outcomes when 
gender, complainant background, legal representation, member publication, PCI appeals 
and CoP principles are examined. To examine responsiveness, the analysis will look at 
complaint timeframes. 
This chapter also will analyse the enforcement of the PCI’s chief sanction and 
compliance with its rules concerning publication of its decisions. As discussed in Chapter 
4, the publication of the decisions of the Press Ombudsman and/or the PCI is the only 
sanction available to the regulator when member publications are adjudged to have 
breached the CoP. These guidelines are supported by Principle 10.1 of the CoP which 
states: “When requested or required by the Press Ombudsman and/or the Press Council 
to do so, the press shall publish the decision in relation to a complaint with due 
prominence.”  
In order to meet this due prominence requirement, the decisions must follow a set of 
“publication guidelines” drawn up by the PCI. The guidelines contain a number of 
elements, which, for the purposes of this analysis, were condensed into four categories. 
First, the guidelines require that member publications publish a negative decision 
“promptly”. In the first two years (2008-2010), the PCI asked that members publish 
decisions within 10 working days. For this analysis, the 10 working day limit was used 
as a measure of promptness. Second, members must publish a decision on the same day 
as the offending article. Third, the decision must be published on the same editorial page 
or further forward, or, where an offending article appeared on the front page, on one of 
the first four editorial pages. Fourth, the decision must be published unedited, without 
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editorial commentary, including headlines, and with the logo of the Press Ombudsman 
and/or PCI (see Table 14, p.140). 
Finally, this chapter also presents a brief comparison of the Press Ombudsman and 
PCI with the UK’s Press Complaints Commission (PCC) based on complaint data 
gathered by Frost (2000, 2004, 2015) prior to the PCC’s closure in 2014. 
 
6.2: Consistency – Member publications 
Of the 273 complaints formally examined by the Press Ombudsman and PCI that were 
published on its website, the vast majority of the complaints were about articles which 
appeared in national newspapers with 251 (92 per cent) of the cases involving national 
daily and Sunday publications. The PCI does not formally publish a table of the so-called 
‘worst offenders’ in annual reports. This information is, however, available by examining 
each individual complaint and collating the data. According to newspaper titles extracted 
from the complaint database (Table 18), the Sunday World was the subject of the highest 
number of formally adjudicated complaints. Some 34 complaints lodged against the 
publication reached formal adjudication, 16 of which were upheld in some form. The 
Irish Independent had the second-highest number of formal complaints lodged against it, 
at 30. An identical number of complaints, 16, were upheld in some form against the 
publication. The Irish Times was the third most complained about member publication 
when formal adjudications are examined. The Press Ombudsman and PCI processed 29 
complaints against the newspaper, five of which were upheld in some form. The two 
other publications among the top five was the Herald and the Sunday Independent with 
26 and 22 complains reaching formal adjudication respectively. The Herald received 8 
negative rulings, while the Sunday Independent recorded 10. Of these five, four titles are 
published by INM, Ireland’s largest newspaper group (see O’Brien and Rafter 2012). It 
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is a publicly listed company and includes shareholders such as Denis O’Brien, who also 
holds extensive interests across the wider Irish media industry. The remaining title is 
published by the Irish Times Trust (see O’Brien 2008). The trust was set up in 1974 to 
maintain the independence of the newspaper and has established a set of principles to 
guide the newspaper’s journalists (O’Brien 2008: 200-207). It also insulates the 
newspaper to a degree from the pressure to record significant profit (O’Brien 2008: 274). 
 
Table 18: Member publication (national) complaints 
Publication Type Owner All Upheld % 
upheld 
Sunday World Tabloid INM 34 16 47% 
Irish Independent Mid-market INM 30 16 53% 
Irish Times Broadsheet Irish Times Trust 29 5 17% 
Herald Tabloid INM 26 8 31% 
Sunday Independent Mid-market INM 22 10 45% 
Irish Mail on Sunday  Mid-market DMG 21 11 52% 
Irish Daily Mail Mid-market DMG 14 5 29% 
Irish Sun  Tabloid News UK 14 5 29% 
Irish Daily Star Tabloid INM/N&S 12 5 42% 
Irish Examiner  Mid-market Landmark 10 3 30% 
News of the World Tabloid News UK 9 4 44% 
Sunday Times Mid-market News UK 8 3 37% 
Daily Star Sunday  Tabloid INM/N&S 7 4 57% 
Sunday Tribune Mid-market INM/TN PLC 7 3 43% 
Irish Daily Mirror Tabloid Trinity Mirror 3 0 0% 
Irish Sunday Mirror Tabloid Trinity Mirror 2 1 50% 
Irish Farmers Journal Specialist Agricultural Trust 2 1 50% 
Sunday Business Post Broadsheet Sunrise Media  1 0 0% 
 
Of these five publications, an assessment of the complaint outcomes showed differing 
levels of upheld complaints (Table 18). The Sunday World, Irish Independent and Sunday 
Independent all recorded negative outcomes as a percentage of formally adjudicated 
complaints above 45 per cent, with the Irish Independent found to be in breach of the 
CoP in more than half of the cases against it. Figure 7 has taken all three data types – 
total complaints, upheld complaints and the percentage of upheld complaints – and shows 
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that there are varying levels of upheld complaints for each publication. In particular, 
Figure 7 shows that only 17 per cent of the 29 complaints formally adjudicated against 
The Irish Times resulted in a negative outcome for the newspaper. This compares with 
53 per cent for the 30 complaints against the Irish Independent, and an average of 44 per 
cent across the other four titles in the top five list. Figure 7 essentially shows that 
complainants had a less than one in five chance of having a positive outcome of their case 
against the broadsheet Irish Times while complainants taking cases against the Sunday 
World, Irish Independent and Sunday Independent had a far better opportunity of success, 
around one in two in each case. 
 
Figure 7: Top five publications 
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Figure 8 shows how many complaints are upheld as a percentage against all national 
member publications. The Irish Daily Star Sunday, which was owned jointly by INM and 
UK publisher Northern and Shell before ceasing publication in 2011, received four 
negative decisions from seven cases taken against it, with a 57 per cent success rate for 
complainants. As outlined above, the Irish Independent had a significantly higher number 
of complaints formally examined, at 30, but had a similar level of upheld complaints at 
53 per cent. The Irish Mail on Sunday, a mid-market newspaper, had 52 per cent of the 
21 complaints against it upheld in some form. 
At the other end of the scale, The Irish Times recorded the lowest upheld rate at 17 per 
cent despite being a publication which dealt with among the highest level of formally 
adjudicated complaints. The Irish Sun recorded an upheld rate of 29 per cent for the 14 
cases against it, with the Irish Daily Mail recording an identical level of complaints 
examined and upheld. In a similar vein, the Irish Examiner recorded an upheld rate of 
around 30 per cent off 10 complaints with the Herald seeing a similar level of complaints 
upheld against it from a total of 26 cases formally adjudicated by the Press Ombudsman 
and PCI. 
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Figure 8: Percentage of upheld complaints (national newspapers) 
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6.2.1: Publication by ownership 
The national newspaper market in Ireland is dominated by four publishers, INM, DMG 
Media, News UK and the Irish Times Trust. Table 19 shows the total number of formally 
adjudicated complaints, those of which were upheld and the percentage of upheld 
complaints connected with publications owned by each news group.  
 
Table 19: Complaints per news group/company 
News Group All 
complaints 
Upheld 
complaints 
Percentage 
upheld 
DMG  35 16 45.71% 
INM 138 62 44.93% 
News UK 31 12 38.71% 
Irish Times  29 5 17.00% 
 
 
DMG Media, publisher of the Irish Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday, had 35 complaints 
against its publications reach formal adjudication. Some 16 complaints were upheld in 
some form. Ireland’s largest publisher, INM, which published the Irish Independent, 
Sunday Independent, Sunday Tribune, Irish Daily Star, Herald, Irish Daily Star Sunday, 
and  
Sunday World during the period under study, dealt with 138 complaints in total over the 
time period. A total of 62 of these resulted in negative decisions against its publications, 
giving complaints a 45 per cent success rate. News UK, the publisher of the Irish Sun, 
News of the World and the Sunday Times, had 31 complaints, with 12 of these resulting 
in negative outcomes for the group, also around 39 per cent16. The Irish Times Trust, 
which publishes the Irish Times, recorded 29 complaints. As noted above, just five of 
these were upheld in some form, meaning complainants had a 17 per cent chance of 
                                                 
16 The Sunday Tribune, Irish Daily Star Sunday and News of the World are no longer published 
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receiving a positive outcome against the newspapers in the formal adjudication service. 
Trinity Mirror and Landmark Media, as well as a number of other smaller publishers, saw 
their publications receive only small numbers of complaints making any analysis 
meaningless. 
 
 Table 20: Complaints for domestic and UK-based titles 
 
 
 
 
As referenced in Chapter 3, much debate around the setting up of the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI focused on the perceived influence of the UK-based press. Table 
20 analyses and compares the complaints adjudicated against both the domestic Irish 
press (publications that are wholly Irish) and the UK-titled Irish editions17. It shows that 
the majority of the 251 complaints against national newspapers which reached formal 
adjudication, 161, concerned ‘domestic’ newspapers. Of these, 62 complainants achieved 
a positive outcome from their complaint, or 38.5 per cent. In contrast, a smaller number 
of complaints, 90, were taken against the Irish editions of UK-based newspapers. Some 
38 of these were upheld in some way, or 42 per cent.  
 
                                                 
17 The Star titles were included in the UK-based category for this analysis. However, there is a 
case to be made for including these as domestic titles, largely due to the significant differences 
between the UK and Irish publications. When the Star titles are included in the UK figures, the 
“percentage upheld” column is 39.4% for Irish titles and 40.8% for UK-based titles on the basis 
of 180 and 71 formally adjudicated complaints respectively. 
Type All 
complaints 
Upheld 
complaints 
Percentage 
upheld 
Domestic 161 62 38.51% 
UK-based 90 38 42.22% 
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6.2.2: Publication by type 
The analysis of publications also showed that complainants succeeded in 45.5 per cent of 
their cases against mid-market newspapers (Table 21). Some 112 formally adjudicated 
cases related to the publication type with the Press Ombudsman or PCI upholding 51 of 
the claims in some form. In the tabloid sector, complainants achieved their objectives in 
around 40 per cent of cases, with 43 instances of upheld complaints from a total of 107 
claims. In stark contrast, some 30 complaints were levelled against broadsheet 
newspapers – the majority of which was the 29 cases levelled against the Irish Times. 
Some 5 of these were upheld, or just over 16.5 per cent.  
 
Table 21: Complaints per newspaper type 
Type All 
complaints 
Upheld 
complaints 
Percentage 
upheld 
Tabloid 107 43 40.19% 
Mid-market 112 51 45.54% 
Broadsheet 30 5 16.67% 
 
 
Some 18 formally adjudicated cases involved the regional or local press. Just four of 
these cases were upheld in some form, meaning complainants had around a one in five 
chance of receiving a positive outcome. Just one case was taken against a magazine, 
which was upheld, while three complaints reached adjudication in relation to student 
publications, with two of the cases upheld in some form. 
 
6.3: Consistency – Complainant background 
In 269 of the formally adjudicated complaints, the background of the complainant was 
categorised by the researcher into one of 12 categories. Table 22 shows that almost half 
of all formally adjudicated complaints were made by complainants who decided not to 
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reveal their identity or for who an obvious background category could not be assigned 
due to lack of information or because the individual was unknown to the researcher. In 
these cases, complainants had a 34 per cent success rate with their complaints, with 45 
cases upheld in favour of the complainant. 
 
Table 22: Complaints outcomes per complainant background 
Background Complaints Upheld Rejected/SRA Percentage 
upheld 
Civil servant/Public sector 7 5 2 71.40% 
Education 10 6 4 60.00% 
Celebrity 7 4 3 57.10% 
Charity/NGO 12 6 6 50.00% 
Politics 15 7 8 46.70% 
Media 15 7 8 46.70% 
Union/Representative Org. 17 7 10 41.20% 
Business 27 11 16 40.70% 
Unknown/Private 132 45 87 34.00% 
Religious 12 4 8 33.30% 
Health 11 3 8 27.30% 
Legal 4 0 4 0.00% 
 
Once again, numbers of complaints for some categories were too small for any 
meaningful analysis. Nevertheless, the data showed that 8 of the 12 groupings identified 
in the complaint files achieved a greater level of successful outcomes than those in the 
unknown or private category.  
Of particular note were complainants categorised as emanating from political or media 
figures. In both categories, complainants achieved an identical success rate of 46.70 per 
cent from 15 cases in each category. This is one-third higher than those in the base 
category of unknown or private.  
Well-known or celebrity complainants took seven cases, four of which were upheld in 
some way with the remaining dismissed or deemed SRA. In ten cases related to the 
education field – i.e. university lecturers, teachers and so on – 60 per cent of complainants 
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achieved successful outcomes. Some 41.20 per cent of complainants from the union or 
representative group sector had cases upheld in as had those from the business sector. 
At the other end of the scale, complaints originating from the religious were upheld in 
one-third of cases while those from a health background achieved a 27.30 per cent success 
rate. Interestingly, complaints from law firms – not those made on behalf of a complainant 
– were not upheld in any of the four cases taken and categorised as such.  
However, establishing categories of this nature is potentially problematic as they do 
not take into account any objective analysis of whether the person in question is well-
known in general. As Frost (2004: 104) noted, identifying complainants in this manner is 
“subjective”. Thus, assessing the backgrounds of the complainants for this study was also 
somewhat subjective rendering it limited, at least in terms of replicability. Nevertheless, 
in a number of categories, Frost attempted to “bring consistency” to his study by 
establishing criteria for each category of complainant. In the celebrity category, Frost 
ruled that such complainants could be categorised once they came from “any artistic 
community…who would be recognised by a reasonably wide section of the general 
community” (2004: 104). For politicians, Frost said that MPs were all listed irrespective 
of how “well-known” they were, while “councillors are only listed as ‘well known’ if 
they would be recognised by some section of the general community”. Frost also included 
“those who are well-known or notorious from any walk of life but particularly including 
entertainment, business, academe, trade unions, politics and charities” (2004: 104). 
Using Frost’s methodology, a number of categories were re-examined in order to 
improve the reliability of the findings. Table 23 contains this analysis. For politicians, all 
TDs and Senators were included while councillors were excluded as none reached the 
Frost (2004) threshold. Of the 11 complaints deemed to come from politicians sufficiently 
well-known, six resulted in successful outcomes, or 54.50 per cent. The remaining five 
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were rejected or deemed SRA. This compared to the lower figure of 46.70 per cent of 
complaints upheld in the general politician category before the Frost standard was 
applied.  
 
Table 23: Complaint outcome per 'well-known' complainants 
Background Complaints Upheld Rejected/SRA % upheld 
Politics 11 6 5 54.50% 
Business 16 8 8 50.00% 
Celebrity 7 4 3 57.10% 
Media 8 4 4 50.00% 
Overall average 52.4% 
 
Originally, some 27 cases were deemed to originate from the world of business. 
However, when revised, some 16 complainants were deemed “well-known”. Thus, the 
analysis showed that half of all complaints were successful. This compares to the 40 per 
cent success rate in the pre-Frost analysis. 
 
Figure 9: Complainant categories 
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The success rate change was less pronounced in the media category. As Table 26 
shows, those with a distinct media background recorded a 46.7 per cent success rate in 
having complaints upheld. In the new analysis half of the eight complainants received a 
positive decision of some kind. The number of “well-known” celebrity complainants did 
not change under the Frost revision criteria. 
In total, according to the four categories of complainants identified in Table 26, some 
42 complaints were made by people deemed under Frost’s analysis to be sufficiently 
“well-known”. Of these, 22 received successful outcomes, or some 52.4 per cent. This 
compared to the 34 per cent success rate for complainants in the “unknown/private” 
category and an overall upheld rate of 39 per cent (see Figure 9). Therefore, when viewed 
in conjunction with Table 26, the data suggested that those who are “well-known” or 
come from backgrounds such as politics, media, business and celebrity were more likely 
to achieve a positive outcome in the Press Ombudsman and PCI complaints process than 
those in the private or unknown category. 
 
6.4: Consistency – Gender 
 
Table 24: Complainant outcomes per gender 
 
Total complaints Total upheld % upheld 
Female 56 28 50.00% 
Male 166 58 34.94% 
N/A 51 21 41.18% 
 
In 222 cases, the gender of the complainant could be ascertained. Of these, 56 complaints 
were made by female complainants. The complaint database showed that half of all 
female complainants were successful with their cases, with 28 complaints upheld or 
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upheld in part. The remaining cases were either dismissed or cases where the publication 
was deemed to have offered SRA. In contrast, 166 complaints made by male 
complainants were formally examined by the Press Ombudsman and PCI. Just under 35 
per cent of these – 58 complaints - were upheld.  
In total, 39 per cent of complaints which reached formal adjudication were upheld in 
some way, i.e. a successful outcome for the complainant. As Figure 10 shows, the 50 per 
cent success rate of female complainants is somewhat higher than this average, with 
success for male complainants below this level. The Press Ombudsman and PCI dealt 
with roughly three times as many complaints made by males. Nevertheless, the data 
suggests that female complainants have been more likely to achieve successful outcomes 
when compared to their male counterparts, and also receive more decisions in their favour 
when compared with the overall average.  
 
Figure 10: Gender outcomes 
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As Table 24 shows, there was also a further category of complaints. Labelled as N/A, 
these complaints fell into a number of different categories. These included complaints 
made by companies rather than individuals such as a case in which the airline Ryanair 
had a complaint partially upheld over an article in the Irish Mail on Sunday in February 
2014 which alleged that a flight crew had kept passengers on a plane for a number of 
hours. The Press Ombudsman upheld a breach under Principle 1 Truth and Accuracy of 
the CoP (CoP) with the PCI upholding the decision under appeal. Other complaints in 
this category included those taken by families or couples, including five complaints taken 
by the Dwyer family on behalf of their deceased son, Michael, who was shot dead by 
security forces in Bolivia in 2009. The Press Ombudsman and PCI upheld two of the 
family’s complaints, against the News of the World and the Sunday World, but found no 
breach of the CoP in articles in the Irish Daily Star and Irish Sun and a further News of 
the World article. A number of other complaint types are also included in this category 
including those taken by campaign groups such as the Irish Traveller Movement and 
those who took complaints but did not disclose their identity. When each category was 
extracted from the data the numbers were too small for further robust analysis. 
 
6.5: Consistency – Legal representation 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Press Ombudsman and PCI has, on a number of occasions, 
expressed negative sentiment about the use of solicitors by complainants (PCI 2009: 5). 
Indeed, the Press Ombudsman, said engaging solicitors would not ensure success for a 
complainant (Horgan 2009).  
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Figure 11: Cases involving solicitors 
 
 
In total, some 39 complainants – or 14.23 per cent of all complaints - used the services 
of solicitors to make their complaints. As Figure 11 shows, the concerns expressed by the 
Press Ombudsman and PCI on the matter coincided with spikes in 2009 and 2010 in the 
use of legal representation. The following years, 2011, 2012 and 2013, however, saw a 
drop off in the use of solicitors. Nevertheless, some 11 complainants used legal 
representation in 2014, a significant increase on the three years previous.  
 When the outcome of these 39 complaints was examined, it showed 18 complaints 
resulted in a successful outcome for complaints with the remaining 21 dismissed/SRA. 
As Table 25 shows, some 46.15 per cent of complainants who used solicitors to make 
complaints on their behalf achieved successful outcomes. This compared with 38 per cent 
for the remaining 234 complainants who did not use legal services, and the overall 
average of 39 per cent. 
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Table 25: Complaint outcomes involving legal representation 
  Cases Upheld Dismissed/SRA % Upheld 
Legal representation 39 18 21 46.15% 
No legal representation 234 89 145 38.03% 
 
 The analysis of legal representation in complaints is based on small numbers. 
Nevertheless, Figure 11 does suggest a marginally positive trend in the number of 
complainants deciding to use solicitors in the process, with a spike in 2014 likely to cause 
concern for the Press Ombudsman and PCI. The data in Table 25 showed that 
complainants were marginally more likely to achieve a successful outcome if they 
employ solicitors to deal with their complaint. 
 
6.6: Consistency – Appeals to the PCI 
Decisions of the Press Ombudsman can be appealed to the full PCI, which, as Chapter 4 
showed, is a 13-member panel dominated by independent members. The complaint 
database showed that in all, some 117 of the 273 formal adjudications, or just under 43 
per cent, were appealed to the full PCI. The data suggests that over time, the decision by 
a complainant or a newspaper (or both) to appeal a case had fallen in line with a 
downward trend (see Figure 12). This is unsurprising given the limited circumstances 
under which decisions may be appealed. Indeed, any appeal must either reveal some new 
information on the case or show that the Press Ombudsman has erred in his/her 
application of the office’s procedures (PCI 2009: 12). As the PCI notes, “mere 
disagreement with the Press Ombudsman’s decision is not grounds for appeal” (ibid). 
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Figure 12: Appeals to the PCI 
 
 
Appeals were lodged by complainants and by member publications. A total of 117 
appeals were lodged according to the analysis of the complaint data – 74 by complainants 
alone (63 per cent), 37 by member publications alone (32 per cent), and six by 
complainants and member publications (5 per cent).  
The data showed that the PCI overturned or partially overturned the decisions of the 
Press Ombudsman on 9 occasions, or just over 7.5 per cent of cases it heard. In six of 
these cases, the PCI partially overturned the decision of the Press Ombudsman. In all of 
these, the partial overturn still meant that the negative element of the decision was 
published in the member publication. In only three cases (2.5 per cent of the total) the 
earlier Press Ombudsman’s decision was fully overturned. 
As stated, complainants were responsible for 74 of the 117 appeals dealt with by the 
PCI. Of these, complainants succeeded on just three occasions in overturning the Press 
Ombudsman decision – all of which were partial overturns. These figures suggested an 
appeal success rate for complainants in getting decisions of the Press Ombudsman 
overturned of 4 per cent. 
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In comparison, newspapers appealed the decision of the Press Ombudsman on 37 
occasions, exactly half as frequently as complainants. However, member publications 
were twice as successful as complainants in seeing decisions overturned. The data 
showed that on three occasions, the PCI partially overturned decisions of the Press 
Ombudsman. These cases still resulted in a negative decision being printed in the 
offending publications, but would have reduced the eventual length and scope of the 
decision as published. Newspapers also succeeded in successfully arguing for full 
overturns in three decisions of the Press Ombudsman. In each instance the negative 
decision of the Press Ombudsman would not have been published as the PCI overturned 
the decision in its entirety. On no occasion did a complainant succeed in arguing for such 
a full overturn. The data suggests that newspapers had a 16 per cent success rate in getting 
negative decisions overturned in full or in part in comparison with a 4 per cent for 
complainants. 
 
6.7: Consistency – CoP principles 
The majority of complaints cited multiple principles of the PCI’s CoP (CoP). Thus, the 
number of times particular clauses in the CoP were cited was far in excess of the 273 
complaints formally examined. In addition, six of the ten clauses of the CoP contain 
individual sub-clauses. Complainants may cite the general clause, i.e. 3. Fair Procedures 
and Honesty, or they may cite individual sub clauses such as 3.2 which states that the 
press shall not obtain information, photographs or other material through 
misrepresentation or subterfuge, unless justified by the public interest. 
 
 
 
181 
 
Table 26: Upheld rates for CoP clauses 
Principle Complaints Upheld % Upheld 
1. Truth and Accuracy 210 53 25.24% 
2. Distinguishing fact and comment 129 28 21.71% 
4. Respect for rights 116 13 11.21% 
5. Privacy 116 25 21.55% 
3. Fair procedures and honesty 105 7 6.67% 
8. Prejudice 40 6 15.00% 
7. Court Reporting 19 4 21.05% 
9. Children 12 4 33.33% 
6. Protection of sources 2 0 0.00% 
10. Publication of decision 2 1 50.00% 
 
When all complaints are collated under their specific headline clause, as Table 26 
shows, complainants cited truth and accuracy more frequently than any other clause of 
the CoP. On 210 occasions in all, complainants claimed that newspapers had breached 
the truth and accuracy provisions of the CoP which states that journalists “shall strive” 
for truth and accuracy, and, with due prominence, correct inaccuracies where they occur 
and apologise where prudent. Some 53 of these complaints were upheld, or 25.24 per 
cent.  
The distinguishing fact and comment clause establishes that newspapers can advocate 
their own views but that comment must not be presented as fact. It attracted the second-
highest number of complaints. Some 129 complainants cited the clause and its sub clauses 
in their complaints with 28 of these instances resulting in the principle being upheld. For 
both Respect for Rights, which refers to “malicious misrepresentation” by journalists, 
and Privacy, which over five sub-clauses sets out strict provisions on the topic, 116 
complainants were taken. In the former, 13 cases were upheld under the clause, while 25 
were upheld under the privacy clause. The fair procedures and honesty clause details how 
journalists ought to approach information and newsgathering. It attracted 105 complaints 
in total, seven of which were upheld.  
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Figure 13: Upheld rates per CoP clause 
 
 
Figure 13 shows that the upheld rate for a number of clauses of the CoP was similar. 
For clauses truth and accuracy, fact and comment, privacy, court reporting and children, 
the percentage of upheld complaints was remarkably consistent, with children, which sets 
out guidelines for the press on the treatment of minors, attracting 12 complaints in all, 
four of which were upheld. However, Figure 13 also shows that a number of clauses have 
much lower upheld rates. Fair procedures and honesty, for example, was one of the most 
popular clauses for complainants to cite with 105 cases attracting complaints under the 
principle. However, just over 6.5 per cent of these where upheld, or seven in total. The 
majority of these, some four upheld complaints, dealt with clause 3.2 which states that 
“the press shall not obtain information, photographs or other material through 
misrepresentation or subterfuge, unless justified by the public interest”. In all, nine 
25.24%
21.71%
6.67%
11.21%
21.55%
0.00%
21.05%
15.00%
33.33%
50.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
183 
 
complaints cited this clause with just under half successfully arguing for a breach. 
Respect for rights also attracted a high level of complaints under the principle with 116 
complainants citing it. Just 13 of these complaints resulted in upheld decisions under the 
clause, or just over 11 per cent. In addition, while based on smaller numbers of 
complaints, prejudice also saw few complaints upheld under the principle with just 6 from 
40 citations resulting in upheld decisions. The clause deals with content that is “intended 
or likely to cause grave offence or stir up hatred” against people or groups. 
 
6.8: Responsiveness – Complaint timeframe (a) 
The majority of the individual complaint files published by the PCI on formally 
adjudicated complaints indicated the date the offending article was published and the date 
of the final decisions by either the Press Ombudsman or PCI. Due to data protection 
restrictions, the complaint files could not be accessed in order to ascertain the exact date 
that the complaint was made to the Press Ombudsman. Although complainants have three 
months in which to pursue a complaint via the PCI, it is reasonable to assume, that any 
complaint was likely to have been lodged in the days and weeks after the initial article, 
rather than on the same day as the article. Indeed, given the requirement that complainants 
must complain to editors in the first instance, there is likely to be some time lag between 
the article publication and the lodging of the formal complaint. However, as a result of 
the restrictions on the complaint files, the following analysis was based on timeframes 
between the date of publication of the article and the final outcome of the PCI’s 
adjudication as these were the only dates available to the researcher. Nevertheless, the 
data provided a good basis for examining the period of time it took for the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI to deal with complaints. 
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Figure 14: Days taken to conclude adjudications 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, there are three complaint outcomes in the formal 
adjudication process. The first category are complaints which were dismissed or not 
upheld by either the Press Ombudsman or PCI on appeal or referral. The analysis of the 
PCI data showed that there were 80 cases in this category which contained data that 
allowed for an assessment of how long the case took to be resolved. The data showed it 
took an average of 135 days, or approximately 4.4 months, for the PCI to dispose of 
complaints in this category. The data showed that the longest case in this category took 
some 347 days to conclude. The case was taken by Deirdre Walshe over articles in the 
Irish Examiner on 22 and 23 November, 2012. Ms. Walshe alleged a breach of the truth 
and accuracy, fact and comment and respect for rights provisions of the CoP over the 
articles which reported on an Employment Appeals Tribunal hearing involving the Irish 
Coursing Club. The case was not upheld under a ruling by the Press Ombudsman made 
almost a year later on 5 November 2013. The case was not appealed to the PCI. The 
shortest timeframe in this category took 30 days. It involved a complaint made by 
Brendan Price of the Irish Seal Sanctuary over an article in the Sunday Times on 3 July 
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2011. Mr. Price claimed the article, which examined a donation to the organisation, 
breached the truth and accuracy, fact and comment, fair procedures and honesty, respect 
for rights and privacy clauses of the CoP. The Press Ombudsman did not uphold the 
complaint in a decision on 2 August. The case was also not appealed to the PCI.  
 
Figure 15: Timeframe - cases not upheld 
 
 
When assessed on a yearly basis, Figure 15 shows that the median number of days 
taken to resolve each complaint not upheld is on an upward trajectory. In 2008, the first 
year of operation of the Press Ombudsman and PCI, the quickest turnaround time for 
complaints in this category was achieved at an average of 98 days, or just over three 
months. However, the data suggests this timeframe has increased with 157 days – or five 
months - the median average recorded in 2010.  
The second category of complaints are those where the member publication involved 
is deemed to have offered SRA. Surprisingly, given that the newspaper had already 
offered to resolve the complaint, the average days taken to resolve complaints in this 
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category was almost 158 days, or 5 months. This is almost a month longer than 
complaints which were not upheld. The longest period recorded in this category was 302 
days. The complaint was taken by Luke Gardiner Ltd., a property business, about an 
article in the Irish Times which referred to the condition of a building it owned on 
Dublin’s Henrietta Street. The company complained under truth and accuracy, fact and 
comment, fair procedures and honesty and respect for rights about the 2 February 2010, 
article. The Press Ombudsman on 9 November ruled that SRA had been offered when the 
newspaper offered to print a letter from the company setting out its grievances. An appeal 
to the PCI by the complainant affirmed the decision of the Press Ombudsman on 10 
December. The shortest timeframe for resolution in this category was 50 days. The case 
was taken by Adam Levick, the managing editor of a website called CiF, who complained 
against the Irish Times over coverage of conflict in the Middle East. The article was 
published on 16 January, 2014 and on 7 March the Press Ombudsman ruled that SRA 
had been offered by the newspaper. Another case took 57 days, just less than two months. 
This case was taken by Melanie Schregardus, an air traffic controller in Dublin, against 
the Irish Mail on Sunday in relation to an article it published on 24 January 2010, which 
was based on the complainant’s blog. The Press Ombudsman ruled on 22 March that the 
newspaper had offered the complainant SRA by publishing a later statement qualifying 
the article – albeit without the approval of the complainant. The case was not appealed to 
the PCI. 
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Figure 16: Timeframe - cases SRA 
 
 
In contrast with Figure 15, Figure 16 shows that the yearly medians for complaints in 
the SRA category exhibited a downward yearly trend. Over the first four years of 
operation, the timeframe for dealing with complaints with this outcome hovered around 
the six month mark on three out of the four years which, again, is surprising given the 
assumption that an offer of SRA ought to lead to a less complicated case with the 
newspaper already accepting some form of remedial action was warranted and necessary. 
However, as Figure 16 shows, the timeframe for the category has decreased sharply over 
time and is now more in line with the other categories of complaint outcomes.  
The third category of complaints are those which were upheld in some fashion. A total 
of 92 of these complaints contained the data required to examine how long the cases took 
to be resolved. Here, it took an average of 139 days, or 4.5 months, to reach the upheld 
resolution. This is a similar timeframe for complaints which were not upheld, but 
significantly shorter than those deemed SRA. According to the data, the longest case took 
409 days to reach a resolution. It involved a complaint by James McCamley, a trade union 
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member, under five principles of the CoP over an article in the Herald on 28 April 2009, 
which reported on an industrial dispute involving the complainant. The Press 
Ombudsman upheld the complaint on 16 February 2010, with an appeal by Mr. 
McCamley to the PCI heard on June 11 at which the decision of the Press Ombudsman 
was affirmed. Two other cases in the same year taken by Mr. McCamley both took 408 
days to complete. The shortest case took 33 days to formally adjudicate on. It was taken 
by a member of An Garda Síochána, who chose not to disclose his or her identity, over 
an article about overtime payments in the Irish Independent on 10 May 2012. The Press 
Ombudsman upheld the complaint under Principle 1 in full in a decision on 12 June.  
 
Figure 17: Timeframe - cases upheld 
 
 
Figure 17 shows similarities with Figure 15 in that in its first year the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI maintained the lowest turnaround time for dealing with upheld 
complaints. All other years saw increases with the data suggesting that thereafter, the 
Press Ombudsman and PCI settled into a relatively stable timeframe between 134 days 
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and 153 days according to the median numbers extracted from the data. Nevertheless, 
Figure 17 also suggests that there has been an upward trend in how long it has taken the 
office to deal with this category of complaints. 
When the three categories were combined, Figure 18 shows that the overall trend 
matches those exhibited in the first and third categories. Here, the data showed that, once 
again, the Press Ombudsman and PCI disposed of formal adjudications in its first year 
around a month quicker than any other year of operation. Again, for the years 2009-2014, 
the timeframe suggested that decisions were being dealt with in a remarkably similar 
period of time. Nevertheless, the data also showed that since 2011, when the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI were taking a median of 150 days, or just under 5 months, to 
conclude complaints, the period of time has reduced, albeit marginally in the following 
three years. The median number of days taken to dispose of all 220 cases where dates 
were available was 140.5 days, or around four-and-a-half months. 
 
Figure 18: Timeframe - all categories 
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6.9: Responsiveness – Complaint timeframe (b) 
 
Figure 19: Timeframe - days taken during each complaint phase 
 
 
The three types of complaints examined in the previous section were all dealt with in one 
of three ways. First, they would have been adjudicated by the Press Ombudsman. This 
category includes cases that were not appealed beyond the Press Ombudsman’s decision, 
as well as those that were appealed to the PCI. According to complete data for 210 
complaints which were examined by the Press Ombudsman, it took a median of 119.5 
days, or just under four months, to issue his decision. The data showed that the Press 
Ombudsman dealt with five cases in less than 40 days including a case which took just 
27 days to issue a formal adjudication on. The data also included at least 15 cases which 
took more than 200 days to conclude, including two cases which took almost a year – 
333 and 347 days respectively – to be adjudicated on.  
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Figure 20: Timeframe - days taken for Press Ombudsman adjudications 
 
 
Again, Figure 20 indicates that the Press Ombudsman dealt with its workload quickest 
in 2008, its first year. Thereafter, the data suggests that complaints took around a further 
month, on average, to reach an adjudication. The year 2010 saw the slowest work rate, at 
almost five months and, in general, the data suggested a modestly upward trend.  
The second category were cases which were referred by the Press Ombudsman directly 
to the PCI for adjudication. Although there were just ten of these cases recorded during 
the time period examined, the data suggested that it takes a median of 157 days for the 
PCI to adjudicate on cases referred to it by the Press Ombudsman. In the first three years, 
the Press Ombudsman referred 7 cases to the PCI. This has dropped off to one every 
subsequent year expect in 2014 when there were none. 
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Figure 21: Timeframe - days taken for PCI referral adjudications 
 
 
Albeit limited, the data does suggest an increasing trend in the amount of time it took 
for the PCI to deal with complaints in the period under review. This is somewhat distorted 
by the 359 days it took the PCI to deal with a single complaint in 2012. It involved a 
complaint taken by the Irish Traveller Movement against the Herald under Principle 10 
alleging that the newspaper had not published an earlier negative decision according to 
the due prominence guidelines set out by the office. Despite the relatively clear cut nature 
of the complaint, the PCI, which upheld the case, made its decision on 7 September, 
almost a year after the initial decision was published. Nevertheless, the data in Figure 21 
again indicates that timeframes for dealing with complaints never returned to levels 
recorded in the first year. 
The final category of complaints are those which were appealed to the PCI. In this 
category, comparing the date of the PCI’s determination with the date of the Press 
Ombudsman’s decision gave an indication of how long it took for the PCI to rule one an 
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appeal. As expected given the holding of monthly PCI meetings, the figures suggested a 
much shorter timeframe, with 48 days the median emerging from the data.   
 
Figure 22: Days taken for PCI appeal hearings 
 
 
In contrast with much of the earlier data, the trend line was flat for appeal timeframes, 
suggesting the PCI had maintained its workload. Nevertheless, Figure 22 showed that the 
first year in operation was again the quickest for dealing with complaints at 39 days. 
While this replicates earlier data, it also showed there is a smaller increase from the first 
year in comparison with the following years. 
 
6.10: Responsiveness – Complaint timeframe (c) 
In addition to section 5.2.2 which examined the backgrounds of complainants, this section 
further assesses how long it took for each grouping of complainants to have their 
complaints formally adjudicated.  
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Figure 23: Timeframe - days taken by complainant grouping 
 
 
Figure 23 shows a range stretching from just over three-and-a-half months to just over 
five months for the median times for dealing with complaints when each grouping is 
examined. The largest of these, complainants whose background was unknown or 
deemed private, it took a median of 141.5 days, or four-and-a-half months, for their 
complaints to be concluded from the time the offending article was published. This 
compares to faster timeframes for those categorised as celebrities, media professionals 
and politicians. As referenced above, these categories contained those complainants 
deemed ‘well-known’. Each of the groupings saw their complaints dealt with in around 
four months, with a median of 120, 123.5 and 124 days respectively, or around 20 days 
less than those in the private or unknown grouping.  
A further analysis was undertaken in four categories using the classification referenced 
in earlier sections as proposed by Frost (2004). The four categories were politicians, 
business people, media figures and celebrities. In only one of the categories, business, 
did a difference in the median number of days occur when compared to the overall results 
in Figure 23. Complaints taken by well-known business people took the regulator a 
median of 136 days to process the complaint, compared to 141.5 for those in the 
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private/unknown category. The difference of three days is too small to base any 
conclusions on. 
Overall, despite the restrictions of the analysis due to the limited numbers of 
complainants in each category, the data does show that there are different timeframes for 
different complainant groups. 
 
6.11: Compliance 
In total, 107 cases resulted in decisions which were upheld in some form, resulting in a 
requirement that the publication involved publish the decision according to the 
publication guidelines. In 15 of these cases, incomplete data – mainly complainants who 
took complaints anonymously – meant that full assessments of whether the newspaper 
met the criteria could not be completed. Thus, 92 upheld complaints formed the basis of 
the analysis in this section. When the publication of decisions were analysed in these 
cases, it showed that in 88 cases, or 96 per cent, the newspaper in question had breached 
one or more of the publication guidelines thus failing to adhere to Principle 10.1 of the 
publication guidelines. Figure 24 shows that in the majority of the cases, member 
publications breached the guidelines on more than one of the four criteria on 51 
occasions. In a substantial minority, 37, newspapers breached a single criteria.  
 
196 
 
Figure 24: Types of breaches of publication guidelines 
 
 
Included in those cases where multiple breaches occurred, are three cases where 
member publications did not publish the upheld decision at all. Two of these cases related 
to upheld complaints against the News of the World newspaper. The newspaper ceased 
publication on 10 July 2011. The decisions in both cases, which were both partially 
upheld, were published by the PCI after 10 July thus resulting in no publication of the 
upheld decisions. The second of these cases resulted in a partially upheld decision for 
Michael Scanlon and Rosanna Farrell under the CoP privacy clause. The complainants 
successfully argued that an article about their return home with a newborn baby to a 
location where their first child had died tragically was a breach of privacy. In his decision, 
the Press Ombudsman indicated that the complaint was postponed for a “considerable 
time” to allow the newspaper to engage in conciliation in light of the fact the News of the 
World had ceased publication.  
However, despite several postponements granted at the request of the 
parent company’s legal representatives, in the light of the fact that the 
newspaper concerned had ceased publication, renewed requests by the 
Office of the Press Ombudsman for a reply to this complaint did not 
elicit a response (Office of the Press Ombudsman 2011) 
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The final involved an upheld decision published involved a 2010 case taken against 
the Sunday World. It related to a complaint taken by Wayne O’Donoghue, who was 
convicted in 2005 of the manslaughter of a minor. Mr. O’Donoghue argued that a front-
page article which included details of his location, university degree and girlfriend was a 
breach of privacy and fair procedures and honesty. The Press Ombudsman found the 
article had breached Mr. O’Donoghue’s privacy but had not breached Principle 3. The 
PCI affirmed the decision declining to admit an appeal by the newspaper. Despite 
numerous searches of the newspaper’s archive and correspondence with the PCI, 
evidence that the newspaper had published the decision could not be located. 
One case that is representative of those where newspapers failed to follow the 
publication guidelines is the first upheld case adjudicated on by the Press Ombudsman 
and PCI. It involved a complaint taken by Tony Gregory, a well-known independent TD, 
who argued that a report in the Herald about his illness – based partly on a visit by a 
journalist to his home - was a breach of his privacy. The Press Ombudsman upheld the 
complaint in full, one of 19 cases upheld in full between 2008 and 2014. The newspaper 
appealed the decision. However, the PCI affirmed the Press Ombudsman’s decision. The 
PCI concluded that 
intrusion into the complainant’s home, especially at a time of illness 
and anxiety, and when other ways of contacting the complainant were 
available, was not justified either by the complainant’s public position 
as a Dáil deputy, or by the significance of the information being sought. 
It concluded that the practice of so-called “door-stepping”, especially 
when it involves the person’s private home, requires a high level of 
justification (PCI 2008) 
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Speaking about the case in the Dáil, Dermot Ahern, the then Minister for Justice, 
highlighted how the upheld decision and its publication in the offending newspaper boded 
well for the Press Ombudsman and PCI. 
I commend the recent decision of the PCI and the Office of the Press 
Ombudsman, which vindicated the right to privacy of a member of this 
House. The decision will be welcomed by all sides in the Oireachtas 
and beyond. The good start that has been made by the Press Council 
augurs well for the future. I welcome the fact the newspaper in question 
published the decision in a position of prominence, similar to the 
position in which the offending article was printed. Such an approach 
is required under the legislation before the House. I am pleased that this 
requirement has been observed by the newspaper concerned in this 
instance (Dáil Éireann 2008b) 
The Press Ombudsman and PCI did uphold Mr. Gregory’s right to privacy, however, 
Ahern’s assertion that the newspaper involved had published the decision with due 
prominence is more problematic. When the publication of the decision was examined in 
the offending newspaper, according to the PCI’s guidelines, it breached three of the four 
criteria; the upheld decision was published on 3 May, more than 10 working days after 
the PCI’s determination on 18 April, the upheld decision was published on the wrong 
day, a Saturday rather than a Wednesday, and the publication of the decision was edited 
as it did not include the correct headline nor the logo of the PCI.  
Ahern was, however, unlikely to have been aware of these breaches, and was perhaps 
heartened by the fact that the decision was published on page 4 of the newspaper, further 
forward than the page 5 the offending article had appeared on. Nevertheless, asserting 
that due prominence had been achieved, particularly considering the PCI’s own 
guidelines for achieving this, cannot be considered entirely accurate in this case. 
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Figure 25: Multiple breaches of publication guidelines 
 
 
Of those decisions which breached one or more of the four publication guidelines, 
Figure 25 shows that the majority involved instances where newspapers breached two of 
the guidelines. Illustrative of these was a case taken by Gerry Adams, the Sinn Féin 
President and TD, against the Irish Independent over a report in May 2014. Mr. Adams 
complained that the article, which reported that he had attempted to stop the newspaper 
from investigating him, had breached fair procedures and honesty and respect for rights 
principles. The Press Ombudsman upheld part of the complaint under the respect for 
rights principle, but dismissed the remainder of the complaint. An appeal by the 
newspaper was unsuccessful. The offending article had appeared on the front page of the 
Irish Independent on a Saturday. The decision, however, was published on page 22 of the 
newspaper and on a Friday, thus resulting in two clear breaches of the publication 
guidelines. The decision was, however, published without additions and within 10 
working days of the PCI determination.  
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A further 14 cases involved three breaches of the publication guidelines. These 
included a complaint by the Teaching Council about two articles in the Irish Independent. 
The articles, which appeared on page 1 on Tuesday, 22 November 2011, and page 10 on 
Friday, 16 December, reported on a study carried out by the organisation. The Teaching 
Council complained that the articles – with an emphasis on the first article - had breached 
truth and accuracy and fair procedures and honesty. The Press Ombudsman ruled on 9 
March, the following year, that the articles had partially breached Principle 1. A month 
later, on Monday 9 April, on page 11, the newspaper carried the decision. The publication 
thus breached three of the guidelines for publication in that it was not published promptly, 
appeared on the wrong page and the wrong day. 
A single article breached all four of the publication guidelines. The case involved a 
complaint by Justine Delaney-Wilson, an author, who argued that the Irish Independent 
had breached truth and accuracy when it carried a report about the complainant’s book 
on page 12, on Monday, 2 February 2008. The Press Ombudsman partially upheld the 
complaint on May 30. More than a month later, on page 20 on Thursday 17 July, the 
newspaper published the decision on the wrong page, more than 10 working days late, on 
the wrong day and without the PCI logo. The decision included a criticism of the 
newspaper’s management of the complaint for its "failure…to respond to the 
complainant’s correspondence, in relation to what it later agreed was an error on its part” 
which “prolonged the handling of what should have been a relatively simple matter”.   
Figure 24 also identified 37 cases where member publications breached a single 
criterion of the publication guidelines. The vast majority of these decisions – 31 - were 
not published promptly within the 10 working day range. The data showed that the 
median days for these cases is 25 days, which is almost double the 14 normal days 
covering the 10 working day limit set down by the PCI.  
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Figure 26: Days taken to publish upheld decisions 
 
 
Figure 26 shows the number of days taken to publish the upheld decision in each of 
the 31 cases. It shows that the majority of those were published within a month, which 
is, nevertheless, outside of the initial 10 working day timeframe. A number are also just 
outside of the 10 working day (14 ordinary days) limit, with 8 cases resulting in 
publication of the decisions in less than 20 days, or around 15 working days.  
According to the analysis of the publication of decisions, just four cases were recorded 
where member publications did not breach any of the four criteria. The first record of a 
newspaper abiding by the publication guidelines occurred in 2008. It involved a 
complaint by Liam Lonergan, a businessman, who complained that a front page article in 
the Sunday Times breached truth and accuracy and fact and comment principles of the 
CoP over the newspaper’s decision to quote an employee as a spokesman. The Press 
Ombudsman partially upheld the complaint under truth and accuracy. An appeal by the 
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newspaper to the PCI affirmed the decision on 12 September in the same year. Some nine 
days later, the Sunday Times printed the decision on page two in full and unedited, and 
on the same day – albeit the newspaper’s only day of publication, Sunday. Another of the 
four cases involved a complaint by Harry Browne, a journalist and author, about an 
editorial addition to a letter Mr. Browne had sent for publication to the Irish Times (the 
letter dealt with a previous PCI complaint Mr. Browne had made against the newspaper 
over a review of one of his books). The complaint, under truth and accuracy, was fully 
upheld. On 3 February, some 10 days after the Press Ombudsman decision, the newspaper 
published the decision in full, on the same day, Monday, and further forward in the 
newspaper on page two (the letter was originally published on page 15). Thus, the Irish 
Times met, on this occasion, the guidelines established by the PCI. 
As has been discussed, the only sanction available to the PCI is the power to enforce 
publication of its adjudication in a member publication according to the publication 
guidelines. Therefore, non-adherence to this by member publications is a serious issue 
which strikes at the heart of the credibility of the Irish system of press regulation. The 
following sections will look at the breaches in more detail. 
 
6.12: Decision publication timeframe 
By far the most common of the four criteria breached when publications published upheld 
decisions was a failure to carry the Press Ombudsman and PCI’s decision within the 10 
working day range, changed in 2009 to the more nebulous term “promptly”. The 
particular criterion was breached on 76 occasions from a total of 92 upheld complaints 
where complete data could be collected. The longest time taken for a newspaper to 
publish an upheld decision was 114 days, or well over 3 months. The complaint was taken 
by a Ms. McLoughlin about an article in the Sunday World in March 2008 which 
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identified a deceased relative as a drug trafficker. The Press Ombudsman partially upheld 
the complaint, which was unsuccessfully appealed to the PCI. On January 4, 2009, the 
newspaper published the decision, some 100 days outside the 14 day (10 working days) 
limit.  
In all 92 cases where data was available, the median days taken for newspapers to 
publish decisions of the Press Ombudsman or PCI was just over 22 days. The year 2012 
saw most decisions published, with 17 member publications carrying upheld decisions in 
that year. The following year saw the fewest, at 9.  
 
Figure 27: Annual averages for publication of decisions 
 
 
When the median number of days taken to publish decisions was analysed on a yearly 
basis, it showed that the first year saw the lowest median number of days at 16. However, 
each year after this saw the number of days increase to 20 or above, with the overall trend 
suggesting an increase in the number of days taken, over time, by newspapers to publish 
decisions. 
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6.13: Decision publication day 
A total of 24 cases recorded breaches of the same day requirement. Given the number of 
member publications which are Sunday newspapers published only on a Sunday or 
regional or local newspapers which are published once a week on the same day, the lower 
instance of this breach is to be expected. Nevertheless, in total 41 upheld complaints 
related to member publications which are published on multiple days of the week. This 
suggested that where newspapers had the capacity to print decisions on another day, 58 
per cent breached the requirement to publish on the same day.  
The single upheld case taken to the Press Ombudsman and formally examined under 
Principle 10 Publication of the Decision dealt with a failure of a newspaper to publish an 
upheld decision against it on the same day of the week. The initial complaint was taken 
by the Irish Traveller Movement in relation to an article in the Herald on Wednesday, 14 
September 2011 which it argued linked the Travelling community with criminality. The 
complaint was partially upheld by the Press Ombudsman and the PCI in March 2012. The 
Herald published the upheld decision on a Saturday almost a month after the PCI decision 
in April (also a breach of the prompt rule). As a result, the complainant took a case under 
Principle 10 which the Press Ombudsman referred directly to the PCI. 
The complainants pointed out that the decision had not been given due 
prominence in accordance with Principle 10 of the Code because it had 
not been published on the same day of the week – Wednesday - as the 
original article, but on a Saturday, a day when the paper had a much 
smaller circulation. The newspaper responded that the decision to 
publish the decision on a different day of the week had been taken 
because of production requirements (PCI 2012) 
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The PCI upheld the complaint, concluding that the publication of the decision had not 
met the due prominence requirement under the code and the guidelines. It said the 
decision should have been published on a Wednesday. The Herald duly obliged, printing 
the decision within the 10 working day period after the PCI decision on Wednesday, 19 
September. However, the publication of the decision still breached the guidelines, the 
analysis showed, as it was published on the wrong page, 29, when the initial article 
appeared on page 27 (the first publication of the upheld decision was on page 18).  
 
6.14: Decision publication page 
On 25 occasions, member publications breached the requirement to publish decisions on 
the same page or further forward, the data showed. Two particularly illustrative examples 
involved the Sunday World in 2009. The first case was taken by James Gantley whose 
complaint about an article which linked him to crime was partially upheld. The original 
article was published on page 16 while the decision was published on page 46 of the 
newspaper. The second case was taken by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Ennis about a report in the 
Sunday World which carried comments attributed to Mrs. Ennis in relation to the death 
of their son. The article appeared on page 6. The upheld decision was carried on page 50.  
Further analysis of the complaint database showed that in total, 34 complaints were 
taken by complainants over articles which appeared on the front page of a member 
publication. Of these, 24 complaints were upheld. The majority of those which were 
upheld, 16, followed the publication guidelines which state that where offending articles 
appeared on the front page, the publication of the decision must be carried on one of the 
first four editorial pages. The analysis showed that no member publication corrected their 
breaches of the CoP on their front pages or on page 3. In some 9 cases, the decisions were 
published on page 2, while in 7 cases the decisions were published on page 4. In one case 
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no record could be found of publication of the decision. It involved a complaint – 
referenced earlier - taken by Wayne O’Donoghue against the Sunday World referred to 
above.  
The complaint database showed that in a further 7 cases which centred on front page 
articles, member publications breached the publication guidelines by printing the decision 
further back in their newspapers. Two of these cases were about complaints taken by 
Gerry Adams, a Sinn Féin TD, against the Irish Independent and Sunday Independent, 
referred to above. Both newspapers carried reports on their front pages on successive 
days in May, 2014, claiming that Mr. Adams had tried to stop coverage of him. The Press 
Ombudsman and PCI partially upheld Mr Adams’ complaints. However, the decisions 
were published on page 17 in the Sunday Independent and page 22 in the Irish 
Independent in clear breach of the publication guidelines. 
 
6.15: Decision publication treatment 
Analysing the text of published decisions showed that on numerous occasions, 
newspapers changed tenses or words in decisions in order to comply with their 
publication style. However, these were not regarded as significant enough to constitute 
breaches. In addition, the requirement that newspapers only print upheld parts of 
decisions meant that assessing whether elements were unedited etc. was difficult. Indeed, 
many publications disregarded this requirement and printed the full decisions, including 
parts which were not upheld.  
However, on 24 occasions newspapers committed publication errors which resulted in 
clear breaches of the requirement that decisions be published unedited, without 
commentary and alongside the logo of the Press Ombudsman and/or PCI. A number of 
different categories of omissions illustrated breaches on this criterion.  
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The first is the editing of decisions. The first example of this was a complaint taken 
by Janet French about coverage of her deceased daughter in the Irish Sun. The complaint 
was upheld by the Press Ombudsman. An appeal to the PCI by the newspaper resulted in 
a partial overturning of the decision, however, the newspaper was still obliged to publish 
parts of the decision which were upheld. At publication, the newspaper edited the 
decision text to lead with the information about the successful part of its appeal to the 
PCI. This is a breach of the guidelines given that the text of the decision begins with an 
outline of the case taken by Mrs. French. Another case involving Mrs. French saw a 
similar breach. In this case, Mrs. French had a complaint about the Irish Star Sunday 
partially upheld. However, when published, the newspaper edited the decision to lead 
with the fact that “following a lengthy process” part of the complaint was not upheld. The 
newspaper did, however, acknowledge its breach in a later publication. 
In our publication of the decision…an introductory paragraph added to 
the decision may have created the impression that the complaint made 
by Mrs. French against the newspaper had not been upheld. This was 
not the case. We regret any misleading impression that may have been 
created by the manner in which this decision was published, and we 
accept that in line with Principle 10of the CoP, newspapers against 
which complaint are upheld are required to publish the text of decisions 
by the Press Council or the Press Ombudsman in full and without 
editing, alterations or additions (Irish Star Sunday 2008) 
The second category are complaints which failed to carry the logo of the Press 
Ombudsman and/or the PCI. These breaches included a case taken by James Gantley 
about a report in the Sunday World. According to the partially upheld decision, the 
newspaper did not engage with either Mr. Gantley or the Press Ombudsman in relation 
to the complaint. It breached the guidelines as the publication of the decision did not carry 
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the logo of the Press Ombudsman (it was also not published within the 10 working days 
and was on the incorrect page).  
A number of member publications also carried different headlines to those stipulated 
in the decision text published by the Press Ombudsman and PCI, which, although minor, 
constituted breaches of the guidelines. This type of breach included a complaint taken by 
Rev. Guy Chave-Cox about a report of his property ownership in the Sunday Times. The 
Press Ombudsman and PCI upheld the complaint, however, when published, the 
newspaper carried a headline which stated “Press Council Decision” when it should have 
read “Rev. Guy Chave-Cox and The Sunday Times”. Included in this criterion were cases 
where newspapers included their logo in the headline of the publication of the decision. 
This occurred on a number of occasions, including a complaint taken by Keith Fahy over 
a breach of his privacy by the News of the World which published the location of his place 
of work. The Press Ombudsman and the PCI partially upheld the complaint. However, 
when published, the newspaper edited the headline of the complaint to include its red-top 
style logo in place of the name of the newspaper. 
Perhaps the most obvious breach of this criterion is the Irish Times’ response to an 
upheld complaint by Kevin Myers, a newspaper columnist. Myers complained about the 
newspaper’s coverage of a separate complaint against him for one of his articles in 
another newspaper. The case was referred to the PCI by the Press Ombudsman which 
partially upheld the complaint. Instead of publishing the decision in the manner governed 
by the guidelines, the Irish Times carried a news story style report by-lined by one of its 
reporters. While the report featured the text of the decision in its proper format, the report 
contained the wrong headline of “Press Council partially upholds complaint against ‘Irish 
Times’” rather than the correct headline, “Myers and the Irish Times”. The publication 
did, however, meet all of the other criteria under the publication guidelines. Nevertheless, 
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the publication is clearly designed to appear as editorial and breaches the criterion as a 
result.  
 
6.16: The Press Complaints Commission 
Press self-regulation commenced in the UK in 1953 with the establishment of the original 
Press Council. Throughout its more than 30-year existence, it faced criticism over a 
number of perceived failures, including an inability to robustly regulate the British print 
press (O’Malley and Soley 2000: 51-96). The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) 
replaced the Press Council in 1991 in response to similar threats of privacy laws and 
political disquiet (Frost 2004: 101-103) about press standards that prompted the 
establishment of the PCI (see Chapter 3). Many have argued that the PCC failed to 
properly regulate the press (Cohen-Almagor 2015; Frost 2015; Brock 2010; Bingham 
2007). Frost (2004, 2015) concluded that none of its work supported the claims that it 
was an effective regulator or that it had brought about a change in the culture of the British 
press. Indeed, he also argued that the PCC’s structures were designed as a mechanism to 
reject or not deal with the vast majority of complaints (2004: 113-114). The Leveson 
Inquiry (2012) corroborated much of this academic criticism. 
The rare examples of substantive research carried out in other Liberal model press 
system, in Canada (Pritchard 2000), the United States (Ugland 2000, 2008), and in Britain 
(O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000, 2004, 2015), all support the conclusion that 
industry power over self-regulatory instruments has infected regulatory structures, 
procedures and decision-making, resulting in credibility problems and regulatory 
failures. And, while the PCC may have clearly failed to provide a robust regulatory 
framework, it is the only substantive example of press self-regulation suitable for 
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comparison in the Liberal model system. Indeed, its failure produces a very obvious basis 
for comparison with institutionalised independent press regulation.  
 
6.17: PCC comparison (a) 
The PCC received almost 55,000 complaints during its 18 years in existence, with the 
complaint data analysed by Frost (2015) indicating an upward year on year trend in the 
number of complaints lodged. In its first year, 1991, the PCC received some 1,520 
complaints, while in 2008, some 4,698 complaints were lodged with it, an increase of 
over 200 per cent. In comparison, as shown in Chapter 4, the complaints received by the 
Press Ombudsman and PCI remained relatively stable over the period under examination, 
with 372 complaints lodged in 2008 compared to 350 in 2014, albeit over a much shorter 
time period. According to Frost (ibid), the PCC consistently stated that the increase in 
annual complaints was evidence of increasing awareness of the organisation. The Press 
Ombudsman (PCI 2011: 9) has been more circumspect, arguing that the reasons behind 
increases or decreases in complaints are difficult to pinpoint. 
 
 Table 27: PCC headline data 1991-2009 (Frost 2015) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 27 outlines how the PCC dealt with the almost 55,000 complaints. As Frost 
pointed out (2015), the majority of complainants to the PCC did not receive a formal 
  per cent of total 
Not pursued by complainant 1783 3.28% 
No case under code 13908 25.61% 
Outside remit 11093 20.43% 
Disallowed for unjustified delay 1419 2.61% 
Third party  3672 6.76% 
Complaints not formalised 10733 19.77% 
Resolved 10673 19.66% 
Adjudicated 1016 1.87% 
Total 54297 
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hearing of their complaint with just under 1.9 per cent of complaints reaching formal 
adjudication by the PCC while a further almost 20 per cent were resolved informally. As 
noted by Frost (ibid), a complaint resolved by the PCC occurred where complaints were 
“resolved to the express satisfaction of those complaining or those complaints in which 
the Commission judged that an offer of remedial action by the editor was sufficient to 
remedy any possible breach of the CoP”. The resolution took many forms, Frost noted, 
with corrections, apologies, private letters of apology, undertakings of future conduct and 
so on all common. Some complaints involving offers of remedial action that have been 
turned down by complainants also reached formal adjudication where they PCC held 
SRA had been offered (Frost 2012: 28). Of the formally adjudicated complaints dealt 
with by the PCI, 59 from a total of 273 concluded with an SRA adjudication. 
Nevertheless, the PCC data showed that just under 80 per cent of complaints never 
reached formal or informal adjudication by the Commission. 
 
Table 28: PCI & PCC headline data comparison 
 
                                                 
18 Included in this category for the PCI were the 31 cases between 2008 and 2014 that were postponed 
due to legal action that was ongoing. 
  Ireland UK 
Total  2687 54297 
Not examined 
  
Outside remit/Non-member publications/3rd party18 810 14765 
Delay & withdrawn 1250 13935 
Ruled out on 1st reading 129 13908 
Total not examined 2189 (81.5 per 
cent) 
42608 (78.5 
per cent) 
Informal examination 
  
Resolved/Conciliated 135 (5 per 
cent) 
10673 (19.6 
per cent) 
For adjudication 
  
Adjudicated 273 (10.2 per 
cent) 
1016 (1.9 per 
cent) 
212 
 
 
Table 28 has grouped various different categories in Table 27 for the purposes of a 
comparison with similar complaint data from the Press Ombudsman and PCI. It shows 
that the Press Ombudsman and PCI both rule out examination of a larger percentage of 
complaints. Some 81.5 per cent of complaints lodged with the Press Ombudsman and 
PCI are not examined for a variety of reasons as listed in Table 28. This compares to 78.5 
per cent of complaints which were not examined by the PCC during its existence. 
However, a far larger number of complaints are formally adjudicated on by the PCI, with 
10.2 per cent of complaints receiving a formal examination compared with the PCC’s 1.9 
per cent. This is explained by the PCC’s “gradual shift in emphasis from adjudication to 
resolution” which Frost (2015) alluded to. Indeed, almost 20 per cent of cases informally 
assessed by the PCC were deemed resolved compared to 5 per cent with the PCI. 
However, as Chapter 4 also showed, the Press Ombudsman and PCI are also examining 
increasing numbers of complaints under the resolution and conciliation route. 
In addition, Frost (2012) found that between 1993 and 2010, national newspapers 
made up 47.9% of complaints that the PCC adjudicated on followed by 34.5% for 
regional and local newspapers and 5.6% for magazines19. In comparison, 92% of formally 
adjudicated complaints dealt with by the PCI related to national daily and Sunday titles. 
The remainder of the cases involved local, regional and student publication as well as a 
limited number of complaints about magazines. The contrast can be partly attributed to 
the difference in size and diversity in the UK and Irish newspaper markets.  
In further research, Frost (2010: 384) found that 12.2 per cent of complaints dealt with 
by the PCC concerned privacy issues. The majority of the complaints that the PCC dealt 
                                                 
19 Scottish newspaper (8.7%), Northern Irish papers (2.3%) and others (0.9%) made up the 
remaining categories. 
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with concerned accuracy. These statistics are reflected by the complaint data gathered 
from the PCI, where between 2008 and 2014 some 13.2% of complaints concerned 
privacy (see Table 12, p.127). Similarly, the majority of complaints (38.4%) were made 
under the accuracy provisions of the PCI CoP which also includes reference to truth. 
 
6.18: PCC comparison (b) 
According to PCC data analysed by Frost (2015), the organisation upheld or partially 
upheld an average of 51 per cent of the cases it formally adjudicated on. As with the PCI, 
the only sanction the PCC had was that members were obliged to publish the adjudication 
(Frost 2015). Figure 28 shows a year by year analysis of the number of formally 
adjudicated complaints examined and ruled on by the PCC. It also shows an obvious 
downward trend in the number of overall formal adjudications in later years which was 
offset by a rise in informal resolutions references earlier.  
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Figure 28: PCC annual complaints, upheld and rejected 
 
 
In comparison, the database of complaints of the Press Ombudsman and PCI showed 
that an average of 39 per cent of complaints formally assessed were upheld in full or in 
part. Figure 29 showed a year by year break down of complaints which were deemed 
SRA or dismissed and those which were upheld in some fashion. Absent from the PCI 
data, however, was an obvious downward trend in the number of annual adjudications. 
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Figure 29: PCI annual complaints, upheld and rejected 
 
 
6.19: Conclusion 
This chapter examined the work of the Press Ombudsman and PCI with reference to a 
selective accountability framework. It assessed concepts of consistency and 
responsiveness as measures of answerability, the first element of accountability. The 
chapter then investigated industry compliance with the Press Ombudsman and PCI’s 
sanction powers in order to satisfy the second measure of accountability, enforcement. In 
addition, the chapter also compared the complaint and adjudication levels achieved by a 
liberal system self-regulatory organisation, the PCC, with the Irish scenario, an 
independent, legislatively underpinned regulatory body. 
The data has revealed a number of interesting areas of contrast. When complainant 
genders and backgrounds were examined, it showed that female complainants succeeded 
more often with their complaints when compared to their male counterparts, while 
complainants classed as well-known from politics, media, celebrity and business had 
higher upheld rates than the private, regular complainants. In addition, the data showed 
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that when complainants employed legal representation, their complaints were upheld 
more frequently.  
As expected, there was a wide variation in the number of complaints and the number 
of upheld adjudications against each member publication. However, a further analysis of 
the data, showed that some news organisations achieve better outcomes than others 
despite being the subject of similar levels of adjudicated complaints. In addition, there 
was contrasting outcomes per publication type – mid-market, tabloid or broadsheet. The 
research also found that there is a difference, albeit limited, where overseas and domestic 
titles were concerned. In addition, the research established that member publications were 
far more successful with cases which were appealed to the PCI. This is surprising given 
the independent nature of the board.  
There are no obvious reasons for the divergence in outcomes in these examples. 
Further study is needed in this regard. For example, conducting research on the particular 
journalistic ethos of each publication could yield useful indicators of reasons for the 
number of complaints and complaint outcomes. This would be particularly interesting 
given the fears expressed over Irish journalism moving closer to the UK tabloid culture 
(see Chapter 3) and the similar upheld adjudications against INM and DMG Media. In 
addition, more study on the particular complaint type per title may provide interesting 
findings. 
The various data types examined are unpersuasive when assessed in isolation as a 
measure of consistency of the PCI . However, the data is slightly more persuasive when 
examined collectively but ultimately does not show any glaring inconsistencies in the 
work of the Irish system. Nevertheless, the variations shown in the treatment of 
complainants, the outcomes of appeals and the outcomes of complaints across the 
newspaper type spectrum all suggest that more research is needed on the consistency 
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element of the conceptual framework of accountability and the work of the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI. This subject will be further examined further in Chapter 7. 
As Chapter 4 discussed, there is no formal limit for how long it should take the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI to deal with complaints. However, during his evidence to the 
Leveson Inquiry, Press Ombudsman John Horgan (2012) said he tried to reach a decision 
on cases within a “maximum period of three months”. In addition to this, he referred to a 
two-week period which the complainant has to attempt to resolve the complaint directly 
with the member publication before the formal adjudication process begins. The PCI’s 
website also gives complainants informal advice on how long it might take for a 
complaint to conclude. It says that the process may “vary” but if conciliation fails over 
an up to 6-week period, the Press Ombudsman may take “a further two weeks” to make 
a decision which will be delayed if appealed. This suggests that from the date of 
publication of the article, it may take up to 8 weeks, or two months, for a complainant to 
get an adjudication, with a further month expected in the case of a PCI appeal given the 
monthly meetings of the board. 
The data showed that in 2008, it took over three-and-a-half months on average to deal 
with complaints from the date of publication of the offending article to the decision. 
However, in each of the years after this to 2014, the average time period for reaching an 
outcome took four-and-a-half months, with the peak reached at almost five months in 
2011 (Figure 18). Further analysis of complaints which were not appealed beyond the 
Press Ombudsman, showed that the Press Ombudsman began his work in 2008 by dealing 
with complaints in three months. However, in each of the following years, it took the 
office around four months to adjudicate on complaints. In total, it took a median of 140.5 
days – or four-and-a-half months – for complaints to reach a decision through the formal 
adjudication process. 
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The findings on responsiveness can be interpreted in two ways. First, in the absence 
of any formal limits for dealing with complaints, is a median of 140.5 days from the date 
the article appeared to the complaint outcome a ‘speedy response’? Bearing in mind that 
the data in this study used the original article date – the actual date the complaint was 
first lodged was unavailable - for the basis of the assessment, an overall average for 
dealing with complaints of four-and-a-half months is a good outcome for the PCI for a 
number of reasons. First, it is substantially less than the time it would take complainants 
to reach a conclusion in a legal case that they may take through the courts which can often 
take many years to come to hearing and ruling. One of the reasons for setting up a 
complaints-handling system such as the PCI is to help people who have complaints avoid 
the adversarial, costly and lengthy legal route. Second, the PCI was still in its early phase 
during the years under review. Chairman Mitchell said the most “urgent challenge” 
during these years has been to “embed the new system” and “refine its procedures” 
(Mitchell 2015: 121). Thus, dealing with complaints in such a time period suggests that 
the PCI has made a good start in terms of responsiveness. It is reasonable, however, to 
expect that the timeframe for dealing with complaints should decrease in the coming 
years, particularly in light of the debates on the setting up of press regulation in Ireland 
discussed in Chapter 3, and the promise of a quick complaints handling service. 
In addition, in light of the informal attempts by the Press Ombudsman and the PCI to 
establish some form of guidance for complaint handling time limits at around eight 
weeks, it is also reasonable to conclude that complaints-handling is failing to meet this 
promise.  It is clear from the data that in the first year of operation, the regulator was 
achieving success with these time periods. However, since then, the time period for 
dealing with complaints has extended, thus suggesting that the Press Ombudsman and 
PCI are not meeting their informal deadlines it offers to complaints for dealing with 
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complaints. Perhaps the PCI’s suggestion on speediness (as well as some of the other 
remarks from the Press Ombudsman and others over the years) is somewhat ambitious, 
particularly considering that the system is still young. However, the eight-week 
timeframe, which would obviously be extended should any PCI appeal be lodged, is a 
strong benchmark for the system to aim at in its next phase of development. 
As discussed, the second core element of accountability is sanction. The Press 
Ombudsman and PCI’s only sanction is the publication of its upheld decision in the 
offending member publication. Decision must be published according to a set of 
publication guidelines which are reinforced by the CoP in order to ensure due prominence 
with the offending article. This is the standard of enforcement which was examined. The 
analysis of all upheld complaints and the subsequent decision publication showed that 
there is widespread non-cooperation with this standard, with varying levels of non-
compliance found. It is worth pointing out that in all except three cases, newspapers 
published the negative decision against them. That is to be commended and suggests that 
member publications cooperate with the PCI in this regard. This is particularly important 
given the mixed record that self-regulatory press councils have on ensuring that their 
decisions are published (see Chapter 2). It is also worth highlighting the fact that, on 
occasion, newspapers published decisions which were not upheld against them. This 
shows a basic level of co-operation between the newspaper industry and the regulatory 
organisation. However, a deeper analysis showed that 96 per cent of decision publications 
breached one or more of the four categories required to meet the due prominence 
standards. This strongly suggests that there are problems with the core sanction power 
operated by the Press Ombudsman and PCI. There are no obvious reasons from the 
material studied that suggest reasons for the errors in publishing decisions. The word 
‘guidelines’ may give member publications the impression that they are optional, 
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although this is not the case as the PCI says newspapers “must” follow these rules on its 
website. It may also be the case that layout staff on newspapers are not aware of, and not 
given proper direction, on where to place and how to treat PCI decisions. Although 
outside the scope of this research, interviews with newspaper editors and the Press 
Ombudsman/PCI may shed light on this.  
The main consideration of this chapter was to assess whether the Press Ombudsman 
and PCI met standards of accountability using the twin related concepts of answerability 
and enforcement. The research suggests that in relation to answerability, the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI partially met consistency and responsiveness standards. While a 
number of areas suggest that further research is required, the PCI in its first six years of 
operation has achieved some success on both elements.  However, in relation to 
enforcement, while the research shows there is widespread compliance with the 
requirement to publish a negative decision, it also suggests that the publication of upheld 
decisions in member publications is not being carried out in accordance with the PCI’s 
Publication Guidelines and therefore cannot be said to be meeting due prominence 
requirements. Given that the publication of decisions is the PCI’s sole sanction power, 
this presents a mixed picture in terms of enforcement for the PCI during the years under 
review.  
In addition, the chapter set out to examine whether independent regulation differed in 
any way from self-regulation, and what strengths and weaknesses it exhibited when 
compared to industry-led regulation. The comparison with the PCC suggests a number of 
areas where further study is needed on independent regulation. The independent Irish 
regulatory system formally dealt with fewer complaints than the failed self-regulatory 
system and it also upheld fewer complaints than the PCC – both subjects for which Frost 
(2015) criticised the PCC. Complaints were not examined for a variety of reasons, all of 
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them entirely legitimate. However, further study could contextualise and suggest possible 
reasons why, for example, 1,216 complaints to the PCI were made outside the three-
month time limit and what were the reasons for ruling out 129 complaints on a first 
reading. In general, finding that the PCI dealt with fewer informal and formal complaints 
was surprising given the independent and institutionalised nature of Irish press regulation. 
The comparison with the PCC also highlights potential strengths of independent 
regulation showing that the Press Ombudsman and PCI dealt with a far higher number of 
complaints via the formal adjudication process than the PCC which favoured informal 
resolution of complaints. These findings will be discussed at length in Chapter 7. A 
number of areas emerged from the comparison that are outside of the scope of this study 
but could be areas for further research. These include a deeper examination of why the 
PCI’s work is dominated by national newspapers when compared to the PCC (Frost 2012: 
33). In addition, there is scope to look deeper at privacy complaints made to the PCI given 
the subject’s central role in the setting up of the Irish system as well as other systems in 
the Liberal North Atlantic area (see Frost 2010). It would also be interesting to compare 
the types of complaints levelled against individual newspapers in both systems as well as 
compare the types of titles that are most commonly involved in complaints. 
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Chapter 7: Analysis and discussion 
 
7.1: Introduction 
Press regulation in the Anglo-American journalistic milieu emerged after the 
philosophical shift to a socially responsible media during the 20th century. Chapter 2 
traced how the work of the Hutchins and Ross Commissions in the US and UK 
respectively highlighted an erosion of liberal journalistic traditions of unrestrained 
freedom. The media in the dominant North Atlantic liberal system began to accept greater 
extra-juridical responsibilities to their audiences and readers.  
However, as Chapter 2 showed, the literature strongly suggests that defining a 
definitive set of journalistic responsibilities for the North Atlantic liberal system is 
problematic. Nevertheless attempts to codify a set of standards have been made at both 
the nation state and international level. The clearest and most common manifestation of 
this has been self-regulatory press councils which usually publish an agreed code of ethics 
and take complaints on the basis of alleged breaches of specific clauses. Indeed press 
councils in the UK, US and Canada have been in the vanguard of attempting to hold 
journalists in the North Atlantic liberal tradition accountable, while at the same time 
striking the balance with maintaining the concept of a free press. 
Despite their ubiquitousness, self-regulatory press councils in the North Atlantic 
liberal system have failed to enforce their mandates to hold journalists accountable for 
ethical breaches (Pritchard 2000; Ugland 2000, 2008; O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 
2000, 2004, 2015). Chapter 2 examined press councils in the US, Canada and Britain. 
The existing literature has found that none of these press councils successfully upheld 
journalistic responsibilities in any systematic manner due, in large part, to structural flaws 
and a failure to enforce accountability mechanisms.  
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 Nerone (1995: 29), in the political economy tradition, has argued that the concept of 
social responsibility was an idea promoted by the media as it is in the institution’s 
interests to perpetuate a ‘myth’ to maintain its own freedom, mainly for economic 
advantage. McChesney has also pointed out that “the political economy of 
communication has focused on how capitalist control and commercial support of media 
have tended to serve elite interests in a manner that is anathema…to core democratic 
values” (1998: 8), which, as Chapter 2 established, mirror journalistic responsibilities. 
Indeed, Herman and Chomsky’s (2010) ‘flak’ concept – public complaints about media 
coverage – is also relevant, as the authors argued it is controlled by the same power 
sources which played, and continue to play a key role in fixing basic journalistic 
principles and dominant ideologies suitable to capital. As Chapter 2 showed, the literature 
on regulation of the press strongly supports the political economy agenda. Research has 
shown that industry power over self-regulatory instruments has infected structures, 
procedures and decision-making, resulting in credibility problems and accountability 
failures (Pritchard 2000; Ugland 2000, 2008; O’Malley and Soley 2000; Frost 2000, 
2004, 2015). 
Academics, governments and media commentators have all highlighted the failures 
in the self-regulatory approach to press councils. These failures of media accountability 
in the North Atlantic liberal press system have pushed the concept of social responsibility 
into a new space. The increased focus on journalism ethics and media accountability has 
led to a questioning of the orthodoxy of self-regulatory approaches. However, there has 
been little substantive action by policy makers or the media in forming new, and robust, 
approaches to the failures of self-regulatory press councils. 
Ireland – a country considered by Hallin and Mancini (2004) to be part of the North 
Atlantic liberal tradition - has produced the only substantive example of change. Chapters 
224 
 
3 and 4 established that the Irish media, in conjunction with government, set up a unique 
press council in an attempt to avoid many of the failures that had undermined self-
regulatory systems. The PCI is an independent, legislatively underpinned and 
incentivised body where the formal process of institutionalisation and legal recognition 
has resulted in the codification of an accepted set of professional norms created and 
accepted by industry. The PCI exhibits striking differences with Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) analysis of the dominant non-institutionalised and informal press regulatory 
approaches in the North Atlantic liberal area. 
This chapter reviews and analyses the findings in Chapter 6 to examine if independent 
press regulation in the Irish case has resulted in a robust accountability processes, or, if 
independent regulation exhibits the same weaknesses prevalent to date in self-regulatory 
press councils in the North Atlantic liberal press system. It discusses initial observations 
based on work in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. This can be split into two sub-sections, structural 
and operational. The structural-subsection examines three key areas of discussion around 
independence, transparency and the PCI CoP. The operational sub-section discusses 
working aspects of the PCI including the informal complaint handling procedures and 
some basic data comparisons with the PCC in the UK. The chapter then lays out the 
findings from the formal complaint analysis undertaken in Chapter 6. The final part of 
this chapter points out the wider significance of some of the findings and how they 
contribute to ongoing press regulation debates. 
 
7.2: Independence  
The literature suggests that structural independence from both the state and industry is an 
important characteristic for successful press regulation (Bertrand 2003; McQuail 2003; 
Sawant 2003; Cohen-Almagor 2005; Duncan 2014) and effective ombudsmanship 
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(Kliadman and Beauchamp 1989; Meyer 1991; Van Soye 2007; Kenney and Ozkan 2011; 
Mollerup 2011; Evers 2012). It has been one of the core elements lacking in self-
regulatory approaches. In his report into the ethics, practices and culture of the British 
press Justice Leveson concluded that the self-regulatory PCC was “constrained by serious 
structural deficiencies” which limited its work. He said the power of the Press Standards 
Board of Finance, a committee of senior newspaper executives which oversaw the work 
of the PCC on appointments, the CoP and funding, “means that the PCC is far from being 
an independent body”: 
It is a clear flaw in the self-regulatory system that the Editors’ CoP 
Committee, the body with sole authority to amend the Editors’ CoP, is 
made up exclusively of serving editors and executives. This gives rise 
to at least the perception that rules are being made which suit the editors 
themselves and not the public (2012: 1529) 
Leveson argued that more journalists and those familiar with the industry, such as 
NUJ members, should replace senior editors on the board of the PCC (2012: 1527). 
Similar concerns about the independence of self-regulatory efforts in Britain had been 
expressed previously (Bingham 2007). In addition, Leveson (2012: 1530) said the PCC 
acted, on occasion, as an “unabashed advocate or lobbyist” for the press’s commercial 
interests. He also argued that by promoting the status quo of self-regulation, the PCC 
“was in at least the short term interests of the industry, promotion of the merits of self-
regulation was an advancement of that interest”. 
In my view, this served to create a real conflict of interest between the 
core function of the PCC, applying the Code and achieving a balance 
between the interests of the subjects of stories and the press, and the 
role it arrogated to itself in advocating the interests of the industry as a 
whole (2012: 1530) 
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Similar concerns were also noted in other jurisdictions. For example, Pritchard (2000) 
included a lack of independence as a “structural flaw” in the make-up of the Quebec Press 
Council in Canada. 
Given these concerns about the lack of independence of self-regulatory models of 
press regulation, one would have expected the PCI to exhibit strong and obvious 
structural differences that would set it apart. There are a number of areas where the PCI 
does differ from self-regulation in its structural make-up. As Chapter 4 discussed, the 
board of the PCI is dominated by independent members and an independent chairperson 
both of whom have no professional connection to the press. Indeed the appointments 
committee is also overseen by the independent chair and a committee chosen by the 
board. In addition, the Press Ombudsman is granted full authority over the administration, 
operation and staffing of the regulator with subsequent administrative changes 
strengthening this independence, as highlighted in Chapter 4.  
While self-regulatory press councils have often appointed independent chairs to 
govern board meetings, no press council in the North Atlantic liberal area that has won 
widespread buy-in by the press has ever been dominated by a lay membership nor 
guaranteed the function of an autonomous press ombudsman. The PCI board also 
contains non-editor industry members such as a member of the NUJ. These are significant 
differences and do suggest that independent press regulation does offer at least the 
perception of independence from industry, thus significantly improving on the structural 
failures of self-regulation, as for example, identified by the Leveson Inquiry (2012) in the 
UK. However, there are a number of areas where there are striking similarities with self-
regulation in Britain and elsewhere.  
First, two of the PCI’s committees – the code and administrative committees – are 
controlled by the newspaper industry. As Chapter 4 established, the code committee, 
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which draws up and monitors the PCI’s CoP, is made up of six newspaper editors, a 
representative of the NUJ, the Press Ombudsman and a chair nominated by the PCI. The 
code committee also has powers to appoint its own members. The administrative 
committee is made up of five members from the newspaper industry and an independent 
chair. It also has power over appointments to the committee. The administrative 
committee’s main work focuses on securing funding for the PCI, which comes entirely 
from industry. 
Second, in terms of resourcing, confidence that the PCI is adequately resourced needs 
further exploration. This is a subject beyond the scope of this study but in terms of 
budgetary independence, in the UK Leveson found the PCC was “barely given enough 
money to perform its key function of complaint handling” (2012: 1577). In terms of 
funding, the PCI is supported solely by member publications. Data contained in the PCI’s 
annual reports showed that funding for the PCI has fallen year-on-year since it began 
operation in 2008 (Figure 30). As one would have expected, due to initial set up costs, 
the first two years of the office saw the largest budget allocation. Significant investment 
would be required to establish an office such as this at the outset. Whether the office 
requires a decreasing level of funding each year, or if industry is unwilling to meet higher 
demands is unclear and cannot be independently verified. Nevertheless, the data 
undermines the position of the PCI which has repeatedly stated that funding levels have 
remained consistent (see Chapter 4). In addition, the reliance on industry to fund the PCI 
somewhat undermines the perception of independence on which the Irish regulatory 
system has been set up. The falling level of funding year-on-year is a concern for Irish 
press regulation and further research and attention is needed to find out if the PCI is 
adequately funded and to examine what other sources of funding could be made available. 
One option could be for the government to offer financial support, however, that may be 
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unpalatable to the newspaper industry. Another option could be the levying of a 
subvention on newspaper readers, perhaps as part of any future public broadcasting 
licence proposals that are likely to see significant reforms due to technological changes 
in how viewers consume media. The spectre of fines for breaches of the CoP may also be 
raised at some point in the future and could be used to fund the office. 
 
Figure 30: PCI funding 
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the PCC over a lack of powers to compel evidence from member publications which left 
the organisation in a position where it was trusting newspapers to respond fully to 
complaints (2012: 1578). “At every step it has to trust that newspapers are properly 
examining the issues and are not being economical with the truth” (2012: 1578). 
Fourth, Nordenstreng (2003) argued that a press council must also be independent of 
the political and judiciary system to be independent. The legislative underpinning of the 
PCI via the Defamation Act 2009 confirms many of the above structures which had 
already been adopted by the PCI. However, Section 6 of the Act gives the Minister for 
Justice a role in the selection of independent board members. It says that appointments 
of independent members must be carried out by a panel of people “who are, in the opinion 
of the Minister, independent” of the media. In addition, the section says that the selection 
process must be carried out “in a manner that the Minister considers sufficient”. Although 
it is unclear if – or even how – this provision operates in practice, it nonetheless suggests 
there is a potential role for government. 
 
7.3: Transparency 
The second structural issue – transparency – can be seen as an inseparable element of 
media accountability that is linked to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) professionalisation 
variable (Lauk and Denton 2011: 218). Indeed the concept of transparency is frequently 
mentioned in the literature, often as an ideal characteristic of press regulation (O’Malley 
and Soley 2000; Sawant 2003; Barker and Evans 2007; Duncan 2014) and for press 
ombudsmen (Evers 2012) who Lauk and Kus (2012: 171) described as “transparency 
agents”. Leveson also argued that press regulation must operate a transparent decision-
making process (2012: 1774). Indeed Leveson was critical on a number of occasions 
about what he believed was a lack of transparency by the PCC in the carrying out of its 
work (2012: 1577, 1559, 1551, 1524). Ugland and Breslin (2000: 246) concluded that the 
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Minnesota News Council lacked any transparent decision-making process and Pritchard 
found that the Quebec Press Council operated in an “ad-hoc” and unclear fashion (2000: 
95).  
The PCI operates a Code or Practice that guides its work on complaints from the 
public. The CoP is a clear reference point for each formally adjudicated complaint and is 
clearly and carefully examined in relation to each reading of a complaint by the Press 
Ombudsman and the PCI. Indeed, the Press Ombudsman and the PCI unfailingly publish 
their decisions and always explain the complaints in an accessible fashion on the PCI’s 
website. In addition, the PCI publishes annual reports which detail top level statistics 
about the number of complaints it receives and the outcome of these complaints. Thus 
the basic standards of transparency are being met. However, there are a number of areas 
which require further attention. 
First, there is the question of the openness of the PCI in its own work. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, an independent member of the PCI’s first board resigned in 2008, citing the 
PCI’s policy not to publish dissenting opinions as a critical reason for his decision. The 
board member said the PCI was upholding a “façade of unanimity” by not publishing all 
details about the decisions on the board. He also raised concerns about “excessive 
confidentiality” and said the PCI came “close to collusion” with the industry due to the 
withholding of procedural information about how decisions were made. No systematic 
analysis of the work of the PCI is possible as it does not publish the minutes of board 
meetings or the voting patterns of board members. The limited information available in 
the Articles of Association (see Table 5 p.99) shows there is a quorum of five for all 
meetings and that the board meetings are being recorded in minutes. In addition, there is 
no information about the meetings or deliberations of any of the PCI’s three committees, 
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the code committee, the administrative committee and the appointments committee. All 
meetings are held in private. 
Second, the PCI does not publish a table of the most common offenders. Although 
this information can be collated (see Chapter 6). The PCI does publish an annual table of 
the number of complaints under each clause of the CoP, but there is no ongoing overall 
statistical record of this. Leveson also voiced his displeasure over the failure by the PCC 
to publish a league-table of the worst offenders and the most breached CoP clauses.  
I think this is very important: the regulator must have a clear sense of 
the scale of code breaches that it is dealing with both in relation to 
individual publishers and in relation to the industry as a whole. This 
information about breaches of the code would be of critical importance 
to the management at the individual publishers and to the regulator in 
its role of promoting and maintaining standards (2012: 1633) 
Third, concern may arise due to the operation of an internal complaint resolutions 
mechanism. As Chapter 6 discussed, the PCI formally adjudicated on 10.2 per cent of 
complaints, compared to the PCC’s 1.9 per cent, with conciliation and mediation 
undertaken in 5 per cent of cases in Ireland compared to 19.6 per cent in Britain. Thus, 
Irish press regulation does exhibit strong differences in its treatment of complaints with 
a far higher proportion being examined via formal structures in a transparent fashion. 
Nevertheless, Chapter 4 also established that the number of cases being informally 
resolved is increasing. Indeed, the PCI also changed its structures to formalise the 
informal conciliation process, also discussed in Chapter 4. Notwithstanding the concerns 
expressed by Leveson and others in relation to the issue, there are a number of other 
potentially problematic issues with this approach in the Irish case. 
The concept of transparency is lost when complaints enter the conciliation process 
given that the structures in place mean mediating complaints is “confidential to the 
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parties” involved, as the PCI mandated in its revised Articles of Association (2012), 
discussed in Chapter 4. The PCI does, however, publish some details of the conciliated 
complaints on its website. Many of the cases have resulted in clear breaches of the CoP. 
For example, in one case a woman complained about the Evening Herald’s coverage of 
a court case which stated inaccurately that her husband had been left without a conviction 
by the court “after paying her compensation”. The woman complained that it was 
inaccurate to state that her husband had paid her compensation. In this case, the 
newspaper “published an agreed clarification”. In another case, a “man complained about 
an article published in the Sunday Tribune which he said gave an incorrect account of his 
role in a dispute involving the company for which he worked. The complaint was resolved 
when the newspaper published a clarification”. In another case, “Mrs Catherine Griffin 
complained about an article in The Corkman that reported on the death of her son which 
contained a headline stating “Brian Griffin died after row”.  The complaint was resolved 
when the newspaper published a clarification stating that Mr Griffin had not died as a 
result of the row, and apologised to the family for any distress caused.” 
The above three cases are all likely to be breaches of the CoP under its accuracy 
provisions. However, as the PCI (2009: 19) has said, the conciliation and mediation 
mechanisms of complaint handling are concluded “without any decision being made as 
to whether or not a breach of the CoP has taken place”. None of these three cases would 
have been included in the PCI data as breaches of the CoP. Thus the PCI operates – albeit 
to a lesser extent – a similar system to the informal complaint handling mechanism that 
was operated by the PCC and led to widespread criticism (Frost 2004; 2015; Leveson 
2012).  
As the PCI has said, the outcome of conciliated complaints in terms of what member 
publications offer complaints in return for errors and/or breaching the code is endless. 
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Some are private, such as letters of apology and the removal of content such as images 
from internal newspaper systems, and some are public such as clarifications or letters to 
the editor. Further study is required to examine whether conciliated complaints in the 
Irish case meet any standard of due prominence but this may be difficult due to the limited 
data made available. Nevertheless, private outcomes are unlikely to meet any standard of 
due prominence, albeit perhaps sometimes requested by aggrieved parties. In addition, 
public ones may also struggle to meet any metric of due prominence. In one conciliated 
complaint, David Elio Malocco complained the Irish Independent wrongly reported that 
he did not respond to a request for comment. The news story at the centre of the complaint 
appeared on Saturday 2 March on page 4 (no year is given). The clarification was 
published in an “in brief” column on page 8 on Saturday 27 April. In another case a 
woman complained that an inaccuracy over paternity in a report of a man’s death in a 
road traffic accident. The offending item appeared at the top of page 6 on Tuesday 2 
April. After conciliation, a two-paragraph clarification appeared on Saturday 1 June as 
the final item in an “in brief” column on page 14. 
These are two random examples from the conciliated complaints disclosed on the 
PCI’s website. In most instances, due to a lack of identifying information about the 
complainant, the article, the date of publication, the headline and so on make a full 
examination of whether due prominence is being met impossible. Thus, a reasonable case 
can be made for seeking greater transparency from the PCI, not just in the outcome of 
these complaints, but also in the process by which these complaints come to a conclusion. 
Conciliation systems may have merit. Indeed, Hallin and Mancini (2004) argued that 
one of the central characteristics of the journalistic professionalisation movement in the 
North Atlantic liberal model is the development of non-institutionalised and informal 
methods of self-regulation. Referring to the use of informal mediation and conciliation 
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by the PCC, Leveson said that mediation and conciliation by the PCC was “often helpful” 
(2012: 1518). However, Leveson also expressed caution about informal complaint 
handling.  
It is…important that mediated complaints are recorded, with code 
breaches identified. It is difficult to see how systemic failures in code 
compliance could be detected if code breaches are not identified as such 
by the Complaints Committee (2012: 1633) 
He argued that most cases dealt with informally do concern instances where a breach 
of the code is committed, thus dealing with them informally means the PCC operated 
away from the transparent manner in which formally adjudicated complaints must be 
dealt with. Indeed, only those that get through to full adjudication are actually recorded 
as breaches. “This allows the fiction that only a handful of breaches of the code occur 
each year to go unchallenged” (2012: 1632).  
A cursory examination of the statistics shows that few complaints reach 
the stage of formal adjudication, and that – although the figures vary 
from year to year – about half of these are resolved in favour of the 
complainant. This very last statistic does not give cause for concern in 
itself, but given the number of complaints in any one year what is 
troubling is the paucity of cases which eventually arrive at the 
adjudication stage. The PCC would claim that this is a mark of the 
success rather than the weakness of the system. That is because many 
complainants welcome a relatively speedy resolution, and in a different 
context it might be remarked that well over 95 per cent of all civil 
disputes are resolved consensually, although as I note elsewhere, 
resolution through mediation is not always speedy. However, given that 
a mediated complaint does not feature in any statistics as a breach of 
the Code, is seems clear that from the point of view of public 
accountability and compliance there is a misleading picture. Further, 
this different context does need to be understood. The policy reasons 
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militating in favour of the compromise of private disputes (cost; 
avoidance of court time; the preference for settlement over a fight to 
the bitter end) do not apply with anything like the same force in relation 
to matters which possess, or at least ought to possess, a regulatory or 
standards dimension. In most regulatory regimes, the complainant and 
the regulated party are given the opportunity to sort out the dispute 
between themselves, but once that process breaks down the regulator 
takes over and investigates the matter. There is a balance to be struck 
between mediation and formal adjudication, but I have little doubt but 
that under the current system that balance has fallen in the wrong place 
(2012: 1558) 
Leveson (2012: 1558) also found that “given that a mediated complaint does not 
feature in any statistics as a breach of the Code, is seems clear that from the point of view 
of public accountability and compliance there is a misleading picture”. Indeed, he argued 
that newspapers could – as a result of the lack of clarity surrounding conciliated 
complaints – “point to near unblemished records in relation to breaches” (2012: 1560). 
Given the Hallin and Macini (2004) conclusions in relation the dominant informality 
of complaint handling measures in the North Atlantic liberal system, one would have 
expected to observe a greater emphasis on formal adjudication methods – and therefore 
transparency - in an independent, institutionalised media accountability framework that 
would set such a system apart from the hitherto norm of self-regulation.  
 
7.4: CoP 
The third structural issue identified for discussion is the CoP. This study’s focus is on the 
accountability mechanisms of the PCI. While the CoP is the document which sets out the 
manner in which journalistic behaviour is to be judged, a formal evaluation of its contents 
is outside of the scope of this study. Nevertheless, there are a number of areas which 
suggest that further examination is required. 
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For Cooper (1989: 30) and White (1995: 455-456), the clearest text for understanding 
journalistic norms is the code of ethics. As well as elevating the professional status of 
journalism in order to protect the industry, White argues, codes are central to laying down 
specific professional norms. McQuail (2010: 172) supports Cooper and White’s 
arguments, pointing out that codes set out principles of professional conduct that 
journalists believe ought to govern and guide the industry. 
Regular substantive comparative research has examined the content of journalistic 
codes of ethics (Laitila 1995; Hafez 2002; Himelboim and Limor 2008). Despite the 
obvious geo-political influences, the research supports the conclusion that codes of ethics 
define clear professional journalistic norms. Indeed, the most striking finding is that 
enough similarities exist in almost every code to establish a universal set of journalism 
ethics (Laitila 1995: 543), thus indirectly supporting the argument that codes provide the 
clearest text for studying professional norms in the industry. Despite a caustic assessment 
of codes of ethics in practice by some (Randall 2000: 145-146; Iggers 1998: 35), and the 
conflict in journalistic debate between theory and practice which Sanders (2003: 3) labels 
as journalism’s “resistance to reflection” or “anti-intellectualism”, great diversity exists 
in the number, type and adherence to codes of ethics in media industries all over the world 
(Laitila 1995; Hafez 2002; Grevisse 2003; Himelboim and Limor 2008). Indeed, codes 
are potentially rich texts for further study on the philosophical basis. As Frost (2000: 96) 
and Cooper (1989: 30) have noted, all codes are fixed, tangible texts which have a moral 
underpinning. Thus, they reflect certain worldviews and provide not only a nuanced text 
but also a means of accountability for journalism. 
Laitila (1995: 533) identifies 13 categories common in codes across Europe with 61 
principles of journalistic ethics identified (Table 30): 
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Table 30: Laitila’s code of ethics commonalities (1995) 
Accountability  
1. To the public: 
a. Truthfulness of information 
b. Clarity of information 
c. Defence of public rights 
d. Responsibilities as creators 
of public opinion 
2. To the sources and referents: 
a. Gathering and presenting 
information 
b. Integrity of the sources 
3. To the state 
a. Respect for state institutions 
4. To the employers 
a. Loyalty to the employer 
Professional identity 
1. Protection of the integrity of 
journalists 
a. General rights and 
prohibitions 
b. Protection from public 
powers 
c. Protection from employers 
and advertisers 
2. Protection of the unity of the 
profession 
a. Protection of the status of 
journalism 
b. Protection of the solidarity 
within the profession 
 
 
 
Laitila found that 85 per cent of ethics codes stress these principles with the codes 
calling for professional journalistic activities based on accountability to the public and 
other regulatory groups. Indeed, the study showed that the most common principles in 
European codes emphasise different aspect of truthfulness, the need to protect the 
integrity and independence of journalists, the responsibility of journalists in forming 
public opinion, fair means in the gathering and presentation of information, protection of 
the rights of sources and referents, and the freedom to express and communicate ideas 
and information without hindrance. Laitila’s work has been replicated by others (Hafez 
2002; Bertrand 2003; Grevisse 2003; Himelboim and Limor 2008;) and the findings 
suggest a vast commonality in terms of the elements that make-up codes of journalistic 
ethics across the world. Such work has prompted much discussion on the concept of a 
universal code for journalists (Herrscher 2002; Tehranian 2002; Ward 2005; Couldry 
2012; Hansen 2014; Ziff 1986; Cooper 1989; Merrill 1989; Wright 2005; Steele 2013). 
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The PCI’s CoP contains both elements of accountability and professional identity, as 
referenced by Laitila (1995). An examination of the CoP shows that it references 
elements of Laitilia’s accountability with truth, clarity of information, public rights and 
responsibilities all referenced. It also discusses the gathering and presentation of 
information and protects the integrity of sources. There is no mention of respect for state 
institutions or employers – which is an uncommon feature of liberal model ethics codes 
in any case. In terms of Laitilia’s professional identity, the CoP starts with the preamble 
in which the concept of journalistic identity is referenced. Several principles also 
reference the role of journalists including protections for sources and the wider 
journalistic role. 
Identifying the common elements of codes of ethics is straight forward. However, 
examining the practical impact that ethical clauses have on journalists and their work is 
more problematic. Various studies have attempted to establish the importance of ethics 
codes in the everyday work of journalists (Fengler et al 2014, Boeyink 1995, Pritchard 
and Morgan 1989). The studies present varying findings, which have, one could argue, 
led to the many critiques of the concept of journalistic codes of ethics (Slattery 2014; 
Mair 2012; Nyilasy and Reid 2011; Smith 2003; Stark 2001; Iggers 1998; McManus 
1997; Merrill 1989; Elliott-Boyle 1986). Contemporary debate about codes focuses on 
the potential for interplay between ethics and legal issues (Christians 1986; Bertrand 
2000; Drechsel 2014; Frost 2015), the concept of a global code of communication ethics 
(Herrscher 2002; Tehranian 2002; Ward 2005; Couldry 2012; Hansen 2014) and the 
impact that technological advancements and their use in the journalistic practice have had 
on codifying principles (Cooper 1998; Deuze and Yeshua 2001; Phillips 2010; Dodson 
2012; Hansen 2014; Wyatt and Clasen 2014). 
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Examining how journalists in Ireland view the PCI CoP has not been examined as 
part of this research. However, there are some areas noted during this research which 
require highlighting. 
First, the Irish code was written by the Press Industry Code Committee (Reid 2006) 
which said that the code was “intended as a work in progress and it is expected that it will 
continue to evolve”. Indeed, the NNI told an Oireachtas Justice Committee in 2008 that 
it was expected that the “code will develop with the jurisprudence of the press council” 
(Dáil Eireann 2008).  The concept of ethical evolution of codes is well established as an 
important element in their success (Cooper 1989: 30). Bertrand argued that the writers of 
codes do not intend a sacred text but a guide which needs to be “discussed, cleansed, 
updated, structured” (2000: 38) and Nordenstreng pointed out that codes are kept alive 
by regular revision (2003). However, as Chapter 4 discussed, there have been just two 
limited changes to the PCI CoP between 2008 and 2014. Evaluating the updated material 
is beyond this study’s scope. Nevertheless, given the literature’s commitment to the 
concept of an evolving code, it is surprising to see few substantial additions or changes 
to the code as it was first published in 2008. As the PCI enters its next phase of operation, 
it may be an opportune time to review the CoP in light of its operation over the first six 
years. 
Second, consistency is a key principle in the accountability framework established in 
this study. The principle is one of the elements of answerability. For Cooper (1989: 30), 
White (1995: 455-456) and McQuail (2010: 172) the clearest text for understanding 
journalistic norms is the code of ethics. As well as elevating the professional status of 
journalism in order to protect the industry, White argues, codes are central to laying down 
specific professional norms. Thus, as Christians (1986: 46-49) and Barker and Evans 
(2007: 17) have argued, codes of ethics are important texts for establishing consistent 
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accountability frameworks. One of the ways that codes operate is to provide regulators 
with a clear guide in deciding on cases as well as the establishment of a form of precedent. 
Ugland and Breslin (2000) argued that  
If the Council ignores its earlier decisions, rejects their authority, or 
makes no effort to intelligently link them, it instructs journalists and the 
public to be equally dismissive. If there are no rules that transcend the 
most immediate cases, and if there is no acknowledgement of those 
who have already grappled with the same problems, the council cannot 
help but be perceived as hopelessly situationalist (2000: 236) 
A non-systematic analysis of the Irish complaints shows that the PCI has consistently 
dealt with complaints by, for example, reaffirming on a number of occasions that 
unverified information – including in headlines and opening paragraphs - must be 
attributed correctly so as not to mislead readers over whether the information is factual. 
In one of its first cases in 2008 involving a report in the Irish Mail on Sunday about the 
death of the model Katy French, the PCI upheld the complaint, and concluded: 
It was the judgement of the Press Council that, when a news story is 
based on unofficial sources which cannot be named and whose 
accounts have not been, or cannot be, verified, the story cannot be 
reported as if it were established fact, and the basis for it must be made 
clear from the outset (PCI 2008) 
This sentiment has been expressed by both the Press Ombudsman and the PCI 
repeatedly. This level of consistency must be seen as a positive contribution to the 
complaints system.  
Interestingly, there was also one instance which showed the challenges that the Press 
Ombudsman faced (and press regulatory regimes in general) in applying the CoP 
consistently. In January 2009, the Press Ombudsman partially upheld a case taken by Ray 
O’Donoghue on behalf of his son over a report in the Irish Sunday Mirror which quoted 
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from a planning application that concerned the family. In his decision, the Press 
Ombudsman ruled that reporting information in a document of public record – in this 
case a planning filing – was not a breach of the complainant’s privacy once the document 
was quoted and referred to correctly, as was the case in this incident. In another case, 
taken by Dick Hogan in relation to a report in the Sunday World in February 2009, the 
Press Ombudsman again affirmed that the use of a public document – this time a record 
from the Companies Registration Office – was not a breach of privacy. He argued that 
what the complaint described “as his private affairs are in fact public affairs as 
documented in the Companies Registration Office”. 
In a similar case, in October 2013, the Press Ombudsman partially upheld a complaint 
taken by Dirk Folens in relation to a May 2013 report in the Irish Mail on Sunday which 
relied, in part, on a planning document filed by the complainant. In his ruling, the Press 
Ombudsman  
accepted that the graphic of the property was, if based upon public 
planning records, publicly available.  Principle 5.2 states that ‘... the 
right to privacy should not prevent publication of matters of public 
record ...’ However, the Press Ombudsman decided that   ‘should not’ 
allow for the possibility of exceptions, and that it therefore does not 
exclude the possibility that the inclusion of material that is publicly 
available may, in certain circumstances, be an unacceptable breach of 
the right to privacy. The Press Ombudsman decided, in the light of all 
the circumstances, that the inclusion of the graphic of the complainant’s 
home was not justified by the provisions of Principle 5.2 of the Code 
in relation to matters of public record or – as argued   by the publication, 
because it was in the public interest or was material that was publicly 
available - and  it was therefore a breach of the entitlement of readers 
to have news and comment presented with respect for their privacy and 
sensibilities as also expressed in Principle 5.2 (PCI 2013) 
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In the main, the CoP is a fair, accessible and straight-forward set of ethical principles. 
It is not an A-to-Z list on what newspaper journalists can and can’t do, but rather it offers 
a set of overarching principles that firmly roots Irish journalistic culture in the Anglo-
American tradition and also guides journalistic behaviour. The examples given here are 
just two instances of how the CoP was used during the period under review. Further study 
could expand on these points to provide a more in-depth analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the CoP that could inform any ongoing or future reviews of the ethical 
code. 
 
7.5: SRA 
As Chapter 4 established, 59 complaints (22 per cent of total formally adjudicated) were 
formally adjudicated by the PCI as having been instances where the member publication 
offered SRA to the complainant. The Press Ombudsman makes a decision that SRA has 
been offered in formal adjudication where he feels the member publication had already 
offered the complainant a sufficient response to correct the error during the pre-formal 
adjudication phase of the complaint. In these cases, the offer of remediation is turned 
down by the complainants who then decide to pursue a formal complaint. Where 
newspapers offer SRA, one can make the assumption that the member publication 
accepted that it had breached the code in some manner. However, when the complainant 
turns down the offer of remedial action (which can take many forms) and the Press 
Ombudsman rules that SRA was offered after formally adjudicating the complaint, the 
PCI and Press Ombudsman have no role in reviving the member publication’s offer to 
the complainant to correct the inaccuracy.  This was confirmed by the Press Ombudsman 
in his ruling of a complaint taken by Tom Quirke against the Irish Examiner in December 
2011. 
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When a newspaper’s offer of a clarification has been refused by the 
complainant, but has been considered satisfactory by the Press 
Ombudsman, a newspaper is not required to publish this clarification. 
However, the Press Ombudsman recommends that in this case the 
newspaper should nonetheless consider publishing its proffered 
clarification as a goodwill gesture, and in recognition of the delay 
involved in arriving at this conclusion (PCI 2012) 
Given that there is a clear case to be made that newspapers accept that they have 
breached the CoP in some way, failing to insist that newspapers carry out the remedy 
offered appears unfair to complainants who have taken formal complaints in a bid to 
ensure that their case is upheld. In addition, the Press Ombudsman has ruled that where 
SRA is offered, complainants should consider whether to take a formal complaint at all. 
Robert O’Farrell complained that the Irish Examiner had breached Principle 1 (truth and 
accuracy) of the PCI CoP in relation to a report of a legal action taken against the HSE 
as well as coverage of an inquest which involved his late father. The Press Ombudsman 
ruled that SRA had been offered by the newspaper when it offered a meeting with the 
editor and a clarification which was turned down by the complainant. This was upheld 
on appeal to the PCI.  
It should be emphasised that relatively uncomplicated complaints such 
as this one should require a decision by the Press Ombudsman only 
after all other reasonable options, including options that do not 
necessarily involve publication, have been fully explored. A decision 
not to engage in this process militates substantially against a 
satisfactory outcome (PCI 2008) 
The reason behind the complainant’s decision in this case to pursue a formal 
adjudication is unknown. Further research is required in this area to understand why 
complainants turn down offers of remedial action to pursue formal complaints. However, 
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one of the reasons in this case may well have been to ensure that the breach of the CoP 
was corrected with due prominence under the PCI’s publication guidelines. The Press 
Ombudsman’s ruling that his decision to pursue the case “militates substantially” against 
a satisfactory outcome for the complainant is surprising. Perhaps formalising the type of 
remedial action that newspapers can offer to bring it closer into line with the sanction in 
formally adjudicated complaints – i.e. the publication of the decision according to the 
publication guidelines - could provide an incentive to complainants to accept SRA offers. 
At present, there is no limit to the remedial offers that member publications can advocate, 
many of which may well be unpalatable to complainants. An incentive to publish a 
correction/apology with due prominence at the end of the informal complaint stage 
between the complainant and the member publication may result in the Press 
Ombudsman having to deal with fewer complaints of this nature and may also satisfy 
some complainants.  
 
 
7.6: The PCC and PCI 
Chapter 6 included comparing the work of the PCI to the PCC in the UK. Given the 
theoretical assumption of this study – that independent press regulation is a more robust 
system than self-regulation – one would expect to have found wide divergence in a 
number of categories. There were, however, both differences and similarities. 
First, in its first year, 1991, the PCC received some 1,520 complaints, while in 2008, 
some 4,698 complaints were lodged with it, an increase of over 200 per cent (Frost 2015). 
In comparison, as shown in Chapter 4, the complaints received by the Press Ombudsman 
and PCI remained relatively stable over the period under examination, with 372 
complaints lodged in 2008 compared to 350 in 2014, albeit over a much shorter time 
period. According to Frost (2015), the PCC consistently stated that the increase in annual 
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complaints was evidence of increasing awareness of the organisation. The Press 
Ombudsman (PCI 2011: 9) has been more circumspect, arguing that the reasons behind 
increases or decreases in complaints are difficult to pinpoint. 
Second, the PCC was heavily criticised for not admitting a large number of complaints 
for either informal or formal adjudication (Frost 2004). According to data compiled by 
Frost (2015), the PCC did not examine 78.5 per cent of the complaints it received for a 
variety of procedural issues. Given the well-publicised criticism of this, one would have 
expected independent press regulation to rule out fewer complaints. However, the data in 
Chapter 6 shows that 81.5 per cent of the complaints lodged with the PCI were neither 
informally or formally examined. Frost (2004: 113-114) concluded that the PCC was 
designed as a mechanism to reject the majority of complaints, in part due to the high 
numbers that are not admitted beyond a first reading. It is clear, however, that a press 
council requires structures to operate effectively. It must have limitations on what type 
of complaints it can investigate. Many of these rules, such as the ruling out of complaints 
from non-member publications, are pragmatic and help the PCI streamline its work. 
Nonetheless, the high number of complaints that are withdrawn, ruled out on a first 
reading and excluded over delay are issues that require further study. That study is likely 
to be limited by data protection issues which bar any examination of the complaint files 
of the PCI. One potential avenue to overcome this is for the PCI to begin publishing basic 
data about all complaints, and the reasons why the complaints did not meet the standards 
required. It is too early to say if the PCI mirrors the findings of Frost (2004) in relation 
to the PCC in this area, however, given the higher rate of complaints that do not make it 
to informal or formal adjudication via the PCI during the period studied, that perception 
could develop should this trend continue. 
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Third, in terms of the outcome of adjudicated complaints, in order to prove itself as a 
robust regulator one would expect to see a higher level of upheld complaints via the 
independent system of press regulation. The PCI upheld or partially upheld 107 
complaints during the period examined. This amounts to 4.1 per cent of the overall 
number of cases it received and 39.2 per cent of the complaints it formally adjudicated 
on. According to data produced by Frost (2015), 444 complaints were upheld by the PCC 
either fully or in part. This equates to less than 1 per cent of the overall complaints 
received by the PCC, but 51 per cent of the cases formally adjudicated. 
The Irish data shows that complainants to the PCI have a 4.1 per cent chance of having 
their complaint upheld, compared with 1 per cent at the PCC. This is a sign that 
independent regulation of the press via the Irish system has been more robust in terms of 
formal adjudications which are the only sanction that carry the full weight of the PCI’s 
enforcement powers. Such a finding is to be expected, however, given the independence 
and legislative underpinnings of the PCI. In isolation, a 4.1 per cent rate for upholding 
complaints from all complaints received is less persuasive. In addition, the PCI upholds 
fewer complaints that it formally adjudicated on when compared to the PCC. This finding 
is somewhat unexpected.  
Fourth, the data also suggests further differences with the PCC in terms of what 
happened with complaints once they were admitted for assessment. Indeed, one would 
expect that the PCI would informally conciliate cases less frequently than the PCC given 
Hallin and Mancini’s belief (2004: 223-224) that informality is a hallmark of professional 
self-regulation. Other authors have referred this as a self-regulatory press council’s 
standard position (Bertrand 2003: 122-125) and there has been regular criticism of the 
approach (Frost 2004, 2015). The data showed that the PCI did informally conciliate on 
fewer cases than the PCC, with some 5 per cent of complaints being resolved via informal 
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arbitration compared to 19.6 per cent of cases at the PCC. However, as Chapter 6 
established, the level of complaints in Ireland that are being concluded informally is on 
an upward trajectory year-on-year and given the lack of any transparent or overtly public 
outcome via this method, this trend should be analysed on an ongoing basis to ensure that 
formal adjudication remains the dominant method for assessing complaints.  
Fifth, one would have expected independent mechanisms of press regulation to 
formally adjudicate on more cases than self-regulatory bodies. The data also showed this 
to be the case, with the PCI formally adjudicating on 10.2 per cent of cases compared to 
the 1.9 per cent of cases examined by the PCC. 
 
 
7.7: Conclusion 
In this study the main data gathering concerned formal adjudications published by the 
Press Ombudsman and/or PCI between 2008 and 2014. In Chapter 5, a methodology was 
established for examining this data. It split accountability into two constituent parts based 
on theoretical contributions in the area. In the first, answerability, the framework 
highlighted the concepts of consistency and responsiveness. In the second, enforcement, 
sanction is central. In order to be a robust regulatory system, the PCI must exhibit strong 
standards in each field, i.e. complaint outcomes must show consistency and must be 
concluded speedily, and the sanction for upheld complaints must meet a standard of due 
prominence. In the following sections, the data in Chapter 6 will be discussed to examine 
if the PCI meets these standards. 
 
7.7.1: Answerability - Consistency 
Chapter 6 began with an analysis of a number of data points relevant to the first element 
of the methodological framework, consistency. It highlighted a range of areas, including 
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the outcome of complaints by each member publication, ownership and type. It also 
examined complaint outcomes per complainant background, gender and whether the 
complainant used legal representation in making the complaint. In addition, Chapter 6 
examined the outcome of appeals to the PCI from both member publications and 
complainants, and highlighted how the CoP has been cited by complainants and what 
parts of it are more successful than others in terms of getting an upheld complaint. 
When viewed in isolation, each of the above elements do not suggest any significant 
inconsistency in how the PCI and Press Ombudsman dealt with the cases in terms of 
favouring one side or the other. Chapter 6 (section 3) showed that there was a small 
difference between gender for upheld complaints (35 per cent for male, 41 per cent for 
female) and the outcome if complainants used legal representation (46 per cent success 
for those who did, 38 per cent for those who didn’t).  However, there were some data 
points that revealed wider statistical divergence.  
First, as Chapter 6.2 discussed, one newspaper, The Irish Times, has a lower negative 
adjudication rate when compared to many other national newspapers, despite having a 
similar number of formal adjudications during the period under study (Figure 7). Indeed, 
at 17 per cent, the newspaper was less than the overall average of 36.5 per cent of 
adjudicated cases that concluded in favour of the complainant. In addition, The Irish 
Times publisher has a lower rate of upheld decisions against it than the three other major 
newspaper publishing companies – DMG Media, INM and News UK - when all titles are 
collated into their respective groups. As the only broadsheet in the market other than the 
Sunday Business Post20, The Irish Times is largely responsible for the 16.8 per cent 
                                                 
20 The Sunday Independent is also published in broadsheet format, however, its content and ethos is very 
much in the mid-market tradition of its sister title the Irish Independent. For that reason, it is included in 
the mid-market category. 
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upheld rate for that genre of newspaper. This compares with 45.5 per cent for mid-market 
newspapers and just over 40 per cent for tabloid newspapers.  
Second, there were further specific areas that also showed statistical differences. 
Complaints involving well-known national politicians, business people, media 
personalities and celebrities concluded in the complainants’ favour at a rate of 50 per cent 
or higher compared to an average rate of 34 per cent of those who were coded in the 
unknown or private category, and an overall average of 39 per cent upheld in all 273 
cases examined. Moreover, complainants successfully appealed the decision of the Press 
Ombudsman in part in 4 per cent of appeals, compared with 16 per cent in part or in full 
for member publications. Again, however, viewed in isolation, this data cannot be pointed 
to make a strong conclusion about consistency. 
However, the data, when viewed collectively, could be suggestive of underlying 
trends in how the PCI deals with complaints. First, the finding that outcomes differ 
significantly depending on which type of newspaper is at the centre of the case is unusual. 
One would expect that member publications of the PCI, which sign up voluntarily to the 
system albeit with the attractiveness of new defences in defamation cases, would expect 
that their complaints are dealt with consistently by the regulatory body. This conclusion 
is not suggesting that the PCI does this. However, the data does suggest that broadsheet 
newspapers have a far better chance of arguing their case successfully than mid-market 
or tabloid newspapers. There may be several reasons for this situation. The brashness of 
mid-market and tabloid newspapers is likely to attract more complaints and may present 
more obvious breaches of the CoP. Broadsheet newspapers may also be more aware and 
attentive to codes of ethics given the traditional perception of that type of journalism 
compared to the history of ‘red top’ newspapers. Indeed, the Irish Times is published by 
the Irish Times Trust which publishes an internal code of ethics that the newspaper’s 
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journalists are obliged to follow. Given the failures of self-regulatory approaches that 
have been highlighted in this regard, in particular the reticence of some publishers to be 
part of the PCC system (see Chapter 6), the obvious divergence in terms of upheld 
complaints is surprising. Further research, which is outside of the scope of this study, 
could conduct an in-depth analysis on each of the complaints to gain a better 
understanding of why the broadsheet press has fewer upheld complaints in formal 
adjudication.  
In addition, the research found that there are differences among the main publishers 
in respect of upheld adjudications. The percentage of formally adjudicated complaints 
which resulted in an upheld decision against DMG Media titles was 45.7% and for INM 
titles it was 44.9 per cent in total. In comparison, the same figure at the Irish Times was 
17 per cent from 29 complaints. News UK (38.7 per cent) also recorded a higher upheld 
complaints rates than the Irish Times.  
At the hearings of the Leveson Inquiry (2011), witnesses from the Northern and Shell 
group of newspapers – which had left the PCC in 2011 - gave evidence that suggested 
the PCC “was run by and for the benefit of a particular section of the press” (2012: 1529). 
Richard Desmond, who owned the group, told the inquiry that the PCC had unfairly 
treated his newspapers, which are mainly tabloid publications. Leveson declined to say 
whether this suggestion was supported by evidence, but added that the suggestion of a 
lack of consistency in dealing with certain newspapers was important given that the 
Private Eye publication had also declined to be involved with the PCC. Its editor Ian 
Hislop also cited a perceived lack of fairness in how the PCC dealt with member 
publications. 
The majority of scholarship in this field assesses consistency as an inherent 
characteristic of a code of ethics and in respect of how particular principles are interpreted 
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by regulators (Pritchard 2000; Ugland and Breslin 2000). This type of analysis is outside 
the scope of this study as this research deals with outcomes of complaints rather than the 
standard by which complaints are assessed. Leveson (2009: 1686) recommended that his 
new system of press regulation be consistent in the way it handles complaints (but did 
not substantively set out what this meant) and referring to outcomes, Cohen-Almagor 
(2005: 456) believes journalists would feel “ill served” if found guilty of violating the 
code when another newspaper had been acquitted “after committing the same 
questionable deed”. “Furthermore, it is unjust to inconsistently penalise different papers 
for similar ethical misconduct…Diversity of interpretations is fine within boundaries. 
Each panel of judges should not decide inharmoniously without being aware of 
precedents.” Pritchard (2000: 102) found that one of the structural flaws of the self-
regulatory Quebec Press Council was that it decided on complaints in an inconsistent 
fashion. The author argued that such inconsistency was not random and “clearly 
suggested” that the press council “had undue sympathies for parties to which it had 
financial ties”. 
In addition, the independent nature of the PCI and the founding concept of the 
regulatory system – to give people a fair, free and speedy complaints handling system - 
one would expect that the PCI would represent the interests of ordinary citizens strongly. 
However, as the data on complainant background suggests, in addition to the wide 
divergence on outcomes when Press Ombudsman decisions were appealed, it appears that 
well-known individuals have a better chance of having their complaints upheld.   
The findings here are interesting. Further study is required in order to attempt to 
establish reasons for the differences. However, it is not possible to definitively conclude 
that the Press Ombudsman and PCI have dealt with cases in an inconsistent fashion on 
the basis of this data. The data is suggestive of emerging trends and similar research over 
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the coming years could add to this work and, in time, the outcomes may be used to further 
understand how the Irish system deals with complainants and member publications.  
 
7.7.2: Answerability - Responsiveness 
Many authors correctly argue press regulation and media accountability mechanisms 
should function in a speedy manner (Cohen-Almagor 2014; Henry 1989: 156-158; 
Leveson 2008: 1759; Robertson 1983: 2). However, there is extremely limited academic 
work that goes into specifics on how long a press council should take to deal with a 
complaint. Nevertheless, at its most basic, and considering the overarching theoretical 
framework of this study which starts from the position that independent regulation is 
tougher than self-regulation, one would expect to see the former deal with complaints in 
a speedier manner than the latter.  
Chapter 6 found varying results for the time taken to deal with the three different types 
of complaint outcomes - dismissed, upheld and SRA. When combined, it has been 
established that it took the regulatory system a median of 140.5 days, or just under 4.5 
months, to process complaints. Looking deeper into the statistics, the data showed it took 
the Press Ombudsman a median of 119.5 days, or just under four months, to dispose of 
complaints and, on average, it took the PCI a further 48 days to rule on appeals of these 
decisions, just over a month. As discussed in Chapter 6, there are internal divergences 
within these median and average figures which suggest that some complaints were dealt 
with in less than a month while others took almost a year. It is worth pointing out, of 
course, that the actual figure is likely to be somewhat shorter, given that the actual date 
the formal complaint was initiated is not available, as mentioned previously. 
Nevertheless, the data does provide a guide that demonstrates how long it takes the PCI 
to deal with complaints. 
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Chapter 6 also showed that over time, the time taken to adjudicate on complaints 
showed an upward trend during the period studied in all categories of complaints, except 
for SRA outcomes which decreased over time. The analysis showed in all instances, 
except for SRA, that in the first year of operation, 2008, the PCI and Press Ombudsman 
dealt with complaints speedier than in any other year of operation thereafter reaching a 
regular and consistent level with limited variations either up or down annually. 
As Chapter 4 discussed, there are no formal time limits included in the PCI’s 
structural documentation. There have been, however, a number of informal public 
comments on this topic, as Chapter 3 discussed. Before the PCI was operating, Frank 
Cullen of the National Newspapers of Ireland and a member of the PCI Steering 
Committee, said one of the three main principles of the office was speed. Elaborating 
further, he said this means the PCI would attempt to deal with cases “within one month 
or sooner”. “If possible, a complaint should be dealt with instantly, as speed is critical” 
(Dáil Eireann 2007). Later, in 2008, the Press Ombudsman tentatively referred to a six-
week timeframe for dealing with complaints but said the PCI was covering new ground 
in its first year of operation and was not yet sure how long it would take to deal with 
complaints. Going further still, the Press Ombudsman said there is a “succession of time 
limits”, including a “maximum period of three months” not inclusive of a two-week 
period where complainants must contact newspapers directly. This equates to 117 days. 
The Press Ombudsman appeared to be discussing decisions by his office alone rather than 
those which are also appealed. 
The most definitive statement of the time taken for the PCI to deal with complaints is 
included on its website: 
The time to process a complaint will vary. Complaints are usually 
resolved through conciliation within about four to six weeks.  If the 
complaint is referred to the Press Ombudsman for a decision, it may 
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take a further two weeks for him to make a decision.  If his decision is 
appealed, that will lengthen the process again. 
While it accepts that some complaints may take longer than others, the statement sets 
down a 1.5 month period for conciliation and a further half month for a Press Ombudsman 
ruling. Thus presenting a 2-month timeframe for a complaint to clear formal adjudication 
via the Press Ombudsman. As data on conciliated complaints is unavailable, there is no 
way to independently verify how long these cases take to be resolved. 
The data, as highlighted here shows that it has taken the Office of the Press 
Ombudsman 3.9 months to deal with complaints, almost double the 2-month time frame 
set out on the PCI’s website, a longer timeframe than the 3.5 months signalled as the 
“maximum” by the Press Ombudsman and significantly longer than one month maximum 
mentioned by Cullen. Interestingly, in the first year of operation, decisions by the Press 
Ombudsman took an average of 94 days, somewhat closer to each of these targets. 
However, in each of the years since, the Office of the Press Ombudsman has taken longer 
with the slowest rate of 141 days recorded in 2010. In addition, it took a median of 140.5 
days for all complaints – including those referred or appealed to the PCI – to be 
adjudicated on, with 2011 recording 150 days or 4.8 months, the highest found. Given 
Horgan’s referral to the first year being a trial period, one would have expected to see 
complaints being dealt with a lot slower in the first year and decreasing thereafter as 
complaint procedures were refined. However, the data shows the opposite occurred.  
In addition, one would have expected to see far quicker complaint handling by the 
independent system when compared to self-regulatory ones. However, the results are 
mixed. In Canada, Pritchard (2000:95) found the Quebec Press Council (QPC) was 
hindered by “chronic inability to decide cases quickly” with some cases taking six months 
for a variety of reasons. At an average of 4.5 months – with some cases having taken 
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almost a year to complete – the PCI is not significantly quicker than the failed QPC. It 
also appears slower than the now-closed PCC in the UK. Although Frost (2004) found 
that its claim to be a speedy complaint handling mechanism was unsupported by any 
evidence, the PCC claimed that it reached a conclusion “in most cases…within a month 
of the complaint first being lodged” (Leveson 2008: 242). Leveson concluded that the 
PCC was a system that “can be relatively quick” (2008: 1696) albeit referring to informal 
conciliation. The PCC’s successor, the Independent Press Standards Organisation is also 
regarded as press self-regulation and claims it tries to deal with complaints within 90 
days, or three months. “To help us do so, we require that both publications and 
complainants comply with reasonable deadlines for replying to us” (IPSO 2017). 
Irrespective of whether either of the UK examples achieve this speed, the existence of 
targets that are far quicker than the one set out by the PCI of 2 months is surprising. The 
average of 4.5 months recorded in the data for complaints to conclude suggests that the 
PCI is quicker than many other methods or arbitration and complaint handling, including 
the legal route. In this regard, the PCI’s claims to be a speedy system for dealing with 
complaints is upheld. However, the data also suggests that the PCI is outside many of its 
publicly stated goals for the time taken to dispose of complaints. In the next phase of the 
PCI’s operation it should focus on reducing the period of time for complaint adjudication. 
In addition, the date that the complaint is made should be made public in order to assess 
with accuracy how long it is taking for the complaint to go through all stages of the 
process, including the informal conciliation, formal adjudication and PCI appeal. . 
Of course, there may be many reasons behind the data gathered in terms of speediness. 
Macia-Barber (2014: 120-21) pointed out that work overload is a common complaint 
which reduces effectiveness “not least a reduction in speedy response to complaints”. 
Combine this with the annual drop in the level of funding for the PCI and it may well 
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limit the administrative abilities of the PCI. In addition, as Chapter 6 discussed, the PCI 
has no powers to compel member publications to produce evidence. In the effort to close 
a case, this could well slow the process. Indeed, it may well be that complainant 
prevarication could also be responsible for slowing progress on occasion. 
Nevertheless, the Press Ombudsman has managed to rule on complaints in very short 
timeframes. According to the data, the Press Ombudsman reached a formal adjudication 
on seven complaints during the period studied in two months or less. This suggests the 
office along with the PCI (which generally takes just over a month to rule on appeals) are 
capable at least of disposing of complaints quickly. However, the analysis shows these 
cases were the exception rather than the rule during the first six years of operation 
 
 
7.7.3: Enforcement 
The PCI’s single power of enforcement is the publication of its decisions upholding 
complaints in offending member publications. Indeed, most codes of conduct mention 
that clarifications, corrections and apologies ought to be published with due prominence 
(Harris 1992: 71-73). As Chapter 4 established, the PCI has a set of publication guidelines 
which newspapers must follow when publishing the decisions in order to ensure its 
standard of due prominence is met. Indeed, Principle 10.1 of the CoP affirms that member 
publications “shall publish the decision in relation to a complaint with due prominence”. 
However, despite the good record of newspapers when it comes to publishing decisions, 
there are a number of issues borne out by the data.  
First, Chapter 6 revealed widespread non-compliance with the publication guidelines. 
In total, 96 per cent of adjudications breached one or more of the criteria which all 
newspapers under the PCI system have voluntarily signed up to. A majority (58 per cent) 
breached two or more of the guidelines. The data showed that the most common breach 
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was a failure on behalf of newspapers to publish the decisions within 10 working days or 
“promptly” as the requirement later changed to. Indeed, the 2009 alteration is significant 
when viewed in this context. Chapter 6 showed that in on 76 occasions in a total of 92 
upheld cases newspapers did not meet the 10 working day limit. The decision to change 
the requirement to “promptly” was not highlighted by the PCI and nor has it been 
explained. However, it is clear that the leeway offered by such a subjective word as 
“promptly” is a softening of the guidelines and it is reasonable to conclude that one of 
the reasons for the change was the widespread problems newspapers may have been 
having with publishing adjudications within ten working days.   
While publishing an adjudication quickly is likely to be a key concern of any 
complainant, in and of itself it is not directly connected to the concept of due prominence 
in terms of the actual physical manifestation of a printed adjudication. The other criteria, 
which one could argue are central to the concept – days, page and treatment – also saw 
non-compliance. In 24 of 92 adjudications assessed, decisions were not published on the 
same day as the original article, in 25 cases decision were not published according to the 
provisions on the page of the newspaper and in 24 cases member publications committed 
breaches in that their treatment was outside the scope of what the PCI required, including 
many relatively minor breaches such using a logo the newspaper in the headline which is 
not published by the PCI. Thus, the data suggests that editors are failing to uphold the 
due prominence requirement set down by the PCI. 
Second, the PCI does not publicly display information on where, when and how its 
adjudications were published. From a transparency point of view, this is of particular 
concern especially given the findings of Chapter 6. Under principle 10.1, complainants 
can request that the Press Ombudsman and PCI examine the publication of a decision. 
Indeed, as Chapter 6 discussed, a case was upheld under the provisions. In this instance, 
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the newspaper published the adjudication a second time, but this time on a page further 
back thereby breaching another criterion. Indeed, there are at least two further instances 
of complaints taken against newspapers who failed to adhere to the instructions. The PCI 
refers to two informal complaints which were conciliated by it involving a failure to 
publish decisions correctly. In the first instance, involving the Teaching Council and the 
Irish Independent the PCI said “the complaint was resolved when the newspaper 
published a follow-up article from the complainants”. In the second, a complaint made 
by Gerry Adams TD against the Irish Independent’s treatment of the publication of a 
decision upholding an earlier complaint, the PCI said the complaint “was resolved when 
the newspaper published a statement apologising for the error”.  
The three cases referenced clearly indicate that the PCI had been made aware that on 
occasion member publications were not following the guidelines. However, there was no 
obvious public acknowledgment of this, and the very fact that two of the cases went 
through informal conciliation procedures and resulted in outcomes where the decision 
did not have to be published again suggest a reluctance to highlight, publicly, any 
problems in the due prominence field. This issue goes to the very heart of the PCI given 
that the publication of its decision is the only sanction available to it. As Chapter 6 found, 
there is widespread non-compliance with its own rules for publication, and, as has been 
alluded to here, there is no public highlighting or recognition of the fact.  
In addition, as Chapter 4 established, the Defamation Act 2009 sets down a minimum 
standard that the PCI must meet in order to be recognised under the act as the regulator 
of the press in Ireland. Section (9) of the Act requires that that corrections are given “due 
prominence” and says that a decision of the council “shall be published...as the directors 
of the Press Council direct and in such form and manner as they direct”. The data in 
Chapter 6 suggests that member publications are not following the publication guidelines 
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to meet due prominence which, in turn, could have implications for the legislative 
recognition under the Defamation Act.  
The question also arises, does the PCI have the powers to investigate breaches of 
Principle 10.1? As referenced earlier, where complaints are made under this principle, 
the PCI has investigated and made findings against newspapers in this regard, and has 
insisted that the decision is published again – albeit again breaching the publication 
guidelines. The PCI and Press Ombudsman’s role is rather limited, however, in that the 
concept of the regulatory regime is to be a complaints handling service. It has never 
started and conducted its own investigations, and does not appear to have the structures 
or power to. However, the Defamation Act does extend some leeway to the Press 
Ombudsman. It grants the office holder power to enforce his decisions by “such other 
action as the Press Ombudsman may, in the circumstances, deem appropriate”.  
The concept of due prominence has been an area of controversy in self-regulatory 
systems. Tim Toulmin, a former director of the PCC, said that “due prominence…could 
be a matter of interpretation” which often gave rise to further complaints due to the 
ambiguity (2012: 53). Leveson also noted the subtle distinction between “due” 
prominence and “equal” prominence, and pointed out that victims of privacy or other 
breaches did not agree with newspaper editors on what constituted due prominence 
(2012: 714). The PCC, Leveson correctly concluded, did not have powers to direct 
publication of its decisions in offending newspapers, rather it asked that decisions be 
published with “due prominence” (2012: 714), with no particular criteria upon which to 
base the publication of decisions. A number of those who gave evidence of having won 
complaints, said during the Inquiry’s hearings that the publication of decisions were not 
published with what they expected to be due prominence (ibid). Leveson also referred to 
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a specific example in his report. The article in question was published in The Sun and 
headlined “Boy, 12, turns into girl”. 
The article was held by the PCC to be inaccurate and a breach of the 
girl’s privacy. The original article had appeared on the front page of the 
newspaper, with a further full page on page 5. The adjudication was 
published on page 6, at the request of The Sun and agreed by the PCC, 
in a narrow column on the right of the page, adjacent to an eye catching 
article headlined “£1m Baby P Bungle”. That the adjudication was 
published further back in the newspaper than the article was directly 
contradictory to Mr Mohan’s (former editor of The Sun) written 
evidence, where he had written: “Corrections are never placed further 
back in the newspaper than the original article, except for those 
connected with page one stories where the correction is published on 
page two”. Nonetheless, Mr Mohan appeared to defend the prominence 
claiming that it was one of the longest adjudications ever published. 
That may be so, but if Mr Mohan was claiming the publication of this 
particular adjudication as an example of due prominence, that causes 
significant concern (2012: 714-715) 
During the hearings, James Murdoch, the former chief executive of News 
International, complained that The Guardian had not corrected around 40 errors in its 
reportage about the company he led with any sort of due prominence (2012: 715). In 
addition Christopher Meyer, a former PCC chairman, accepted that a lack of powers of 
direction hampered the publication of decisions with due prominence. He accepted that 
the issue had been a problem for the PCC as well as the wider newspaper industry (ibid). 
Leveson concluded:  
Parts of the press have, at times, sought to avoid corrections and 
apologies and have sought to minimise the prominence of those 
corrections and apologies. I agree with Sir Christopher Meyer that any 
new regulator must address this issue and must have the power to order 
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editors where, when, and how they should publish apologies, 
retractions, corrections and/or adjudications (2012: 716) 
Elsewhere the Australian Press Council, a self-regulatory system, interprets “due 
prominence” as requiring the publication to ensure the clarification is capable of 
“neutralising any damage arising from the original publication, and that any published 
adjudication is likely to be seen by those who saw the material on which the complaint 
was based” (Donovan et al 2012: 25). Donovan et al (2012) asked newspaper readers to 
adjudicate where a clarification should have been published in the case of an incorrect 
front page article in the Australian newspaper the West Australian. In this case, the 
newspaper published a decision of the Australian Press Council on the letters page on 
page 24 (Donovan et al. 2012: 26). A total of 89 per cent of respondents believed that the 
adjudication in the case did not meet due prominence requirements and that the 
publication of the decision should have been published on the front page (58 per cent) or 
one of the first three pages (31 per cent) (Donovan et al. 2012: 28). The authors concluded 
that decisions of the APC should be published on the same page that the offending 
material was published on, or at least in the same section (ibid: 29). An APC survey found 
that 54 per cent of complainants were unhappy with the publicity that their complaint 
received in the offending newspaper (ibid). According to the authors, the APC claimed 
to examine where its adjudications were published but there is no public record of this 
(ibid). Donovan et al. (2012: 31-32) concluded that newspapers need to be given stronger 
publication guidelines such as those issued by the PCI to ensure due prominence 
requirements are met. 
Newspaper readers (and complainants) are led to believe that print 
media organisations will willingly comply with the Australian Press 
Council’s adjudication requirements because, according to the Council, 
these organisations ‘are committed to self-regulation’. However, the 
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case of Adjudication 1468 suggests that The West Australian 
newspaper is not willing to print an adverse adjudication with due 
prominence. Furthermore, it appears that the Press Council is prepared 
to not just overlook but to endorse the paper’s non-compliance and in 
fact, act as an apologist for the newspaper by constructing post hoc 
justifications for the newspaper’s non-compliance (2012: 31) 
Donovan et al (2012) found that there is a significant lack of academic research on 
the effectiveness of enforcement powers for regulatory bodies, not just in the field of 
journalism. They quote a number of conceptual and theoretical studies of self-regulation 
(Heritier and Eckert 2007; Hemphill 2003; Porter and Ronit 2006; Ashby et al. 2004) but 
point out that there are “few empirical analyses of effectiveness”. The analyses conducted 
here of the enforcement of the PCI’s publication guidelines has been undertaken for this 
reason and in light of the fact that the PCI publishes a clear set of guidelines for decision 
publication – whether it goes far enough or not – provides a sound base for such an 
examination, as was conducted in Chapter 6. 
To reach a conclusion about the content of the PCI’s publication guidelines is beyond 
the scope of this study. In any case, the subjective nature of “due prominence” would 
make any such analysis meaningless. Nevertheless, Donovan et al (2012: 25) said the 
PCI’s guidelines represented an “elaboration of what the Australian Press Council’s 
‘likely to be seen’ requirement would mean in practice”. The authors went further to 
suggest that the Irish instructions “are consistent with common sense and with our 
newspaper readers’ interpretations of ‘due prominence’” (2012: 30). In this study, the 
PCI’s publication guidelines were used as a framework for examining how its decisions 
were published in member publications. Given the failure to enforce standards of due 
prominence and to highlight these failures, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the PCI 
would have used its power of direction in relation to adjudications and would have 
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highlighted when and where these provisions were not being met on the basis of it being 
a stronger regulator than self-regulatory solutions.  
In a draft “criteria for a regulatory solution”, Leveson (2012: 29) argued that 
compliance with the regulatory mechanism “must be the responsibility of editors and 
transparent and demonstrable to the public”. Of the 107 upheld or partially upheld cases, 
almost all resulted in a publication of the decision of the Press Ombudsman and/or the 
PCI in one form or another. Thus, on the face of it, it would appear that member 
publications and their editors comply with the sanction power of the PCI and are ensuring 
transparent treatment of complaints. The failure to publish a decision was mainly down 
to the newspaper in question going out of business. The almost complete adherence to 
the requirement that decisions be published – no matter how negative – is a welcome 
sign. There is no reliable information on the number of adjudications not published by 
newspapers in Britain following on from PCC decision. However, independent regulation 
has secured the buy-in of newspaper in this regard. Nevertheless, the widespread non-
compliance with the publication guidelines is more problematic. If the guidelines are the 
standard against which due prominence is to be assessed, it cannot be said that 
complainants are securing this standard and, in turn, that suggests that from an 
accountability point of view the PCI’s sole sanction power is lacking. Although there is 
no research on the topic, the PCC did claim that 84 per cent of corrections and 
clarifications appeared on the same page or further forward or in a dedicated corrections 
column” (Donovan et al 2012: 30). When compared to the findings of this research, the 
Irish system has some way to go to ensure that complainants secure fair outcomes that 
are already offered to them by the PCI. 
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7.8: Concluding remarks 
The concept of the PCI is an admirable one. The board of the PCI does, and always has, 
featured more lay members than members from the media. The perception of 
independence is important for the success of any regulatory as it encourages complainants 
to have confidence in the complaints-handling process. The PCI certainly meets this 
criterion, and it deals with complaints in a relative speedy fashion of just over 40 days on 
average.  
This research has also established that the Press Ombudsman has got through a 
significant body of work in the years studied. Setting up, running and maintaining a 
system of press regulation is a difficult task. During this time, it has received virtually no 
significant criticisms from any of the main stakeholders. The Press Ombudsman has not 
missed opportunities to criticise and censure the press when it breached the CoP and 
sometimes when it hadn’t. 
The analysis of the years studied show that the Press Ombudsman dealt with formally 
adjudicated complaints in a clear manner by unfailingly using the CoP as a guide, which 
has allowed the Irish system to establish a clear working rationale. That rationale is 
obvious to both member publications and complainants given the publication of decisions 
and their justifications. This work can be counted as one of the major successes of Irish 
press regulation in the first six years and it is a significant contribution to the concept of 
press regulation globally given the deficiencies that self-regulatory systems have 
exhibited. 
It is also worth highlighting that the limitations and narrow focus of this study 
precluded an examination of many other aspects of the PCI’s work. There are a range of 
areas where the PCI engages that should be highlighted. For example, the PCI engages 
with regular outreach with the media and the public, as well as student journalists. Such 
work is invaluable for spreading awareness of the office. The Press Ombudsman has also 
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issued alerts to member publications when contacted by people concerned about ongoing 
press coverage that is particularly controversial. This channel of communications is an 
important one as it may not only protect peoples’ privacy at times of intense media 
coverage but it may also guide newspapers in the best and most ethical course of action. 
How often such alerts are issued and their true impact is unknown but it is an important 
part of the PCI’s work nonetheless, and could be a potentially fruitful avenue for further 
research.  
Although outside of the scope of this research, the PCI’s CoP is a practical and 
realistic charter of journalistic ethics. Many codes are aspirational and display a level of 
nativity that throws up fissures between journalistic practice and theory. However, the 
PCI’s CoP avoids this. Over ten clauses and the preamble, it is an entirely sensible guide 
for journalists that is straight forward and useful. It does not set out an A to Z of rules not 
to be broken, but takes a more nuanced and accessible approach to ethical decision 
making and conduct.  
It is worth stating that the sanction of the PCI – the publication of its decision in 
member publications - is something that newspaper editors are keen to avoid. In the UK, 
the Daily Mail  editor Paul Dacre said the notion that newspaper editors view the 
publication of a decision of the PCC as a “slap on the wrist” was a myth (cited in Frost 
2012: 24). “They are genuine sanctions. I, and other editors, regard being obliged to 
publish an adjudication as a real act of shame” (ibid). Including a substantial decision of 
the Press Ombudsman in an edition is embarrassing for PCI member newspapers and can 
lead to coverage by other newspapers of the decision. It undermines the credibility of the 
journalism in that member publication and could ultimately hurt newspapers by turning 
readers off due to the ethical breaches disclosed and censured by the PCI. 
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The PCI has achieved almost complete buy-in from the print media in Ireland. As 
previous chapters have established, there is widespread support from policy makers, 
academics and the media for its work. This research has established that there is 
compliance with the PCI during the complaint process by member publications almost 
all of whom have published the decisions – sometime extremely negative – of the Press 
Ombudsman and the PCI. In addition, as the PCI has noted, it appears that newspapers 
have improved their own internal mechanisms of accountability and complaint-handling 
in response to the setting up of the PCI. However, as Chapter 6 showed, there are also 
some areas that will require further work to improve as the PCI enters its next phase of 
work. 
First, some of the findings of this research suggest that the PCI suffers from some of 
the same issues that led to criticism of self-regulation.  Frost (2004) concluded that the 
PCC was effectively used more for the ruling out of complaints against the UK press than 
for actually dealing with grievances, given the structures that were in place and the 
difficulty that complainants had reaching formal adjudications.   
In the case of the PCI, at the outset of a complaint, complainants must deal with 
newspapers directly. There is no data to reflect how newspapers react to complainants or 
how these cases are resolved beyond a limited publication of the complaint on the PCI’s 
website. As Chapter 6 showed (see Table 28), some 81.5% of complaints from a total of 
2,687 lodged during the years studied were neither informally or formally concluded by 
the PCI. There were some entirely legitimate reasons for some of these complaints not 
meeting the standard required, including that complaints were about non-member 
publications or outside the remit of the PCI. However, other categories, such as 
complaints that were not made within the three-month time limit, those that were 
withdrawn and those ruled out on a first reader, require further research. The comparable 
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percentage of complaints that did not pass to informal or formal reading at the PCC was 
78.5 per cent. Given the well-publicised failures of self-regulation that were widespread 
during the years that press regulation in Ireland was being debated and set up, and the 
eventually institutionalisation of independent regulation – a so-called third way – the high 
level of complaints that do not progress to the latter stages of PCI assessment was 
surprising.  
At the next stage, complainants must enter a process of conciliation where the 
outcome, as Chapter 6 established, is uncertain from a public accountability point of 
view. Again, how this process works in practice is not disclosed, and there is limited data 
to study if any sort of answerability, responsiveness and enforcement is achieved. While 
the PCI resolved fewer cases informally than the PCC, more and more complaints are 
being examined and concluded in this manner. Given the lack of data on how these cases 
are dealt with,  how the outcomes work in practice and the decision not to record these 
cases as breaches of the CoP, it will be interesting to monitor the progression of this 
strand of complaint handling. 
At the final stage of the process, once the complaint enters formal adjudication, this 
research also suggests a mixed picture in terms of the three elements of accountability. 
First, from a consistency point of view, the research has shown that complaint outcomes 
vary between newspaper groups and types. For complainants, there are also variations in 
outcomes depending on whether the complainant is well-known or not. These findings 
were not enough to suggest that the PCI deals with complaints inconsistently. Indeed, the 
research has shown that the Press Ombudsman and PCI generally interpret the CoP in a 
fair and consistent manner. Nonetheless, the findings are suggestive of underlying 
dynamics that do need further explanation. 
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Second, the responsiveness element of accountability also threw up mixed results. 
The vast majority of member publications did engage with the Press Ombudsman and 
PCI over the years studied. Where, on occasion, they did not, the system was quick to 
point that out and criticise the newspapers for it. The key element of responsiveness was, 
however, the time taken to decide on complaints. Here, the Irish system took around four-
and-a-half month to deal with complaints. In isolation, such a time frame is commendable 
given the slowness of many other forms of arbitration, both non-legal and legal. However, 
when compared to the PCI’s suggestions of how long it should take for it to deal with 
complaints, it shows that over the first six years of operation the PCI has struggled with 
such targets. Although the PCI does not have power to compel evidence from member 
publications, it is clear that it did not suffer from the same “chronic inability” to decide 
cases quickly that Pritchard (2000: 95-103) found the Canadian self-regulatory system 
suffered from. 
At the final stage of the formal process and post-adjudication there was, yet again, a 
mixed outcome. As the research has shown, complaints concluded in one of three ways. 
First were those deemed SRA. A total of 59 of the 273 cases of formal adjudications 
published on the PCI’s website, or just over 21.5%, ended with this declaration. Although 
member publications effectively accepted in these complaints that there was some error 
on its part, which varied in severity, the complainant had no chance of securing any 
rectification for the wrong committed. The offer of remedial action that had been refused 
by the complainant does not have to be followed up on by the member publication once 
the Press Ombudsman or PCI deemed the case SRA and the categorisation of the case as 
such also does not necessitate the publication of the decision. In addition, these 
complaints are not recorded as breaches of the CoP. From the point of view of the 
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sanction element of accountability, it is difficult to conclude that SRA cases meet the 
standard required. 
Second, a total of 107 formally adjudicated complaints, or 39%, were not upheld. In 
isolation, no conclusions can be drawn about the figure in this category. Indeed, as this 
research has found, the Press Ombudsman and PCI use the CoP to adjudicate on 
complaints in a consistent fashion. Further research could look into complaint treatment 
in a more systematic fashion and produce more findings in this regard. Nonetheless, when 
combined with the SRA category, the research shows that 166 complainants failed to 
secure any accountability via the PCI’s formal system. This represents just over 60% of 
formally adjudicated complaints and is surprising when compared to the just under 54% 
of complainants that did not have their cases upheld in the formal process operated in the 
UK by the self-regulatory PCC. 
Third, of the formally adjudicated complaints, some 107, or just over 39%, were either 
upheld in full or in part. The compares to a figure of 46% at the PCC. Again, the research 
on this category of complaints shows that there was a mixed picture. As stated, almost all 
decisions upholding complaints were published in member publications which showed 
strong support and acquiescence to the work of the PCI among newspaper editors. This 
is particularly striking when one considers the problems with compliance that self-
regulatory press councils in other North Atlantic Liberal countries have had in terms of 
ensuring decisions are published. However, a deeper look in this area has shown that 
there is widespread non-compliance with the PCI by member publications when it comes 
to publishing the decisions in the manner directed by the publication guidelines. The 
research has shown that complainants are struggling to secure due prominence – as 
mandated by the publication guidelines – even when their complaints are upheld. 
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The theoretical framework established in Chapter 5 held that in order to be a robust 
regulatory regime the PCI must exhibit consistency, responsiveness and meet its own 
standard of enforcement via its only sanction. On all three counts, there are arguments 
both for and against that can be made based on the data that this research has examined. 
Perhaps that is to be expected given that this research analysed the work of the PCI in its 
first six years in operation, a relatively short time frame. Indeed, the challenge of these 
early years was to “embed the new system, refine its procedures and, above all, building 
understanding of its mission”, as the first PCI Chairman said (Mitchell 2015: 121). There 
is a case to be made that the PCI has done well in these areas. However, this research also 
suggests that further work is needed to embed the system, particularly given the worrying 
findings in respect of publication of decisions. The research also suggests that further 
work refining the procedures of the PCI is required, including ensuring speedier outcomes 
as well as establishing more transparent complaint handling and outcomes. 
However, the more concerning findings of this study are issues that not only lie with 
the PCI, but must also be the responsibility of the press industry which, as Chapter 4 
showed, exerts a strong influence over the PCI’s work. On both responsiveness and 
enforcement the press industry has a key role to play. Part of the delays in dealing with 
complainants could well be due to inaction or obfuscation by member publications. 
Indeed there are complaints where the Press Ombudsman has highlighted the role played 
by member publications in this regard. In terms of enforcement, the PCI is clearly 
struggling to ensure that its decision are published according to its publication guidelines, 
but member publications are also utterly failing to follow the guidelines that they have 
voluntarily signed up to print adjudications with due prominence. The guidelines are not 
onerous and appear eminently fair, however, the almost total disregard for one or several 
elements of the guidelines – in addition to the lack of any substantive highlighting of the 
271 
 
matter – strikes at the very heart of independent press regulation. It ultimately undermines 
the system and could lead to the perception that both industry and the regulator are 
complicit in ensuring that complainants are not receiving fair and proper treatment. 
This study has contributed to the understanding of press regulation in the North 
Atlantic Liberal model press system identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004). By focusing 
on the Irish case, this study has found that a so-called third way of independent and 
institutionalised press regulation exhibits many strengths when compared to self-
regulatory systems. However, this study has also highlighted that the Irish system exhibits 
many of the weaknesses that have been present in self-regulatory solutions. Overall, this 
study found a mixed picture on all three elements of accountability. In addition, it has 
also shown that there were problems with the publication of decisions, which in turn 
suggests that full accountability was denied to complainants when their cases were 
upheld. In the course of this research a number of other important areas requiring 
examination emerged. 
First, as Donovan et al (2012) have noted there is very little study in the field of 
assessing how press councils enforce the sanction power they hold. Much of the existing 
research examines overview complaint data and structural make-up, however, this 
information is limited. Reaching conclusions on such limited data is problematic as such 
information gives a picture of how press regulation may be working without qualitatively 
or quantitatively assessing specific actions such as complaint adjudication and 
enforcement of sanctions. If researchers expanded to study enforcement standards and 
methods a far better picture would emerge of how press regulation operates. It would also 
produce a far better idea of the interplay between the media and the regulator to combat 
the stock response of editors that they ‘fear’ or ‘loathe’ publishing adjudications. Such 
analysis should be conducted of all self-regulatory regimes, including the PCC, as it 
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would provide a far more complete picture than we currently have. While few self-
regulatory regimes have prescriptive guidelines for publication of decisions, the PCI’s 
ones would provide at least a basic starting point for examining if standards of due 
prominence are being met. 
Second, there is a dearth of study that examines the complainant experience with press 
regulatory organisations. Barker and Evans (2007) surveyed the attitudes of those who 
had dealt with press self-regulation in New Zealand. The findings, albeit limited, 
produced a mixed picture that nevertheless suggested widespread unhappiness with how 
complaints had been handled. Similar research here is required to shed light on the 
complaint process and understand whether complainants believe standards of 
answerability and enforcement are being met. Indeed, it would be important to study the 
responses of complainants whose complaints were upheld in order to understand their 
opinions about the publication of PCI decisions, whether they are aware of the breaches 
of the PCI publication guidelines and if they believed the decision was published with 
due prominence. Such data would add to the findings available in this research by 
illustrating in a quantitative and qualitative manner the complaint-handling process. 
Third, the work of the PCI during the period under examination also requires further 
study. The informal conciliation techniques needs to be examined. This method of 
complaint handling is promoted by the PCI and has been promoted by other failed 
regulatory regimes. However, in order to assess whether it is a credible and fair 
mechanism, a full assessment of responsiveness, consistency and enforcement must be 
undertaken. This, however, is difficult as the PCI carries out this process with 
confidentially guaranteed to both parties. Further study is also needed of the complaints 
that are ruled out by the PCI. Again confidentiality issues barred an examination for this 
study. Given the vast majority of complaints do not even reach informal handling, it is 
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imperative that these complaints are examined independently to ascertain if the bar is 
being set too high for complainants. Given that the proceedings of the PCI were also 
unavailable to this researcher, a full study of all of the PCI meetings by studying the 
minutes as well as the voting patterns of members would be invaluable to illustrate how 
an independent press council operates and what the independent majority means in 
practice. 
Fourth, the lack of available information, referenced above, is a concern. 
Transparency is a cornerstone of successful regulation, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, much of the work of the PCI is conducted in a manner that is not accessible. 
At every stage of the complaint process, except the formal adjudications of the Press 
Ombudsman and some PCI rulings, there is a dearth of publicly available information. 
Within a month of starting its work, John Horgan, an independent member of the PCI 
board, expressed these concerns about the new system of regulation. Horgan criticised 
“excessive confidentiality” and argued the limitations the PCI imposed on making its 
business public came “close to collusion in withholding information from the public”. 
Transparency is a theme that runs throughout much of the engagement with the PCI. 
Simply put, more transparency is required in order to fully understand how the PCI 
operates, what is strengths and weaknesses are and how it can improve.  
A first and basic step to improving transparency standards would be collating all 
published decisions on the PCI’s website. In order to assess whether newspapers were 
following the publication guidelines, it was necessary to search through each publication 
for the published adjudication in the absence of information highlighting what date the 
decision was published, on what page and in what format. The PCI holds some of this 
data and did supply some of it for this research. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
this information should be published on the PCI website in order to make it more 
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accessible. For example, a pdf version of the page of the newspaper could be attached to 
the published decision on the PCI’s website. This could be accompanied by a note 
identifying all of the information about the offending article and the adjudication in order 
for a quick and transparent highlighting of whether the newspaper met the due 
prominence standards. 
Fifth, the importance of Principle 10.1 of the PCI CoP must be underlined. It says that 
“when requested or required by the Press Ombudsman and/or the Press Council to do so, 
the press shall publish the decision in relation to a complaint with due prominence”. 
During the period studied, there were just 2 formal complaints under the principle, despite 
the almost complete non-compliance with the due prominence guidelines that the PCI 
asks all member publications to follow. First, the publication of the published decision 
on the PCI website in the above fashion would empower complainants to file a complaint 
under principle 10.1 thus highlighting that the decision was not in compliance with 
publication guidelines and ensuring the adjudication met the due prominence standards 
required. Second, it is clear that the Press Ombudsman must be empowered to identify 
these breaches independently of a complainant and force the newspaper to adhere to the 
CoP. Leveson identified a failure to launch investigations into breaches of its code as one 
of the key weaknesses of the PCC (2012: 1548). Given the clear widespread non-
compliance of the Irish press, a failure to do the same – solely under principle 10.1 – must 
be regarded in the same manner. 
The findings in this study suggest that a widespread review of the PCI is needed. That 
review should address a number of areas. It is clear that there are significant problems 
with the publication of decisions. As Chapter 6 established, the PCC and PCI had the 
same sanction power, namely the publication of decision with due prominence. There is 
a body of opinion that favours the option of fines. It is likely, however, that there would 
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be strong opposition in the Irish print media, in particular given the financial difficulties 
that many publishers still face, in relation to fines. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the 
PCI’s sanction power to include fines could be considered, perhaps solely as an option 
should upheld decisions not be published correctly. As this research has shown, the 
requirements of the existing sanction power  were not adhered to and went uncorrected 
and unchallenged. Thus the media has shown that it is unwilling to comply with Irish 
press regulation and other avenues of enforcement must be examined. 
Related to this is the PCI’s funding, which this chapter discussed and which has 
declined every year since 2008. It is not clear if the PCI is given adequate funding to 
carry out its function. Nevertheless, the time taken to address complaints suggests that 
the PCI may need further staff. While the PCI has repeatedly praised the newspaper 
industry for its perceived financial commitment to the regulator, more funding would 
allow it to speed up complaint-handling and devote more resource to tackle non-
compliance and transparency improvements discussed. 
The conclusions of this study suggest a mixed attitude in terms of the newspaper 
industry’s commitment to independent press regulation in Ireland. On the one hand, 
member publications are engaging with and publishing the decisions of the Press 
Ombudsman and PCI. On the other hand, however, there is severe non-adherence to due 
prominence provisions. The system requires significant buy-in from newspapers in order 
to operate effectively, and has partly met this standard. However, given the powers of the 
PCI are limited to the publication of its decisions, the undermining of this sanction by 
member publications is an area that requires attention as the PCI enters the next phase of 
operation. As has been discussed, self-regulation has failed as a form of press regulation 
because media control has infected structures to such an extent to render any efforts at 
accountability devoid of any true impact thus subjugating the interests of the media over 
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the public. While Irish press regulation is some way from this particular precipice, further 
work is required to ensure the PCI can offer complainants the standard of accountability 
that has been referenced in this study. Member publication have a leading role, if not the 
lead role, in reviewing the current system and strengthening it. 
However, the track record of the newspaper industry is far from exemplary in this 
regard with almost all press regulation being a reactive rather than proactive solution that 
derives from state or other threats to impose regulation on newspapers. Can the print 
media be trusted to insist on change? Member publications may not be needed to do this, 
however, as the Department of Justice has started a review of the Defamation Act 2009. 
Under the review, the Minister for Justice held a public consultation requesting 
submissions in relation to “the experience regarding the operation of the Press Council 
(recognised under section 44 of the Act) and Press Ombudsman”. The review can be the 
first step to addressing the weaknesses in the system. Indeed, the Minister for Justice 
could ascertain whether in light of these weaknesses the PCI still meets the standards 
required to be recognised under the act. 
This research has shown that the PCI exhibits a number of strengths and weaknesses. 
In addition, its structures and operation contrasted with the work of self-regulatory 
systems, but also exhibited similarities on many fronts. This study set out to examine if 
independent press regulation is a robust system for regulating the press, and whether it 
ensures greater accountability than self-regulatory approaches. While there are many 
laudable features that suggest a strong start for independent press regulation in the Liberal 
North Atlantic system, further work is required to ensure complainants have access to 
true accountability mechanisms. Independent press regulation must also remain cognisant 
of the failures that have led to what Leveson referred to as the “twin failure” of both the 
regulatory system and the industry in respect of the PCC. That failure, he argued,  
277 
 
is itself evidence that there has been no real appetite for an effective 
and adequate system of regulation from within the industry, in spite of 
a professed openness to reform and self-criticism. It is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that the self-regulatory system was run for the benefit of 
the press not of the public (2012) 
Irish press regulation is still in its infancy, however, this study has found no 
conclusive evidence that it is being run for the benefit of the press industry. Nonetheless, 
as the PCI enters a new phase of operations, it must look at some of the weaknesses – 
especially the non-compliance with its publication guidelines – to ensure that when a 
fuller assessments of its work can be undertaken, that it is not included in the same 
category as the PCC and is run in a fair, consistent and transparent manner that ensures 
adequate redress for newspaper readers when their complaints are upheld. 
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